Bright v. Kuehl, 66A03-9407-CV-00255

• Decision Date: 27 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 66A03-9407-CV-00255,66A03-9407-CV-00255
• Citation: 650 N.E.2d 311
• Parties: Catherine L. (Carpenter) BRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, v. Ronald E. KUEHL, Jr., Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 311

650 N.E.2d 311

Catherine L. (Carpenter) BRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, v. Ronald E. KUEHL, Jr., Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 66A03-9407-CV-00255.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 27, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1995.

Patrick J. Roberts, Peru, for appellant.

Byron L. Tinkey, Rochester, for appellee.

OPINION

STATON, Judge.

Catherine L. (Carpenter) Bright ("Bright") appeals from the trial court's judgment of damages against her and in favor of Ronald E. Kuehl, Jr. ("Kuehl"). In her appeal, Bright raises four issues for our review which we consolidate into two and restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Kuehl was entitled to equitable relief arising out of his cohabitation with Bright.

II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Kuehl punitive damages.

We reverse and remand.

Bright and Kuehl met in April 1990 and soon thereafter became engaged. In August 1990, Bright moved into Kuehl's residence and the couple lived together until April 1991. During this eight month period, Bright did secretarial work through a temporary employment agency. Kuehl worked as an engineering technician until he was laid off in February 1991. After being laid off, Kuehl collected $95.00 per week in unemployment and did occasional construction work and substitute teaching. After Kuehl was laid off, Bright worked a second job as a waitress.

During their cohabitation, all bills were paid and all checks were drawn from Kuehl's checking account. Bright deposited her paychecks into Kuehl's account. Kuehl balanced the checkbook monthly. Bright signed checks drawn on the account and used credit cards held in Kuehl's name. With these checks, Bright bought household items and clothing, and paid credit card bills. The parties also traded in Bright's vehicle and acquired a 1990 Grand Prix which was titled in both their names.

Throughout their cohabitation, Bright and Kuehl had a tumultuous relationship which culminated in a mutual protective order in which both parties were restrained from abusing and threatening each other. As a result, the couple separated and Bright could not enter Kuehl's residence to retrieve any of her belongings. Bright did subsequently return with a police officer and obtained two boxes of clothing. Kuehl retained all of the household items acquired by either party during the cohabitation including the Grand Prix which he continues to make payments.

Kuehl then filed suit against Bright seeking damages arising from Bright's alleged unauthorized use and control of his credit cards and checkbook, Bright's destruction of his personal property, medical expenses incurred as a result of Bright's physical attacks, and Bright's excessive use of the phone. Kuehl sought $14,000 in compensatory damages plus treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Bright counterclaimed seeking compensatory and punitive damages based upon Kuehl's unjust enrichment as a result of his retention of the personal property, and for pain and suffering resulting from Kuehl's abusive conduct.

Following a bench trial, the court awarded a judgment in favor of Kuehl of $28,270.39 consisting of $8,270.39 compensatory damages and $20,000 punitive damages. ¹ The court awarded Bright $5,759 in damages on her counterclaim. ² Thus, the net judgment in favor of Kuehl was $22,511.39.

As a basis for the judgment, the trial court found:

[N]otwithstanding the lack of express contract between Ronald and Cathy, a contract can be implied from this relationship generally and also her tipped measure of control, financially, psychologically, and physically over Ronald, with consequence, and therefrom his entitlement to something in return. On the financial side, for example, her expenditures to her benefit far outweighed her contribution, to his detriment. Unjust enrichment and equitable considerations seem to flow naturally and logically therefrom in Ronald's favor, also rendering some entitlement to Cathy.

Record, p. 26.

Bright now appeals the judgment.

We note initially that a general judgment will be affirmed upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence, and the court of review neither reweighs the evidence nor rejudges the credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. Jones (1994), Ind.App., 641 N.E.2d 98, 101. When reviewing a general judgment, we presume that the trial court correctly followed the law. Id. The presumption that the trial court correctly followed the law is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration of a case on appeal. Id.

I. Damages Arising Out of Cohabitation

Bright contends that the trial court's decision is contrary to law because there is no cause of action in Indiana which allows for recovery of funds expended during a cohabitation arrangement in contemplation of marriage absent fraud, deceit or a contract. ³

This case presents an issue of first impression in Indiana: whether a party is entitled to relief based upon contributions during cohabitation without subsequent marriage absent an express agreement.

Our analysis begins with Glasgo v. Glasgo (1980), Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1325, trans. denied. There, a former wife sued her former husband for one-half of the assets accumulated during their period of cohabitation after their divorce. The trial court awarded the former wife a share of the property acquired by the parties during their cohabitation. On appeal, the former husband argued that the cause of action presented an unenforceable claim in Indiana. He contended that claims by nonmarried cohabitants were against public policy in Indiana because common law marriages were prohibited by statute. ⁴ Id. at 1327.

In affirming the trial court's decision, this court addressed the propriety of an equitable claim for relief in instances where couples live together without marrying. The court expressly stated that granting the petitioner relief was not against the public policy of this state and did not in any way impinge upon the legislature's prohibition of common law marriages. Id. The court concluded:

To apply the traditional rationale denying recovery to one party in cases where contracts are held to be void simply because illegal sexual relations are posited as consideration for the bargain is unfair, unjust, and unduly harsh. Such unnecessary results probably do more to discredit the legal system in the eyes of the those who learn of the facts of the case than to strengthen the institution of marriage or the moral fiber of our society. To deny recovery to one party in such a relationship is in essence to unjustly enrich the other. ⁵

Id.

However, the Glasgo court noted that cohabitation does not automatically give rise to the presumed intention of shared property rights between the parties and "[r]ecovery for parties seeking relief would be based only upon legally viable contractual and/or equitable grounds which the parties could establish according to their own particular circumstances." Id. at 1331-1332.

In Chestnut v. Chestnut (1986), Ind.App., 499 N.E.2d 783, this court approved the rationale in Glasgo in affirming the trial court's decision to include the wife's contributions during premarital cohabitation in the distribution of marital property upon dissolution. The court noted that it would be against public policy to ignore the wife's contributions during the period prior to marriage since she and her partner eventually married. Id. at 787.

Other jurisdictions have similarly adopted this right to relief and have held that unmarried couples may raise equitable claims such an implied contract and unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired through the efforts of both. See e.g., the landmark decision of Marvin v. Marvin (1976), 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976) and also; Boland v. Catalano (1987), 202 Conn. 333, 521 A.2d 142; Mason v. Rostad (1984), D.C.App., 476 A.2d 662; Estate of Eriksen (1983), Mn., 337 N.W.2d 671; Hay v. Hay (1984), 100 Nev. 196, 678 P.2d 672; Collins v. Davis (1984), 68 N.C.App. 588, 315 S.E.2d 759, aff'd by 312 N.C. 324, 321 S.E.2d 892; Knauer v. Knauer (1983), 323 Pa.Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553; Watts v. Watts (1987), 137 Wis.2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303, review denied.

As such, we determine that a party who cohabitates with another without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express contract or a viable equitable theory such as an implied contract or unjust enrichment.

Thus, we must now examine whether the trial court properly awarded Kuehl relief based upon an implied contract and unjust enrichment, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment. ⁶

Our test for sufficiency of the evidence requires that we neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility. We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Martin v. Roberts (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 896.

The trial court based its decision upon the notion of implied contract, unjust enrichment, and equitable considerations. The trial court determined a contract can be implied from the relationship based upon Bright's control over Kuehl and the fact that her expenditures for her own benefit outweighed her contribution, and thus entitled Kuehl to relief.

To recover under the theory of implied contract, the plaintiff is usually required to establish that the defendant impliedly or expressly requested the benefits conferred. Biggerstaff v. Vanderburgh Humane Society, Inc. (1983), Ind.App., 453 N.E.2d 363, 364. Any benefit, commonly the subject of pecuniary compensation, which one, not intending it as a gift, confers upon another who accepts it, is an adequate foundation for a legally implied or created promise to render back its value. Cole v. Cole (1988), Ind.App., 517 N.E.2d 1248, 1250.

Unlike in Glasgo...