Bright v. United States

• Decision Date: 08 November 2018
• Docket Number: 14cv968
• Parties: SIDNEY BRIGHT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

SIDNEY BRIGHT, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

14cv968

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

November 8, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, Senior United States District Judge:

Pro se petitioner Sidney Bright moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, Bright's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

This Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and refers only to those necessary to explain its decision. Bright was charged with four counts under a superseding indictment: (1) Count One for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) Count Two for possessing and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (2); (3) Count Three for causing the death of Heriberto Diaz through the use of a firearm during the course of committing the crime charged in Count Two, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(j) and 2; and (4) Count Four for intentionally killing Diaz while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and cocaine, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). United States v. Bright, 528 F. App'x 88, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order); S2 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Bright, (No. 06-cr- 242), ECF No. 39 ("Indictment"). The first trial ended in a mistrial due to a potential conflict of interest between Bright's attorney and a Government witness. Bright, 528 F. App'x at 90-91.

At his retrial, a jury convicted Bright on Count One for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine and on Count Two for possessing and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Bright, 528 F. App'x at 90. This Court sentenced Bright to a total of 460 months of imprisonment because it found that the Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that Bright ordered the murder of Diaz. See Bright, 528 F. App'x at 91; Judgment, United States v. Bright, (No. 06-cr-242), ECF No. 135 at 1; Sentencing Minutes at 28:17-25, United States v. Bright, (No. 06-cr-242) (finding that Bright's sentence should be increased "where a victim is killed under circumstances that would constitute murder," which the Court found "was proven by clear and convincing evidence"). The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. Bright, 528 F. App'x at 89-90.

Bright seeks to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence based on a litany of grounds:

1. ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, based on ten purported deficiencies, including defense counsel's alleged:

A. failure to challenge his convictions under Counts One and Two because they fell outside the limitations period of 18 U.S.C. § 3828(a);

B. failure to pursue a two-point reduction under application note 10(D)(i) of § 2D1.1 of the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines;

C. failure to advise him of his double jeopardy rights;

D. failure to investigate or discover exculpatory material;

E. failure to challenge his prior conviction, which was used to enhance his criminal history Sentencing Guidelines category;

F. failure to advise him of a plea offer;

G. failure to timely file a Rule 29 motion;

H. failure to use available impeachment material;

I. failure to challenge Government witnesses' mental competence to testify; and

J. failure to call the witnesses he requested; 2. violation of his "Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find facts that increased [Bright's] mandatory minimum sentence" and a violation of the Fair Sentencing Act;

3. "false declarations offered to grand jury to obtain indictment" in violation of the Fifth Amendment;

4. Brady violations; and

5. violation of his Fifth Amendment right "to have a grand jury charge amount of drugs that trigger the mandatory minimum."

(ECF Nos. 1, 2.)

On January 29, 2014, Bright supplemented his § 2255 motion to advance another ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that he was not advised that his sentence could be enhanced via cross reference if the Court found that the Government proved the Diaz murder by clear and convincing evidence, even if a jury found him not guilty of that murder. (ECF No. 12 at 3.)

Then, on June 21, 2016, Bright brought another § 2255 motion based on intervening Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). (ECF No. 145.) He also argued that this Court miscalculated his sentence. (ECF No. 145.)

On July 20, 2016, this Court consolidated all of Bright's applications into one § 2255 proceeding. (ECF No. 15.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner may collaterally attack his sentence by "mov[ing] the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). "In ruling on a motion under § 2255, the district court is required to hold a hearing '[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Indeed, "the filing of a motion pursuant to § 2255 does not automatically entitle the movant to a hearing; that section does not imply that there must be a hearing where the allegations are 'vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible.'" Gonzalez, 722 F.3d at 130 (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)). Ultimately, it is within this Court's discretion to determine whether a hearing is necessary. See Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). And where, like here, the judge who presided over the underlying criminal proceeding also presides over the § 2255 motion, "a full-blown evidentiary hearing may not be necessary." Raysor v. United States, 647 F.3d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Second Circuit permits a "middle road" of deciding any disputed facts on the basis of written submissions. Raysor, 647 F.3d at 494.

Collateral challenges conflict with "society's strong interest in the finality of criminal convictions," so defendants are subject to a higher bar "to upset a conviction on a collateral, as opposed to direct, attack." Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d. Cir. 2010). Thus, to prevail on a § 2255 motion, a petitioner must show "constitutional error . . . or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Nnebe v. United States, 534 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). In making such a showing, a petitioner "must set forth specific facts supported by competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle him to relief." Gonzalez, 722 F.3d at 131. However, "a district court need not assume the credibility of factual assertions, as it would in civil cases, where the assertions are contradicted by the record in the underlying proceeding." Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2009).

Further, "[a] motion under § 2255 is not a substitute for an appeal." United States v. Munoz, 143 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1998). The "mandate rule . . . bars re-litigation of issues already decided on direct appeal." Yick Man Mui, 614 F.3d at 53. Further, a claim not raised on direct appeal may not be offered on collateral attack unless the petitioner can show both cause for the default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate actual innocence. United States v. Thorn, 659 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2011). Establishing cause requires a showing that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply" with applicable procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Prejudice means the claimed error "resulted in substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Gutierrez v. Smith, 702 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To demonstrate actual innocence, a petitioner must show "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency, and demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Thorn, 659 F.3d at 233-34 (internal citation omitted).

Because Bright is proceeding pro se, his petition is held to "less stringent standards than [those] drafted by lawyers." Santiago v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 3d 387, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); accord Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). And this Court must liberally construe his papers "to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Green, 260 F.3d at 83 (quotation marks omitted) (applying these standards in the § 2255 context). However, pro se litigants are "not exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Carrasco v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 3d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

II. Issues Raised on Appeal

On appeal, Bright raised many of the arguments that he now advances in his § 2255 motion. More specifically, Bright previously asserted five of the grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel that he reiterates in this proceeding, namely:

1. (A) failure to challenge his convictions under Counts One and Two because they fell outside the limitations period of 18 U.S.C. § 3828(a);

2. (E) failure to challenge his prior conviction, which was used to enhance Bright's criminal history Sentencing Guidelines category;

3. (G) failure to timely file a Rule 29 motion;

4. (I) failure to challenge Government witnesses' mental competence to testify; and

5. (J) failure to call the witnesses Bright requested.

Compare Appellate Brief and Appendix for Sidney Bright, 2012 WL 2785401, at *16-17, *20-22, *25 (June 19,...