Brightley v. Heath
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 11 Civ. 1761 (LGS) |
| Parties | HELMER BRIGHTLEY, Petitioner, v. PHILLIP HEATH, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Petitioner Helmer Brightley brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction of one count of second-degree murder, two counts of second-degree assault and one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon (the "Petition"). This case was referred to the Honorable Debra Freeman for a report and recommendation (the "Report"). The Report recommends that the writ be denied. Petitioner submitted timely objections to the Report (the "Objections"). For the following reasons, the Report is adopted, and the Petition is denied.
The facts relevant to the Petition are set out in the Report and summarized here. George Warren, the victim, was involved in the smuggling and sale of marijuana. He owed a man named Nathaniel Coache a debt in connection with those activities. To satisfy the debt, Warren permitted Coache to sell marijuana from the basement of his building for three months. Petitioner helped with the daily operations of Coache's marijuana business from Warren's basement. After three months, Warren reclaimed the basement over Coache's objection. On the evening of July 10, 1988, Petitioner and Coache's son, Mark Brown (known as "Bigga"), went to Warren's building and argued with Warren about the debt and the use of his building to repay the debt. The argument turned deadly when both Petitioner and Bigga brandished guns and began firing. Warren was shot twice and fatally wounded. Petitioner was apprehended 17 months later.
In May 1991, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to People v. Sandoval, 357 N.Y.2d 849, 853 (1974). In New York state court, a Sandoval hearing permits a defendant, before deciding whether to testify at trial, to obtain a ruling about whether the prosecution may use prior criminal acts for impeachment. Here, the prosecutor sought to inquire about Petitioner's two prior convictions for marijuana offenses and his August 1985 arrest in Florida for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and possession of marijuana. According to the prosecutor, the Florida case against Petitioner was dismissed because the victim declined to testify and another eyewitness was unable to testify because he was found dead in the trunk of a car. The trial court ruled that, if Petitioner testified that he was a nonviolent individual, he could be impeached with limited questions about his involvement in the Florida events, but that details about the alleged beating and torture would be excluded. The court also ruled that the prosecution would be allowed to ask one question about Petitioner's marijuana convictions.
The trial court also held a pretrial hearing pursuant to People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350 (1981), to determine whether evidence of Petitioner's uncharged crimes (the sale of marijuana) would be admissible as direct evidence at trial. The parties agree that, although there is no written record of the Ventimiglia ruling, the trial court must have ruled off the record prior to trial that some such evidence would be admissible to prove motive or intent because the trial court's ruling is referenced in the trial transcript.
The trial spanned twelve days and included the testimony of several witnesses, though Petitioner did not testify. Pertinent to this case, defense counsel sought to impeach one eyewitness to the shooting, Harold Cephas, by questioning him about his cooperation with the prosecution. Cephas testified that the prosecution did not promise him a particular sentence in exchange for his testimony, but that he thought cooperating would "help" him with an unrelated case. Cephas also testified that he had been arrested and charged with murder, but he resolved that case by pleading guilty to criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, for which he received a prison sentence of two to six years.
The prosecution proceeded on a theory that Petitioner and Bigga acted in concert. At the charging conference, the trial court -- over defense counsel's objections -- stated that it would give the jury an "acting in concert" instruction. The jury instructions included an explanation of aiding and abetting and illustrated the crime with hypothetical examples. As part of the charge, the jury was instructed that "the People must prove to you by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant act[ed] intentionally, in other words, that he intended to kill [Warren]."
On June 13, 1991, Petitioner was convicted of one count of second-degree murder, two counts of second-degree assault and one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. On July 11, 1991, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 29 2/3 years to life. He filed a notice of appeal with the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, on or about July 21, 1991. After his conviction, Petitioner's family retained appellate counsel to represent him on direct appeal and in connection with any further post-conviction motions and appeared to have fully paid the retainer by early 1992. Petitioner, however, received only sporadic communication from his appellate counsel despite Petitioner's prodding. Petitioner filed two grievances with the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for theFirst Department. Appellate counsel did not perfect Petitioner's direct appeal until March 20, 2006, nearly 15 years after his appeal was noticed. The First Department denied the appeal and affirmed the conviction on November 18, 2008. On February 27, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal the First Department's decision.
In May 2006, approximately two months after filing a brief on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a motion with the trial court pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 440.10 ("CPL 440.10"), seeking to vacate his conviction. In a decision dated May 14, 2007, the trial court denied Petitioner's CPL 440.10 motion. The First Department denied leave to appeal on October 2, 2007.
Petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis on August 25, 2009, with the First Department, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and denial of due process arising from appellate counsel's delay. The First Department denied the application on July 6, 2010, and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on September 28, 2010.
A district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court "may adopt those portions of the report to which no 'specific, written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Adams v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 855 F. Supp. 2d 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)).
The court must undertake a de novo review of any portion of the report to which a specific objection is made on issues raised before the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1); United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 340 (2d Cir. 2015). When a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments made below, a court will review the report strictly for clear error. Diaz v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 13 Civ. 2038, 2015 WL 5577905, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015). "[A] district court generally should not entertain new grounds for relief or additional legal arguments not presented to the magistrate." Ortiz v. Barkley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Even when exercising de novo review, "[t]he district court need not . . . specifically articulate its reasons for rejecting a party's objections . . . ." Morris v. Local 804, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 167 F. App'x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2006).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the "AEDPA"), a petitioner who is in custody pursuant to a state court's judgment may seek a federal writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his custody is in violation of federal law, provided he has exhausted all available state court remedies, or is excused from doing so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(b)(1). To exhaust, a petitioner must "'fairly present' his constitutional claim to the state courts, which he accomplishes 'by presenting the essential factual and legal premises of his federal constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of reviewing it.'" Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Where a state court has reached the merits of a federal claim, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief unless he demonstrates that the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court." Id. at 132, 134-35 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). State court factual findings "shall be presumed to be correct" and the petitioner"shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).
The Petition seeks habeas relief on the grounds that Petitioner was denied: (1) the right to be present at the Ventimiglia hearing; (2) due process based on an alleged Brady violation; (3) effective assistance of appellate counsel who allegedly had a conflict of interest, and due process because of the delay on appeal; (4) a fair trial because of the state court's reliance on purportedly false information in rendering its Sandoval ruli...
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