Brighton v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1894
• Parties: BRIGHTON v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

61 N.W. 550

103 Mich. 420

BRIGHTON v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 28, 1894

Error to circuit court, Washtenaw county; Edward D. Kinne, Judge.

Action by William Brighton against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, to recover damages for breach of contract. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

C. E. Weaver (Geo. C. Greene and O. G Getzen-Danner, of counsel), for appellant.

Lehman Bros. and Thomas J. Navin, for appellee.

HOOKER J.

On October 19, 1874, the plaintiff, at the time an employ� of the defendant, was injured by reason of a collision of trains upon its railroad. The plaintiff subsequently made a claim against the defendant, through Charles R Miller, his attorney, for damages, and on March 24, 1875, a settlement was made between them. Counsel for the appellant states in his brief that the whole controversy grows out of a disagreement as to what the terms of the settlement were. It seems to be conceded that the defendant paid to the plaintiff the sum of $540, and that the plaintiff executed a release and discharge, of which the following is a copy:

"Name, William Brighton, Adrian, Michigan. For the consideration of five hundred and forty dollars, received, to my full satisfaction, of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, I hereby release and discharge the said company from all claims and demands which I have, or may be entitled to have, against it, either in my own name or in that of any one else, and especially from all liability to me from loss or damages which has resulted or may result to me from injury suffered by me by reason of a collision of two construction trains between Sisson and Deerfield, having my right hand crushed and lost one finger, and injured about my side and back, which occurred on or about the nineteenth day of October, A. D. 1874. Received payment, March 24, 1875.

"[Sg.] William his X mark Brighton. [L. S.]"

The plaintiff claims that at the time of the settlement, and as part thereof, it was agreed that the plaintiff should have employment in a position paying $43.75 per month, or a better place, and that he should be so employed and paid during life, or during his ability and disposition to perform the duties of his position, and could not be discharged without cause. It was further claimed that this agreement was put in writing, signed by the officers who made the settlement for the defendant, and was delivered to the plaintiff or his attorney. The defendant denied that any such agreement or writing was executed, and claims that when presented such execution was refused, but that the plaintiff was given a place on the same terms as any other employ�. The plaintiff was given the position of target tender at Manchester, where he remained about 15 years, until the target at that point was discontinued. He was then transferred to another point, where he was employed as target tender for two years, and until that target was discontinued. He was then given work as a section hand, under one Stegmiller, commencing in February, 1891, and was discharged by direction of the road master on August 22, 1891. His wages as target tender were $43.75, until January 1, 1876, when they were reduced to $31.50, and so remained until November, 1889, when they were made $30 per month. As section hand they were $29.50 or thereabouts, depending somewhat on the amount of Sunday work done. The plaintiff did not produce the disputed writing, which he claims was left with his attorney, and cannot be found; after proof of which secondary evidence was admitted, and he was allowed to recover at the rate of $43.75 per month for the time employed, less what he had received. The jury was also permitted to allow him prospective damages upon the expectancy of life and ability to work.

The more important questions involved are: (1) Whether the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant; (2) the measure of damages.

Counsel for the defendant assert that there was no evidence tending to prove the contract, for the reason-First, that those said to have made it had no authority to make it; and, second that the evidence of the plaintiff and Miller is insufficient to establish it. If there was such a writing, it was executed by the persons who adjusted the claim for damages, and was a part of that transaction. This settlement was carried out by the payment of money, and it was proper to allow the jury to find that the officers had authority in the premises. It is sufficient to say about the second point that there was evidence tending to show that the disputed writing was made and...