Briles v. Pace

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: RUFFIN
• Citation: Briles v. Pace, 13 Ired. 279, 35 N.C. 279 (N.C. 1852)
• Decision Date: 30 June 1852
• Parties: NOAH BRILES v. JAMES PACE.

13 Ired. 279

35 N.C. 279

NOAH BRILES

v.JAMES PACE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1852.

Verbal agreements for leases for any land for more than three years, and those for running for any term, though less than three years, are void, by statute.

And a contract to transfer such a term, or part of such a term, must, in like manner, be in writing.

Appeal from the Superior Couurt of Law of Randolph County, at the Spring Term, 1852, his Honor Judge CALDWELL presiding.

This is assumpsit for the breach of a contract on the part of the defendant, in not finishing a horse gold-mill, which he had contracted to build, within the time stipulated.

The material facts are as follows: In May 1847, the plaintiff, being the owner of one half of a lease on a gold mine, and the sole owner of a lease on another part of the same tract of land, by deed assigned the one half of his interest in the mine to the defendant for $1600; and the defendant, in part payment of the purchase money, agreed, by parol, to build a horse gold-mill for the plaintiff, on the lease of which he was sole owner, with $400, and was to finish it as soon as such a job could be finished. Defendant commenced and prosecuted the work, until some time in the Fall of 1847, and then left it in an unfinished state, and went to work on a mill he purchased on the river. In October 1848, defendant sold and by deed conveyed to one Miller all his interest in the said horse mill, gold mine, and mill on the river,--the plaintiff being present and making no objection.

It also appeared on the trial, that the plaintiff, at the time of the contract with defendant about said mill, was working said mine in partnership with the owners of the other shares, and after said Miller purchased out the defendant, he, the plaintiff, and others, worked the said mine, and used the mill on the river as partners. It also appeared, that on the 10th of December 1847, the defendant wrote a letter to the said Miller, excusing himself for not having come back sooner to finish the work on the said mill, and requesting him to hire some one to complete the work; that said Miller handed over the letter to one Floyd to attend to, and he employed one Trotter to do the unfinished work: that said Trotter commenced work on the mill in January 1848, and worked two days, when he was stopped, and directly thereafter all the machinery, that had been put up at the said mill, was taken down by the said partners, and taken to their mill on the river.

It became a question on the trial, whether the defendant was a partner with the plaintiff in the said horse mill, as well as the gold mine, by reason of some understanding between them; and several witnesses were called, who stated, that they understood from the parties, that they were in partnership in the said mill. There was no evidence offered of a written conveyance from the plaintiff to the defendant for any part of the lease, of which the plaintiff was sole owner, and on which the said mill was to be erected. The defendant's counsel insisted, that, if there was a partnership, the plaintiff could not recover, and moved the Court so to charge. The plaintiff's counsel insisted, that there could be no partnership in the said mill, as it was to be built on leased land; and that all leases of land for mining purposes were void, unless in writing, and none such had been offered in evidence; and the Court was moved so to charge. It was insisted also by the defendant's counsel, that although the work on the mill had been suspended for several months, on the part of the defendant, yet, if Miller, one of the partners, acted upon his letter, and employed Trotter to go on with the work, it was a waiver on the part of the plaintiff as to the suspension of the work. The plaintiff's counsel insisted, that Miller, not being a partner, at the time the contract was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant about said mill, it was not competent for him to waive any right of the plaintiff in relation to such contract; and the Court was moved so to charge.

The Court charged the jury, that, if there was a partnership between the plaintiff and defendant in the same mill, the plaintiff could not recover; and that though the law annulled leases for mining purposes, yet, after the lease was created by...