Brill v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co.
| Citation | 606 F. Supp. 265 |
| Decision Date | 14 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1-Civ-J-14.,84-1-Civ-J-14. |
| Parties | Gail S. BRILL, James R. Whitley, III, and Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville, a national banking association, successor in interest to Jacksonville National Bank, as Co-Trustees of the Testamentary Trusts of Barry L. Green, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. INDIANAPOLIS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a mutual insurance company chartered under the laws of Indiana, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
William E. Kuntz and Timothy W. Volpe, Smith & Hulsey, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs.
Lawrence J. Hamilton, II, and Dana G. Bradford, II, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.
This case came on to be heard on cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendant's motion was filed on October 2, 1984, and the plaintiffs responded in opposition on October 23, 1984. The plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on October 3, 1984, and the defendant responded in opposition on October 15, 1984. A hearing was held on these motions on December 21, 1984.
This action was commenced by plaintiffs to recover as beneficiaries under two policies insuring the life of Barry L. Green. The policies, numbers 0846982 and 1005892, were issued by Indianapolis Life Insurance Company hereinafter "defendant". Each policy contains a clause providing that the accidental death benefit to be paid will be doubled:
If such proof also shows that the death was the result of an injury sustained while the insured was a fare-paying passenger in a public conveyance then being operated by a licensed common carrier for passenger service....
The facts relevant to the decedent's death are not disputed. The only issue remaining for the Court's determination is whether the accident falls within the purview of the above-stated clause requiring that the defendant pay the plaintiffs double the accidental benefit payments provided in the policies.
At the hearing held on these motions, the parties agreed to the following facts:
1. On July 29, 1982, Mr. Barry L. Green hereinafter "decedent" died when the helicopter carrying him and three of his business colleagues, all executives with The Charter Company hereinafter "Charter Company" or its wholly-owned subsidiary, Charter Oil Company hereinafter "Charter Oil" crashed near Galway, Ireland.
2. The helicopter was to transport the decedent and his colleagues from the Ballynahinch Castle Hotel to the Shannon Airport. At the airport, they were to board a private company plane for a business flight to France.
3. The helicopter was owned by Irish Helicopters Ltd. hereinafter "IHL" and the pilot was an employee of IHL.
4. IHL is the sole helicopter air service company in Ireland and is a subsidiary of the national airline of Ireland.
5. IHL is licensed by the Irish government as a Class C authorization holder to carry passengers, cargo, and mail. As a Class C, IHL can provide only non-scheduled service, passengers receive no ticket and their baggage is not checked. The Irish government has the authority to regulate charges but has not done so. See Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment hereinafter "Tr." at 21-22.
6. IHL charges its customers a flat rate per flying hour. Flying time begins when the helicopter leaves IHL's hangar and ends when the helicopter returns to IHL's hangar.
7. IHL regularly advertises its charter flight services to the public including advertisements in the Irish equivalent of the yellow pages, business and trade journals, as well as newspapers of general circulation.
8. Charter Company verbally leased the helicopter through LUQA, Inc., its wholly-owned subsidiary in charge of providing airplane and other travel related services to Charter Company.
9. The service provided to the decedent was not a part of IHL's contract business but was a part of its general passenger transportation business. (Tr. at 9-10). An example of IHL's contract business would be the lease of a helicopter for several months. Id.
10. On July 28, 1982, the evening before the flight, the helicopter had been piloted from Shannon Airport carrying one passenger. The pilot and the aircraft remained at Ballynahinch Castle Hotel overnight in anticipation of the early morning flight the next day.
11. IHL was to provide helicopter service for the specific flights to the airport (including picking the decedent up on his return the same day from France for transportation back to the hotel) and when each flight concluded, the helicopter was free to service other customers.
12. The helicopter was not hired for a specific length of time but for the transportation already reviewed.
The Court will examine these undisputed facts in the context of the provisions of the double accident benefit clause to determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. In order to fall within the purview of the clause, the plaintiffs must show that at the time of the accident: (1) the decedent was a fare-paying customer, (2) the IHL helicopter was being operated as a public conveyance, and (3) the IHL helicopter was a common carrier. See Exhibit A to plaintiff's Complaint at paragraph 2.
The first issue to be addressed in determining whether this accident falls within the purview of the double accident benefit clause is whether the decedent was a fare-paying customer of IHL at the time of the accident. The defendant's position is that under the agreement with IHL, the charge for the flight was computed solely on the number of flying hours and the size of the helicopter, not on a per passenger basis. Since IHL did not charge on an individual basis for its service, the defendant concludes that a "rate" was paid to IHL for the flight rather than a "fare."
The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the defendant reads the term fare too narrowly. Terms used in an insurance policy are to be construed in light of the skill and experience of ordinary people. Morrison Assurance Company v. School Board of Suwanee County, 414 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also Midwest Mutual Insurance Company v. Santiesteban, 287 So.2d 665 (Fla.1973). In construing terms appearing in insurance policies, Florida courts commonly adopt the meaning of words contained in legal and non-legal dictionaries. See Mikos v. Early, 453 So.2d 402 (Fla.1984).
Fare is defined in Webster's Third International Dictionary as "the price charged to transport a person or persons. ..." Id. at 824. Likewise, Webster's Third New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged Second Edition defines fare as "the sum paid or due for transportation. ..." Id. at 664. Construed in the light of the skill and experience of an ordinary person, the term fare as it appears in the clause of this policy, without further limitation, includes the pay arrangement in this case.
The helicopter flight was not gratuitously provided to the decedent. The Court is aware that an individual whose business flight is arranged and paid for by his employer will often board an air carrier without having actually handed over ticket fare. When a business concern arranges its employee's flight, any combination of pay arrangements may be made, depending on such variables as prior dealings with the particular carrier and group and other discount rates. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 6 Ill. App.3d 698, 286 N.E.2d 773 (1972). The clear import of the requirement that the insured be a fare-paying customer is that a sum be paid or promised to the air carrier in exchange for the transportation. The Court finds that in this case the decedent was to be transported to Shannon Airport in IHL's helicopter as a result of a sum having been paid or promised to IHL; therefore, the decedent was a fare-paying customer.
The defendant relies on Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Carbon, 327 So.2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1976), to support its contention that the double accident benefit clause is not applicable because the IHL helicopter was not a public conveyance. In Carbon, a couple were injured while driving a rented automobile. They sued the car rental agency under a Florida statute which provided personal injury benefits. The statute excluded recovery for injuries involving a motor vehicle used as a public conveyance. The trial court having found the statute applicable granted summary judgment and the car rental agency appealed.
In determining whether the rental car was a public conveyance, the appellate court referred to the definitions given the term by legal authorities. Based upon these definitions, the court concluded that the rental car was not a public conveyance "since it was not subject to indiscriminate use by the general public without limitation to particular persons, particular times or special terms." Id. at 793. If the Court were to accept this ruling on its face, then even a taxi service would not be a public conveyance.
The United States Supreme Court in Terminal Taxi Cab Company v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 36 S.Ct. 583, 60 L.Ed. 984 (1916),...
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Brill v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 85-3633
...Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a summary judgment order in favor of the plaintiffs entered by the district court, 606 F.Supp. 265, in an insurance The facts giving rise to this litigation are undisputed. We adopt the findings of fact of the district court. On July 29, 19......