Brink v. Multnomah County
Decision Date | 09 November 1960 |
Citation | 356 P.2d 536,224 Or. 507 |
Parties | David A. BRINK and Rose M. Brink, Appellants, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, Oregon, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Leo Levenson, Portland, argued the cause and submitted briefs, for appellants.
Julian Herndon, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Charles E. Raymond, Dist. Atty., Portland.
Before McALLISTER, C. J., and WARNER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL and HOWELL, JJ.
The defendant county initiated a condemnation proceeding to acquire a portion of plaintiffs' land for the purpose of relocating and widening a county road. The Board of County Commissioners fixed the damages for the taking at $5,725. Plaintiffs appealed to the Circuit Court for Multnomah County and obtained a verdict and judgment for $8,000, together with interest. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment, assigning as error the exclusion of certain evidence which they sought to elicit from Elmer Kolberg, a witness called on their behalf.
When Kolberg was called as a witness, defendant's counsel requested to be heard in chambers concerning the character of the testimony which plaintiffs proposed to elicit from the witness. In the colloquy in chambers which followed, defendant's counsel stated that Kolberg had been 'previously employed for compensation by Multnomah county here to observe this property in question and to act as a consultant and adviser to me as Deputy District Attorney representing Multnomah County and in that respect has communicated with me in regard to certain data relative to this problem.'
Counsel's objection to the use of Kolberg as a witness was stated as follows:
It will be noted that, at this point in the trial, the objection to the witness testifying was not based upon the assertion of the attorney-client privilege, but rather on the ground that Kolberg was an expert witness and that as such he could not be required to testify by one who had not employed him in that capacity. The court, in overruling defendant's objection, gave the following reason:
'The Court: It is the understanding of the Court that the Witness Kolberg has been subpoenaed as a witness and the Court therefore will permit the witness to take the stand and as the Court has indicated to counsel, if it develops that this witness has, under arrangement * * * with the County, conducted an appraisal of the property and is in position to give expert testimony, if he declines to give that testimony the Court will sustain the objection and will not force the witness to give his expert opinion.'
It is not clear from the foregoing explanation of his ruling whether the trial judge proposed to exclude the testimony concerning the appraisal on the ground of privilege or on the ground asserted by defendant's counsel.
When Kolberg took the stand he testified that he had made an examination of the subject property at the request of Multnomah County. Objection was then made by defendant's counsel to any testimony by the witness 'unless there is a showing that this witness has ever been employed by the owner in this case.' Here again the objection was not founded upon the assertion of the privilege of confidential communication between lawyer and client, but upon the ground that one who has not employed an expert witness cannot require him to testify as to those matters within his expertise. The objection was overruled. Thereupon Kolberg continued to testify, stating his qualifications as an expert and describing the subject property. The following testimony was then given:
'Mr. West: Objected to, your Honor, on the grounds that there is no showing at this time that this gentleman was ever employed by the property owner in this case, and this is an effort to use him as an expert witness and the Court has ruled on this matter, and I am going to object to any matters pertaining to his use as an expert witness in this case unless they show he was employed by the property owner.
'The Court: The Court will, if the witness declines to divulge any information with respect to his appraisal of this property, will sustain the witness' right to decline to divulge any such information consistent with the Court's prior ruling as to this matter.
'Mr. West: Well, he asked him to produce some report.
'The Court: He may continue.
'Mr. Curran: Do you have that report with you, Mr. Kolberg, or a copy of it?
'The Witness: I do.
'Mr. Curran: Would you produce it?
'Mr. West: Objected to, your Honor, or the grounds that it's * * *
'The Court: Well, does the witness--do you decline to produce that report?
'The Witness: That is confidential information between me and my client, and unless I am so ordered, I will not produce it.
* * *
* * *
'Mr. West: That's all.
'Mr. Curran: What is the amount of that damage?
* * *
* * *
'Mr. West: May I have an objection?
'The Court: Yes.
'Mr. West: On the ground that the witness is claiming privileges.
'Mr. Kitson: Mr. West brought that out, your Honor.
'Mr. West: I did not.
'The Court: The Court will ask the witness again here, do you decline to or are you willing to divulge your opinion with respect to the value of this property.
'The Witness: That, again, is confidential information between I and my client, and unless I am relieved of that confidence or so ordered, I prefer not to.
'Mr. Curran: If the Court please, I would like to register an objection on the record that the damages as testified to by the witness on the stand was brought out by defense counsel, and under cross examination, and that question on re-direct examination on that new material was brought out by the plaintiffs' counsel, and the defense objected and the order was by the Court that the evidence could not be deduced.
Therefore, we would like to take exception to the ruling of the Court.
'Mr. Kitson: It was ruled as to whether or not the appellant brought it in----
'Mr. West: May I make a statement here, your Honor, that the only question I asked was whether or not he had made an appraisal, and the question directed to him which he was permitted to answer, was that he had made a report to Multnomah County, and in order to clarify as to whether that report he is talking about was an appraisal, I asked him one single question, whether he had made an appraisal, and he answered that he had not, so that's the only purpose, and that's all I questioned.
'The Court: Was your answer that you * * *
'Mr. Kitson: But the rest of the answer now?
'The Witness: That I had expressed an opinion of the damages.
'Mr. Curran: We now, on redirect, your Honor, would like to ask him what the opinion of damages is.
'Mr. Kitson: All we wanted was a statement on the record, your Honor.
'The Court: Any further questions of this witness?
'Mr. West: I have no further questions.
'Mr. Kitson: None here, your Honor.
'The Court: You are excused.'
It is apparent from an examination of the foregoing testimony that there was...
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...polygraph examiner, hire that examiner as a "consultant" under the attorney-client privilege, see OEC 503 and Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Or. 507, 356 P.2d 536 (1960), and if the defendant flunks that examination, the prosecution normally never knows the results of the examination. Even ......
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State v. Riddle
...policy); Imwinkelried, Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 Wash. U. L. Q. at 37-38 (same); Brink et ux v. Multnomah County, 224 Or. 507, 519, 356 P.2d 536 (1960) (concluding that a party could not obtain testimony of opposing party's nontestifying expert, stating that "one li......
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...was not a client, but an agent, of the defendant. The cases relied on by the defendant are not in point. In Brink et ux. v. Multnomah County, 224 Or. 507, 356 P.2d 536, we held that a report made by an appraiser employed by the county as part of the preparation for the trial of a condemnati......
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Riddle Spring Realty Co. v. State
...within the attorney-client privilege. McDuffey v. Boston & Maine R.R., 102 N.H. 179, 152 A.2d 606, 75 A.L.R.2d 872; Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Or. 507, 517, 356 P.2d 536; McCormick, Evidence, s. 93, p. 188. Nor would the mere turning over of these documents to the Attorney General or so......
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Chapter § 62.5 CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE
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