Brinkley v. State
Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Writing for the Court | Lansden |
Citation | 143 S.W. 1120 |
Decision Date | 17 November 1911 |
Parties | BRINKLEY v. STATE. |
Page 1120
v.
STATE.
Page 1121
Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren County; Ewin L. Davis, Judge.
J. W. Brinkley was convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within four miles of a schoolhouse where school is kept, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Jno. L. Willis, for appellant. Attorney General Cates, for the State.
LANSDEN, J.
The plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of Warren county at its May term, 1911, for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within four miles of a schoolhouse where school is kept. The defendant filed a plea of former acquittal, and, upon the determination of the issues raised by this plea against him by the trial judge without the intervention of a jury, he entered his plea of not guilty. A trial was had by the court and jury, which resulted in a verdict of guilty, and a judgment of fine and imprisonment, from which he has appealed and assigned errors. On the trial before the jury, the state offered in evidence a copy of the record in the office of the internal revenue collector of the United States for the district of Tennessee, showing that the plaintiff in error had paid the internal revenue special tax as a retail malt liquor dealer on Main street, McMinnville, Tenn., from September 1, 1910, to June 30, 1911. This record, together with proof that the place of business of the plaintiff in error was within four miles of a schoolhouse where school is kept, is all the proof that was offered in behalf of the state. Plaintiff in error did not testify in his own behalf, but introduced the county court clerk, who testified that he issued a distress warrant against the plaintiff in error, which was placed in the hands of the sheriff, and the plaintiff in error's place of business was closed by the sheriff on Saturday, November 5, 1910, and the sheriff locked up the house, and on the following Monday, November 7th, the witness and others invoiced the stock of goods of the plaintiff in error found in his place of business. There was a stock of beerette, coca-cola, soda fount, ice box, glasses, counter or bar, which looked like an old saloon bar, a mirror, two pool tables, and a screen in front of the door. The counter was up towards the front door, and the poolroom in the rear of the house. No intoxicating liquors were found. Two or three empty whisky bottles were found upstairs in plaintiff in error's house, where there was a bed. The beerette looked and tasted like beer, according to the evidence of plaintiff in error's witnesses; but there is no proof that it was intoxicating.
Chapter 355, Acts of 1903, provides in the first section thereof as follows:
"That in all prosecutions for a violation of the law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within four miles of a schoolhouse, commonly known as the "four-mile law," the fact that defendant has paid the internal revenue special tax, as a retail liquor dealer or is in possession of an internal revenue tax stamp as a retail liquor dealer, shall be prima facie evidence of sales of intoxicating liquors within the meaning of the four-mile law, during the time for which he has paid the internal revenue special tax, or that is covered by the internal revenue special tax stamp possessed by him: Provided, revenue license in this act shall not be construed to mean license for use of manufacturers and druggists or others in manufacturing or compounding or otherwise than for use in sale at retail under state law."
Chapter 384 of the Acts of 1909 provides in the first section thereof as follows:
"That in all prosecutions for violation of the laws of this state prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, copies of the records in the office of the internal revenue collector of the United States for the district of Tennessee, showing that the defendant has paid the internal revenue special tax as a liquor dealer, or showing the issuance to the defendant of an internal revenue special tax stamp, shall be admitted as competent evidence, when such copies are certified to be full, true and complete by the district internal revenue collector."
Copy of the record from the office of the internal revenue collector, introduced by the state and relied upon as making a prima facie case of guilt, is as follows:
"Name, Brinkley, J. W. Business, retail malt liquor dealer. Place, McMinnville, Tenn., Main street. From what time, September 1 — 10. Amount of tax, $16.67. Date of payment or issue of certificate, Sept. 30 — 10. Serial number of stamp, 12504."
"I, W. A. Dunlap, collector of internal revenue for the district of Tennessee, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and complete copy of entries on record 10 in my office, showing the payment by special tax payers in Warren county of special tax of liquor dealers for the period from July, 1910, to June 30, 1911.
"Witness my hand and seal of office, at
Page 1122
office in the city of Nashville, Tennessee, this 5th day of August, 1911.
"W. A. Dunlap, "Collector of Internal Revenue, Dist. of Tenn., "By E. S. Priest, Chief Clerk."
The learned trial judge gave the following instructions to the jury:
"The state has introduced and read to you a certified transcript of the record of the issuance of federal liquor license or tax stamp in Warren county, Tenn., and I instruct you that this transcript is competent evidence, and that it shows that the defendant on September 30, 1910, paid $16.67 for, and received, a certificate from the United States government authorizing him to engage in the business of a retail malt liquor dealer on Main street, in McMinnville, Tenn., from September 1, 1910, to June 30, 1911.
"I further instruct you, in the language of the statute, chapter 355 of the Acts of 1903, that in all prosecutions for a violation of the law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within four miles of a schoolhouse, commonly known as the four-mile law, the fact that defendant has paid the internal revenue special tax as a retail liquor dealer, or is in possession of an internal revenue tax stamp as a retail liquor dealer, shall be prima facie evidence of sales of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the four-mile law, during the time for which he has paid the internal revenue special tax, or that is covered by the internal revenue special tax stamp possessed by him.
"I further instruct you that the term `liquor,' used in said statute, is a general term, comprehending and including the different kinds of intoxicating liquors, which are classed and designated as spirituous, vinous, and malt intoxicating liquors, as charged in the indictment in this cause. What is meant by `spirituous liquors' is distilled liquor, such as whisky and brandy; what is meant by `vinous liquors' is liquor made from the grape, etc., such as wine; and what is meant by `malt liquors' is liquor made from...
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State v. Black, No. 01-S-01-9002-CR00007
...Court's duty to interpret the constitution of this State and declare void any statute violating it. See Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). Legislative judgments alone cannot determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 174......
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State v. Dicks, No. 12
...I, Section 16, of the Tennessee Constitution, it long ago declared its authority and power to do so. In Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 143 S.W. 1120 (1911), the Court "However, we think that the profession generally understands, and the clear weight of modern authority is, that the court......
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Abdur'Rahman v. Bredsen, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV (TN 10/6/2004), No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV.
...statutory criminal penalties to determine whether they imposed cruel and unusual punishments. Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 382-83, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). The court did not, however, define the parameters of the protection afforded by Tenn. Const. art. I, § 16 or explain the analys......
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State v. Booker, E2018-01439-SC-R11-CD
...violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Brinkley v. State, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (Tenn. 1911). There is no precedent or reasoned principle that prevents us from determining whether a Tennessee statute violates a sim......
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State v. Black, No. 01-S-01-9002-CR00007
...Court's duty to interpret the constitution of this State and declare void any statute violating it. See Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). Legislative judgments alone cannot determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 174......
-
State v. Dicks, No. 12
...I, Section 16, of the Tennessee Constitution, it long ago declared its authority and power to do so. In Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 143 S.W. 1120 (1911), the Court "However, we think that the profession generally understands, and the clear weight of modern authority is, that the court......
-
Abdur'Rahman v. Bredsen, No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV (TN 10/6/2004), No. M2003-01767-COA-R3-CV.
...statutory criminal penalties to determine whether they imposed cruel and unusual punishments. Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 382-83, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). The court did not, however, define the parameters of the protection afforded by Tenn. Const. art. I, § 16 or explain the analys......
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State v. Harris
...and in a proper case presenting the question, it would be their undoubted duty to do so. Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371, 382-83, 143 S.W. 1120, 1122 (1911). Accord State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 188-189 In addition, I applaud the majority's decision to subject the sentence in this case t......