Brinkman v. State, Dept. of Corrections, No. 93-2323-JWL.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
Citation863 F. Supp. 1479
Decision Date13 September 1994
PartiesPamela N. BRINKMAN, Plaintiff, v. STATE of Kansas DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.
Docket NumberNo. 93-2323-JWL.

863 F. Supp. 1479

Pamela N. BRINKMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE of Kansas DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.

No. 93-2323-JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 13, 1994.


863 F. Supp. 1480
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
863 F. Supp. 1481
Pantaleon Florez, Jr., Florez & Frost, P.A., Topeka, KS, for plaintiff

Lisa A. Mendoza, Kansas Dept. of Corrections, Edward F. Britton, Jr., State of Kansas, Topeka, KS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is currently before the court on the motion of the defendant, the State of Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC), to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment (Doc. # 42). Plaintiff, Pamela N. Brinkman, a former employee of the KDOC, seeks relief pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. 1992), and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq. (1993) (KAAD).

863 F. Supp. 1482

Plaintiff alleges that the KDOC discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (PDA), and the KAAD, K.S.A. 44-1009(a)(1). She further contends that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against her by failing to make reasonable accommodations for her disability or handicap in violation of the KAAD, K.S.A. 44-1009(a)(8)(E). Defendant denies that it discriminated against plaintiff either on the basis of her sex or on the basis of her alleged disability or handicap.

For the reasons more fully set forth below, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant on plaintiff's Title VII and PDA claim. The court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims, and, thus, dismisses those claims without prejudice.

II. FACTS

The following facts are uncontroverted or are facts accepted in the light most favorable to plaintiff for purposes of this summary judgment motion. Plaintiff began working at the KDOC on April 18, 1988, as a corrections officer stationed at the Lansing Correctional Facility (LCF), in Lansing, Kansas. She remained a corrections officer for the duration of her employment. Plaintiff was pregnant twice during her tenure with the KDOC. It is her second pregnancy which is the focus of this action.

Plaintiff gave birth to her third child in April of 1991. Prior to giving birth, plaintiff received twelve notes from her personal obstetrician, Dr. Adnan Ashkar, which were "excuses" for missing work or were notes requesting that plaintiff engage only in "light duty" at work. On May 10, 1991, while plaintiff was on maternity leave, she received a note from Dr. Ashkar indicating that she could return to work and engage in "light duty" as of May 12, 1991. The notice stated she was to be on light duty "until further notice." Dr. Ashkar testified that it was his intention that she stay on light duty for about six weeks. Plaintiff's return to LCF on May 12th cut short what she originally intended to be a more extended maternity leave. She contends that she was forced to return to work so that she would not lose her health insurance coverage or benefits.

At various times while she was pregnant, plaintiff experienced pain in her knees and ankles. This pain continued after her pregnancy.

On September 3, 1991, approximately four months after the birth of her child, plaintiff visited her family physician, Dr. Peter J. Christiano, for a sinus problem. While there, she mentioned that she had pain in her left ankle. In response to plaintiff's request, her doctor wrote her a note dated September 4, 1991, indicating that she was "not to do increased walking until further noted." The note did not refer specifically to plaintiffs position at the KDOC, nor did it attempt to list what duties were to be performed or avoided. Dr. Christiano did not speak with any of plaintiffs supervisors, nor was he specifically aware of the policies or procedures of the KDOC regarding light duty assignments at LCF. He was also not aware of the specific duties required to be performed by plaintiff at the facility.

On December 28, 1991, plaintiff again visited Dr. Christiano, complaining that her knees and ankles were hurting her. She again requested, and was given, a note from her doctor stating that she work only light duty. Dr. Christiano used the term "light duty" in a general sense and intended that it would mean she should "cut down" on walking or those activities causing her pain.

On December 30, 1991, plaintiff complained to her shift supervisor that her light duty requests were not being accommodated.

It was not clear to plaintiff's supervisors, from the way Dr. Christiano's December 28th note was written, whether plaintiff was to be off work until January 13, 1992, and then resume light duty work, or whether plaintiff was to work light duty until January 13, 1992. Plaintiff was requested to obtain some clarification of the meaning of the note. Plaintiff then presented defendant with a second note from Dr. Christiano indicating that she should work light duty until January

863 F. Supp. 1483
13, 1992, at which time she could return to regular duty. Although the note says "return to regular duty on 1-13-92," plaintiff contends that Dr. Christiano put her on light duty "until further notice."

Plaintiff was requested to meet with the "rostering captain," James McMillan, on January 2, 1992, concerning the last notes from her doctor. Plaintiff contends that this meeting escalated into a "berating" session during which plaintiff was yelled at, intimidated and physically restrained from leaving. On January 3, 1992, plaintiff made a formal written complaint to Walt Keene stating that her light duty requests were not being accommodated.

Plaintiffs last day on the job was January 20, 1992. Plaintiff does not specifically state why she never returned to work. Implicit in her argument, however, is the contention that because she was not accommodated, in that her light duty requests were not accommodated, she was forced to abandon her job. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she repeatedly asked for light duty, that her requests were not accommodated, and that her health deteriorated as a result.

From January of 1991 to December of 1991, plaintiff worked 170 days at KCF. Of those 170 days, she worked 118.5 days in "visitor's reception," 28 days in "tower 7," 16 days in the "visiting room," two days in the "maximum visiting control/bubble," two days as an "escort," two days on "suicide watch" and one day as a telephone operator. Beginning in 1992, she no longer worked at "visitor's reception," worked the "maximum security visiting room" six days and worked as an escort or in "ECA" a few days. The maximum security visiting room, escort and ECA are not considered light duty posts according KDOC personnel policies. Plaintiff also contends that tower 7 was not a light duty post and could not be considered as such with regard to her injuries because of the climbing of stairs and walking that is involved.

On January 23, 1992, Warden David R. McKune wrote to plaintiff noting that he was aware that she was hospitalized and that she was requesting temporary disability. He advised her that as of January 25, 1992, she would have no leave balances and would enter leave without pay status. He further informed plaintiff that a permanent employee may be granted leave without pay status for a reasonable period of time, but that it was necessary that she provide an approximate projected length of absence. He also advised her of the effect her `without pay status' would have on her health insurance coverage and her options in that regard.

On February 13, 1993, Dr. Christiano wrote a letter stating the following (although it is unclear whether defendant received this letter, the court will assume for purposes of this motion, that the KDOC received the letter):

Ms. Brinkman is a patient of mine with degenerative arthritis effecting sic her knees, ankles, and sic elbows. I feel that probably the prolonged walking and standing she does on her job is aggravating the arthritis. I feel she should be on light duty. I have sent other slips with her stating she was to be on light duty.

On March 11, 1992, plaintiff's husband submitted a KDOC "Request for Leave" slip. On the slip, he indicated that plaintiff was under a doctor's care, was unable to give a date of return to work and was "sick til further notice."

On March 20, 1992, Warden McKune sent plaintiff a letter notifying her of his intention to dismiss her from her position as a corrections officer at LCF. He cited K.S.A. 75-2949f(p) which permits dismissal of a permanent civil service employee who exhibits "personal conduct detrimental to state service which could cause undue disruption of work ... as may be determined by appointing authority." He stated that the basis for the dismissal was plaintiff's reluctance to provide requested information regarding her health and work status.

On March 27, 1992, Warden McKune sent plaintiff another letter, this time advising her that he intended to postpone the dismissal. He indicated that he felt perhaps his previous letters were not fully explicit as to the information he required of plaintiff. He was aware that plaintiff had an appointment with her doctor on March 30, 1992, and stated that he would postpone his decision regarding

863 F. Supp. 1484
her dismissal until after that appointment. He scheduled a meeting with plaintiff to discuss her status on April 2, 1992

On April 2, 1992, the KDOC personnel office received a letter from plaintiff's psychologist, Swaran K. Jain, Ph.D. which stated that he had advised plaintiff not to return to work. On April 27, Warden McKune again wrote plaintiff and advised her that he intended to separate her employment at LCF...

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19 practice notes
  • Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., No. 94-4228-SAC.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • February 13, 1996
    ...analysis used under Title VII. E.E.O.C. v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d at 947; Brinkman v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.Kan.1994). The evidence to prove a disparate treatment claim may be direct or circumstantial. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20......
  • Bennett v. Henderson, Civil Action No. 97-2151-GLR.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • August 7, 1998
    ...to defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its treatment of plaintiff. Brinkman v. State Dep't of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 VI. Discussion Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, as a......
  • Medina v. City of Osawatomie, No. 97-2178-JWL.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • January 27, 1998
    ...to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the district court's sound discretion. See Brinkman v. State Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1488 (D.Kan.1994). The district court is expressly authorized to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the c......
  • Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., No. 4:95CV668SNL.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Missouri)
    • June 4, 1996
    ...discrimination action. Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.1994); Brinkman v. State Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.Kan.1994); LaFleur v. Westridge Consultants, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 318, 324 (E.D.Tex.1994). As will be shown, plaintiff fails to prod......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
19 cases
  • Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., No. 94-4228-SAC.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • February 13, 1996
    ...analysis used under Title VII. E.E.O.C. v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d at 947; Brinkman v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.Kan.1994). The evidence to prove a disparate treatment claim may be direct or circumstantial. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20......
  • Bennett v. Henderson, Civil Action No. 97-2151-GLR.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • August 7, 1998
    ...to defendant to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its treatment of plaintiff. Brinkman v. State Dep't of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 VI. Discussion Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, as a......
  • Medina v. City of Osawatomie, No. 97-2178-JWL.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas
    • January 27, 1998
    ...to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the district court's sound discretion. See Brinkman v. State Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1488 (D.Kan.1994). The district court is expressly authorized to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the c......
  • Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., No. 4:95CV668SNL.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Missouri)
    • June 4, 1996
    ...discrimination action. Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.1994); Brinkman v. State Dept. of Corrections, 863 F.Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.Kan.1994); LaFleur v. Westridge Consultants, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 318, 324 (E.D.Tex.1994). As will be shown, plaintiff fails to prod......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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