Brinks v. State
Decision Date | 28 October 1986 |
Docket Number | 1 Div. 267 |
Citation | 500 So.2d 1311 |
Parties | William BRINKS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Barbara A. Brown, Mobile, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Beth Slate Poe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
William Brinks was convicted of pharmacy robbery, in violation of § 13A-8-51, Code of Alabama (1975) and sentenced, as a habitual offender, to life imprisonment without parole. He raises five issues on appeal.
On March 14, 1985, a man entered Chapman's Pharmacy in Mobile and forced the pharmacist, at gunpoint, to fill a pillowcase with Schedule II narcotics. The robber wore a stocking mask and neither the pharmacist nor the store clerk could identify him. After the assailant left the store, both the pharmacist and the clerk heard the noise of a car or truck with a loud muffler and squealing tires. The pharmacist immediately reported the robbery, but was unable to describe the robber or the getaway vehicle.
Alfred Pearce was standing across the street and saw a white Chevrolet pickup truck with a loud muffler drive by the pharmacy, turn around, drive by again, and then park in front of the store. A few moments later he saw the same truck Pearce saw two people in the truck, He described the vehicle to police as a "white '69 or '70 Chevrolet pickup truck," and identified State's exhibit 13 as a photograph of the same truck he saw at Chapman's Pharmacy the day of the robbery.
A police radio dispatch reported the robbery and described the vehicle as a "white longbed, step-side Chevrolet pickup truck," "approximately a '70 or '71 model," "with the tailgate down." Fifteen minutes after hearing the broadcast, Corporal William Brokaw, who was on patrol in the vicinity of the robbery, spotted a truck matching the description given on the radio, and followed the vehicle to a convenience store approximately three and one-half to four miles away from Chapman's Pharmacy. The truck pulled in at the convenience store, and two white males got out of the vehicle. When Officer Brokaw saw that the man leaving the driver's side matched the description of one of the suspects broadcast over the radio, "a large heavy set white male, dark complected with a large stomach," he held the two men at gunpoint until assistance arrived. The suspects were given their Miranda rights and placed in a patrol car, and the truck was searched.
The defendant challenges the admission into evidence of his confession and the controlled substances found during a search of the truck in which he was riding, claiming that both were the fruits of an illegal arrest. Specifically, he contends that the radio dispatch on which the police officers relied in following his truck and later apprehending him did not provide probable cause for his arrest.
Whether a warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid depends on "whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Sexton v. State, 349 So.2d 126 (Ala.Cr.App.1977). See § 15-10-3(3), Code of Alabama (1975). Probable cause cannot be satisfied on the basis of a radio dispatch alone. Ex parte Paschal, 365 So.2d 681, 682 (Ala.1978); Owens v. State, 51 Ala.App. 50, 282 So.2d 402, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 794, 282 So.2d 417 (1973). See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). "While the arresting officers may rely on radio broadcasts 'the subsequent determination by any court as to probable cause must necessarily turn on all the circumstances giving rise to the police dispatch.' " Rudolph v. State, 371 So.2d 962, 964 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General, 371 So.2d 965 (Ala.1979) (quoting Owens v. State, 51 Ala.App. at 61, 282 So.2d at 413).
The circumstances underlying the radio dispatch in the present case established probable cause for the defendant's arrest. The pharmacist's report of the robbery was the basis for the radio dispatch, and provided probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed. Pearce's description of the fleeing truck and its occupants was the foundation for Corporal Brokaw's pursuit of the truck, sighted within fifteen minutes and four miles of the robbery, and provided probable cause to believe that the occupants of the truck were the fleeing felons.
Campbell v. State, 354 So.2d 325, 327 (Ala.Cr.App.1977).
The fact that Pearce's description of the truck and its occupants was given to different law enforcement officers from the officials to whom the pharmacist reported the robbery is immaterial. "The knowledge of all the officers involved in a police situation may be evaluated collectively in assessing whether that knowledge constituted probable cause as is constitutionally required." Shute v. State, 469 So.2d 670, 673 (Ala.Cr.App.1984); Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d 379 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 361 So.2d 383 (Ala.1978). "The knowledge of one officer is imputed to another officer in the situation of a radio call directing a stop or arrest, in assessing whether or not probable cause existed." Shute v. State, 469 So.2d at 673.
The defendant maintains that the State failed to prove a prima facie case due to the inability of the pharmacist or the drugstore clerk to give the police a description of the robber or to identify him as the assailant at trial. He cites Calloway v. State, 473 So.2d 601 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), and Lacey v. State, 354 So.2d 342 (Ala.Cr.App.1978) for the proposition that when there has been no eyewitness identification of the robber the conviction is due to be reversed. That proposition is unsound and not supported by legal authority. "The accused's identity as a participant in a robbery may be established by circumstantial evidence and does not require eyewitness identification by the victim or others." Calloway, 473 So.2d at 602-03. In both Calloway and Lacey, there was absolutely no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, connecting the accused to the robbery.
Here, not only was the defendant found in the truck which had been particularly described by an eyewitness to its flight from the scene of the crime, but the fruits of the robbery were found in the truck and the defendant confessed. Upon waiving his Fifth Amendment rights, the defendant stated, When asked why he robbed Chapman's Pharmacy, the defendant said he "did it for the money," and upon being asked how much money he got, the defendant said he "didn't get any money, he just took drugs." The evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify. During closing argument, the following occurred:
In evaluating a claim that the prosecutor's statement amounted to a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, " '[t]he facts and circumstances of each case must be carefully analyzed to determine "whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would...
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