Brinley v. Lewis

• Citation: 27 F. Supp. 313
• Decision Date: 01 May 1939
• Docket Number: No. 111.,111.
• Parties: BRINLEY v. LEWIS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

27 F. Supp. 313

BRINLEY v. LEWIS.

No. 111.

District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania.

May 1, 1939.

Scragg & Scragg, of Scranton, Pa., for plaintiff.

E. D. Siegrist and Clarke M. Seltzer, both of Lebanon, Pa., for defendant.

ALBERT L. WATSON, District Judge.

This is a motion by the defendant, under the provisions of Rule 12, subsections (e) and (f) of the New Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, for a more definite statement and to strike off part of the complaint. The motion consists of three requests for a more definite statement and a request to strike a paragraph from the complaint on the ground that it is redundant and immaterial.

The defendant urges that the plaintiff be required to furnish a more definite statement as to which of the injuries alleged are permanent; a more definite statement of the expenses for medicine, medical attendance, hospitalization, and nursing; and a more definite statement with regard to the claim of special damages by reason of injury to plaintiff's business.

During the course of the argument, counsel for the defendant stated that the information requested was not necessary for the purpose of answering the complaint. Counsel also stated that considerable investigation had been made of plaintiff's business, and that much information regarding that business was in the possession of the defendant. However, the court was convinced of the good faith of defendant in filing this motion and of his honest desire to have the information requested.

The pleading against which this motion is directed has been carefully considered by the court and it appears to be a most adequate statement of the cause of action. The plaintiff has stated, with admirable brevity and directness, a case of assault and battery. The location and nature of the personal injuries resulting therefrom have been set forth in detail and, as special damage, the plaintiff has alleged that he is registrar and proprietor of a named business which has been injured by his absence and will continue to be so injured by reason of the permanent nature of some of his injuries. The plaintiff also alleges matters in aggravation of the assault. In the opinion of the court, this pleading is sufficient. There are no vague generalities nor ambiguous phrases which are objectionable, nor is it left in doubt as to what the plaintiff intends to prove at the trial.

Rule 8, subsections (a) and (e) require the complaint to be short and the allegations to be simple, concise, and direct. It is evident that the framers of these rules did not intend that compliance with Rule 8 should expose a plaintiff to a motion under Rule 12(e). Attention is called to Rules 33 to 37 inclusive, which provide for a simple and expeditious method of obtaining detailed information as to the cause of action and of limiting the issues to be tried. These rules, with the exception of Rules 34 and 35, do not require the delay of an application to the court for permission to demand the information desired. Furthermore, the information obtainable under these five rules is far more complete than that obtainable under the broadest construction of Rule 12(e). Therefore, I feel that motions under Rule 12(e) are properly presented only where the complaint is so vague or ambiguous or contains such broad generalizations that the defendant cannot frame an answer thereto or understand the nature and extent of the charges so as generally to prepare for trial.

The courts are making every effort to impress upon counsel the necessity for bringing cases before the court for trial at the earliest possible moment and to prevent as much as possible tactics of defendants in seeking, through delay, to prevent the plaintiff from recovering that which...