Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Com'n

• Decision Date: 21 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 2:99CV1637.,CIV. A. 2:99CV1637.
• Citation: Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Com'n, 113 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D. Va. 2000)
• Parties: L. Douglas BRINN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TIDEWATER TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT COMMISSION, t/a Tidewater Regional Transit, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

113 F.Supp.2d 935

L. Douglas BRINN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TIDEWATER TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT COMMISSION, t/a Tidewater Regional Transit, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 2:99CV1637.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

September 21, 2000.

Susan T. Ferguson, Jonathan G. Martinis, Commonwealth of Virginia Rights of Virginians with Disabilities, Richmond, VA, Stephen A. Gold, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Donald H. Clark, Abram W. Vander-Meer, Jr., Williams, Mullen, Clark & Dobbins, PC, Virginia Beach, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment Order filed July 31, 2000, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment filed August 2, 2000. For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion is DENIED.

The complaint was filed on September 27, 1999. Plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf, and as a class action on behalf of all those similarly situated, against defendant for failing and/or refusing to provide necessary public transportation for disabled individuals as mandated by statute, thereby discriminating against these individuals in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the regulations promulgated pursuant to each. On April 17, 2000, an order was entered certifying this case as a class action, approving notice to members of the class, setting forth terms of a permanent injunction and settlement, directing counsel for plaintiffs to file their petition for an award of attorneys' fees within eleven (11) days, and permitting defendant to file a response within eleven (11) days of plaintiffs' petition. Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs on April 28, 2000, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54; 42 U.S.C. § 12205; and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2)(b). Defendant filed its opposition to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs on May 8, 2000. Plaintiffs filed a reply on May 11, 2000. On June 23, 2000, the court held a hearing regarding plaintiffs' motion. The court took the matter under advisement and, on July 21, 2000, entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees in the amount of $29,506.24 for the services of Jonathan Martinis, counsel for plaintiffs, and denying plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees for the services of Stephen F. Gold, a Philadelphia lawyer hired by Mr. Martinis to consult on the case. The court ordered that the fees be paid by defendant within ten (10) days of the date of the order. In lieu of paying the fees, defendant filed this motion, requesting an extension of time up to and including August 29, 2000, to pay the fees or to make a decision to appeal the judgment. Subsequently, on August 15, 2000, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

Defendant premised its Motion to Amend on the grounds that it was entitled to a full and fair opportunity to determine whether it would undertake an appeal; it would be extremely difficult to assemble its governing body on such short notice to make this decision; and neither plaintiffs nor their counsel would be prejudiced in the event defendant's motion was granted. Additionally, in the event of an appeal of the court's order, defendant moved the court to stay payment of the attorney's fees and costs and to dispense with the posting of an appeal bond. In response, plaintiffs argued that the motion should be denied because defendant's alleged "difficulty" in obtaining the necessary funds within the time provided by the court was an insufficient basis for relief. Furthermore, plaintiffs contended that they were in fact harmed by defendant's failure to comply with the order because they continued to lose the interest that would have accrued on the fees had they been paid in a timely fashion. Plaintiffs also requested an additional award of attorney's fees for defending against defendant's motion.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

A. Award of Attorney's Fees

It is well-established that awards of attorneys' fees and costs are within the discretion of trial judges. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Colonial Williamsburg Found. v. Kittinger Co., 38 F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir.1994). In this case, plaintiffs proceeded under Section 12205, which permits the court to award the prevailing party "a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205. There is little case law interpreting this provision. Therefore, courts adjudicating motions under Section 12205 have relied on the body of law produced by motions for attorneys' fees under the general fee-shifting statute applicable to federal statutory civil rights actions. See Robins v. Scholastic Book Fairs, 928 F.Supp. 1027, 1036 (D.Or.1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 485 (9th Cir.1997) (referring to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 1988), noting the scarcity of judicial interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and relying on legislative history, which suggests that Congress intended that Section 12205 would operate in the same manner as Section 1988); Alexander S. By and Through Bowers v. Boyd, 929 F.Supp. 925, 930 (D.S.C.1995), aff'd, Burnside v. Boyd, 89 F.3d 827, 1996 WL 329529 (4th Cir.1996) (finding that the analytical considerations for motions seeking awards of attorneys' fees under Section 12205 are "essentially the same" as those for awards under Section 1988).

Moreover, attorney's fees expended in an attempt to collect attorney's fees awarded by a court are also recoverable under Section 1988. See Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 933 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 803 (7th Cir.1981)). Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act expressly allows the court to award a prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce [the] provision[s] of 1981[and] 1981(a) ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b). It specifically authorizes the recovery of fees for collection efforts because "`[t]he victory would be hollow if plaintiffs were left with a paper judgment not negotiable into cash except by undertaking burdensome and uncompensated litigation.'" Dotson, 937 F.2d at 933 (quoting Balark, 655 F.2d at 803).

B. Award of Post-Judgment Interest

In addition to attorney's fees and costs, post-judgment interest may also be awarded on the entire amount of a civil judgment obtained in a district court. "`[T]he purpose of postjudgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant.'" Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (quoting Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d Cir.1987)). Additionally, it "serves a salutary housekeeping purpose for the forum by creating an incentive for unsuccessful defendants to avoid frivolous appeals and by minimizing the necessity for court-supervised execution upon judgments." Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059, 108 S.Ct. 2831, 100 L.Ed.2d 931 (1988); see Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co., Inc. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).

Despite the failure to specifically include a provision for post-judgment interest, "it is [still] proper for the [c]ourt to correct its ruling to include such interest ... where the interest is allowed as a matter of law." Flowers Transp., Inc. v. M/V Peanut Hollinger, 94 F.R.D. 99, 100-01 (E.D.La.1982) (relying on the analysis of pre-judgment interest in Glick and In re Merry Queen, and premising its holding on Rule 60(a), which allows for the court, at any time on its own initiative, to correct clerical mistakes and errors arising from oversight or omission regardless of whether the error goes undiscovered for more than ten days); see Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir.1972); In re Merry Queen Transfer Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y.1967). Post-judgment interest is "automatic from the date of entry of judgment ... [when] recovered in civil cases in federal district courts." Flowers, 94 F.R.D. at 100; see 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1031 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that "post-judgment interest on the entire amount the court awarded ... most closely comports with the purpose of post-judgment interest articulated by the Supreme Court" in Bonjorno, 494 U.S. at 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570); United States v. Hannon, 728 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that a court may award interest on the entire amount due "when a prior judgment consisting of both principal and accumulated interest is not paid"); Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir.1982) (granting plaintiff interest on award of attorney's fees under Section 1988); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 359 F.2d 403, 404 (2d Cir.1966) (awarding of interest on judgment amount plus interest accrued prior to judgment date was appropriate). Furthermore, post-judgment interest begins to accrue from the date the judgment is entered until payment is made in full at the federal rate of interest as calculated using the formula set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Hitachi Credit Am. Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d 614, 633 (4th Cir.1999).

C. Appeal, Bond, and Stay of Judgment

A defendant is entitled to file an appeal from a final order in a civil case within thirty (30) days of its entry. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). Although the filing of a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction, see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct....