Briscoe v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 October 1889 |
| Citation | 40 F. 273 |
| Parties | BRISCOE v. SOUTHERN KAN. RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
The act of congress of July 4, 1884, gives to the circuit or district court of the western district of Arkansas jurisdiction over suits by or against the Southern Kansas Railroad Company such company having a right, by the act of congress, to build its road and operate the same in the Indian country.
The claim of jurisdiction of this court must be based on the subject-matter, and cannot depend on the citizenship of the parties.
The court has jurisdiction because this is a suit arising under a law of the United States. When is a suit one arising under a law of the United States? When it appears that some title right, privilege, or immunity on which the recovery depends will be defeated by one construction of a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction.
Prior to the act of July 4, 1884, the plaintiff could have had no remedy in the Indian country for the injury caused by the tort of defendant; therefore, he had no remedy anywhere.
When that act of congress gave for the first time a remedy, the right of plaintiff became for the first time a perfect right.
Until the time it was a remediless right, and, practically, was no right, as a right without a remedy is no right. This law of congress gave the plaintiff a right or privilege for the first time.
Jurisdiction exists in a court of the United States as well where an act of congress for the first time gives a right of action, thus affording a remedy, as where it creates a right. In either case it is the existence of a claim to a right or privilege that is founded on a law of congress, and is therefore a case arising under a law of the United States,-- one where a party comes into court to demand something conferred on him by a law of congress.
In a case where a railroad company has legal authority to lease its road, and does lease it, and turns over the whole control and management of the road to the lessee, it would not be liable for damages caused by the torts of the lessee. To absolve the lessor from liability the lease must be authorized by legislative authority.
A corporation cannot absolve itself from the performance of its obligations to the public without the consent of the legislature expressly given.
The lessor is absolved from liability by legislative authority in effect, when the lease is authorized by law.
The authority is not given by the act of congress of July 4 1884, to the Southern Kansas Railroad Company, to lease its road situated in the Indian country. This authority to lease must be expressly given. Congress simply recognized the Southern Kansas Railroad as a Kansas corporation, having an existence under the laws of Kansas, and gave to it certain rights in the Indian country, such as the right to build its road through that country and exercise all the ordinary powers incident to the ownership, construction, and operation of its road.
A state, by chartering a corporation, cannot confer upon it a legal right to act within the jurisdiction of another state.
Every power which a corporation exercises in a state other than the one creating it depends for its validity upon the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised.
Courts of justice of a country have always expounded and executed contracts according to the law of the place in which they were made, provided that law was not repugnant to the laws or policy of their own country.
By the comity of nations foreign corporations are allowed to make contracts, within their respective limits, not contrary to their known policy, or injurious to their interests.
By this principle a railroad corporation has the right to exercise all of its ordinary powers in a state other than that which created it,-- such powers growing out of its franchise,-- such as making contracts in regard to the transaction of its business, etc.
But under such a principle of comity a railroad company cannot exercise, out of the state which created it, an extraordinary power, such as is involved in leasing its road which is situated out of said state; and, when the only authority to lease it is contained in its home charter, it cannot lease a road owned by it situated beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of such home charter, so as to get rid of its responsibility to the public, which it assumed when it accepted the franchise. The leasing of its road by a railroad company is the exercise of an extraordinary power, which cannot be exercised by such company unless express authority is conferred on it.
Railroad companies being public corporations so far as to be subjected to control by legislative action, they can do no act which would amount to a renunciation of their duty to the public or which would directly and necessarily disable them from performing it. They cannot, therefore, without express authority, convey away
by lease for a long time their franchises and corporate rights. But they may contract debts, purchase on credit, and mortgage their personal property not affixed to the road, though used in operating it, as doing these things would be but the exercise of ordinary powers. The laws of Kansas granting to defendant the right to lease its road cannot operate beyond the sovereignty of Kansas.
Barnes, Mellette & Boudinot, for plaintiff.
Duval & Cravens, Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dunlap, for defendant.
PARKER, J., (after stating the facts as above.)
The first question is, did the eighth section of the act of congress of July 4, 1884, give the plaintiff the right to bring a suit in this court? The section is--
Counsel for defendant contend that the last clause of the section to-wit, 'so far as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act,' is a limitation to the section of such a nature as to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to such controversies as may arise between the tribes or nations through whose territory the road is constructed and the inhabitants of such tribes and nations to matters necessary to carry out the provisions of the act,-- in other words, it limits it to such suits between the tribes and nations, or members of the tribes and nations, and the railroad company, as may arise under the act granting the right of way, and pertaining to the right of way, and damages for the same; and that the same cannot be extended to a suit to recover for a common-law tort, a recovery upon which depends in no manner whatever upon the construction of the act granting the right of way to the railroad company. If this proposition is true, the nation or tribe, or the inhabitants thereof, were left by congress without any remedy for torts committed by the railroad company; for, as there is no remedy for torts such as was sued for in this case at the place where the same was committed, there could be no remedy anywhere. As the plaintiff could not sue in the Indian country, he could not sue anywhere. Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109. It is there decided, by Justice GRAY, that to maintain an action of tort founded upon an injury to person or property, and not upon a breach of contract, the act which is the cause of the injury and the foundation of the action must be actionable or punishable by the law of the place in which it is done. The latest case on this subject is Carter v. Goode, 50 Ark. 156, 6 S.W.Rep. 719, where the doctrine that is well sustained by American and English law, as announced in the case of Le Forest v. Tolman, was fully and clearly recognized. Then the plaintiff was remediless, unless the provisions of this act gave him a remedy. The nations of Indians through whose lands the 120 miles of the Southern Kansas Railroad passes have many rights that may be destroyed or affected by the tortious acts of the defendant. There are many resident Indians, and many lawful residents in these nations who are not Indians. They have rights that may be affected or destroyed by the torts of the defendant. Did congress intend that this road should obtain from the United States the franchise which gave it the right to build its road, own it, run it, and receive its earnings, and the lawful residents of this country, for a distance of 120 miles, were to be left without a remedy for an injury to personal property, no matter how great the same might be, caused by the negligent and tortious conduct of defendant's agents? This is hardly to be presumed. Unless there is an entire absence of any language in the act which will, by a reasonable construction, warrant the conclusion that it was the purpose of congress to afford a remedy, the act must be construed to harmonize with the purpose of congress to promote the right and secure justice by affording a means of redress to the lawful inhabitants of these nations for a tortious act committed by defendant. ...
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