Brisson v. State

• Docket Number: A22-1827
• Decision Date: 21 August 2023
• Citation: 994 N.W.2d 920
• Parties: Natalie R. BRISSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

994 N.W.2d 920

Natalie R. BRISSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, et al., Respondents.

A22-1827

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed August 21, 2023

Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Joseph Weiner, Anna Veit-Carter, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

REILLY, Judge

Appellant, a former inmate, challenges the dismissal of her claims against respondents—the State of Minnesota, its department of corrections (the DOC), and its commissioner of corrections—arising out of a sexual assault by a correctional officer.Appellant asserts the district court erred by (1) dismissing her tort claims against respondents on the ground that respondents were immune from vicarious liability, and (2) granting summary judgment on her sex-discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (the MHRA).Based on our decision in Sterry v. Minnesota Department of Corrections , 986 N.W.2d 715,717(Minn. App.2023), we conclude that the district court erred by determining that respondents were immune from vicarious liability under the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act (the MSTCA) and dismissing appellant's tort claims.We also conclude that appellant's sex-discrimination claim survives summary judgment because the MHRA provision on which the claim relies, Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, does not require a showing that respondents knew or should have known that the correctional officer would engage in discriminatory conduct.We therefore reverse and remand.

FACTS

AppellantNatalie R. Brisson sued respondents seeking to hold them vicariously liable for a sexual assault by corrections officer Randy Beehler, who was employed by the DOC at the time.The complaint and supporting documentation reflect these facts.¹

In September 2019, Beehler was assigned to transport Brisson from the Olmsted County jail to the Hennepin County jail in a prison vehicle.Beehler restrained Brisson with shackles and handcuffs and placed her in the back of the vehicle.Beehler drove to an abandoned business building, parked the vehicle, removed Brisson's restraints, and ordered her to sit in the front seat.Beehler engaged Brisson in a conversation about sex and fondled her breasts.Beehler threatened Brisson that she would get into trouble if she told anyone what occurred.Beehler then left the abandoned business building and continued driving, leaving Brisson in the front seat without restraints.As he was driving, Beehler exposed and forced Brisson to touch his penis.Beehler also ordered Brisson to pull down her jeans and expose her vagina.Beehler digitally penetrated Brisson's vagina.Beehler grabbed the back of Brisson's head and pulled it to his groin, forcing her face and mouth to touch his penis.Brisson did not want to engage in sexual contact but felt forced to cooperate due to Beehler's position of authority and his threats toward her.Beehler later drove to the Hennepin County jail and transferred her into the custody of jail staff.

Brisson sued respondents asserting, as relevant here, various tort claims and a claim for sex discrimination in violation of the MHRA.²Respondents brought a motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion in part, dismissing all the claims against respondents except for the MHRA claim.The district court reasoned that respondents could not be held liable on the tort claims because Beehler was not acting within the scope of employment when he sexually assaulted Brisson.

Respondents later moved for summary judgment on Brisson's MHRA claim.The district court determined there was "no genuine dispute of fact regarding whether [respondents] knew or should have known of any sexual harassment or potential sexual misconduct by [Beehler]."The district court noted that respondents had introduced evidence that the DOC never received complaints or allegations of sexual misconduct regarding Beehler, that the state had many policies in place to prevent sexual harassment, and had enacted a zero-tolerance policy for sexual abuse or harassment.The district court found that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brisson as the nonmoving party, there was no evidence that could be presented establishing that respondents knew or should have known that Beehler would sexually assault Brisson.Based on this determination, the district court granted the summary-judgment motion, dismissed the MHRA claim and entered final judgment.³

Brisson appeals.

ISSUES

I.Did the district court err by dismissing Brisson's tort claims?

II.Did the district court err by granting summary judgment on Brisson's MHRA claim?

ANALYSIS

I.The district court erred in dismissing Brisson's tort claims against respondents.

A pleading may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e)."A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded."Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 603(Minn.2014).On appeal, this court reviews de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief; and we accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.Hansen v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 934 N.W.2d 319, 325(Minn.2019).We will uphold dismissal "if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded."Finn v. All. Bank , 860 N.W.2d 638, 653(Minn.2015)(quotation omitted).

The district court considered whether respondents were immune from Brisson's tort claims under the MSTCA, Minn. Stat. § 3.736(2022), and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.Under the MSTCA, the state is subject to liability for torts "caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the scope of office or employment."Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1."Scope of office or employment" means that "the employee was acting on behalf of the state in the performance of duties or tasks lawfully assigned by competent authority."Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3)(2022).The district court reasoned that Beehler was not acting on behalf of the state at the time of the sexual assault.

Our recent decision in Sterry compels reversal.986 N.W.2d at 717.In Sterry , a former inmate sued the DOC and a correctional officer alleging that the correctional officer, who was assigned to supervise Sterry and other inmates, engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and stalking.Id.One time, Sterry was working in the prison kitchen when the officer ordered him into a supply room and fondled his penis without his consent.Id. at 718.The officer threatened Sterry to obtain compliance and continued to sexually harass him.Id.Sterry brought a civil action alleging the DOC was vicariously liable for the officer's tortious conduct.Id.The DOC moved to dismiss the complaint and argued it was immune under the MSTCA.Id.The district court dismissed Sterry's tort claims against the DOC, concluding that the DOC was immune from liability because the MSTCA's "definition of ... scope [of employment] effectively severs the State's liability from [the officer's] sexual contact with Sterry."Id.

In reviewing the district court's analysis, we conducted a two-part analysis by first interpreting the statutory definition of "scope of office or employment," and then examining whether the DOC was entitled to dismissal based on Sterry's allegations related to the officer's scope of employment.Id. at 719.As for the first part of the analysis, we began by noting that "whether an employee's acts fall within the scope of employment is generally a question of fact."Id. at 721(citingReetz v. City of Saint Paul , 956 N.W.2d 238, 247(Minn.2021)("[W]hen determining the vicarious liability of an employer, the issue of whether an employee was acting within the scope of their employment is also a question of fact.")).We then considered the interplay between the MSTCA and the common law and concluded that

the only reasonable interpretation of the MSTCA's scope-of-employment definition is consistent with the common law.We see no material reason to differentiate the MSTCA's definition of scope of employment from the common law.Thus, we interpret the MSTCA's definition of scope of employment to be consistent with the common law on scope of employment for vicarious liability.

Id. at 723.

Having determined that the definition of "scope of office or employment" in the MSTCA adheres to the common-law understanding of scope of employment, we next turned to the second part of the analysis to consider whether Sterry's complaint stated legally sufficient tort claims against the DOC.Id.We determined that Sterry's complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal.Id. at 725.Sterry asserted the officer "was supervising Sterry as a representative of [the DOC] at the time of the sexual assault."Id. at 724.The complaint also alleged the officer was performing department duties and tasks related to her position as a correctional officer.Id.Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, we determined that Sterry's allegations "sufficiently allege that [the officer] acted within her scope of employment as provided in the MSTCA, and so, Sterry's complaint survives the state's immunity-based motion to dismiss."Id. at 725.We therefore determined the DOC was not entitled to dismissal of Sterry's complaint and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.Id.

Applying Sterry to this case, we conclude that Brisson's complaint alleges sufficient facts to withstand dismissal of the tort...