Brister v. A.W.I., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-3263,90-3263
• Citation: 946 F.2d 350,1993 A.M.C. 1990
• Parties: Barry BRISTER and Karen Brister, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. A.W.I., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 350

946 F.2d 350

1993 A.M.C. 1990

Barry BRISTER and Karen Brister, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. A.W.I., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

No. 90-3263.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 17, 1991.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Nov. 25, 1991.

Chester C. Stetfelt, Jr., Kenneth W. Manuel, Jacobs, Manuel & Kain, A. Remy Fransen, Jr., Fransen & Hardin, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants, cross-appellees.

Wood Brown, III, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown, Read, Hammond & Mintz, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before KING and JONES, Circuit Judges. ^*

KING, Circuit Judge:

Barry Brister sued his employer, A.W.I., Inc. (AWI), for injuries suffered when he slipped and fell during the course of his employment as a member of a drill rigging crew. Brister appeals the district court's decision, contending that the court erred in: (1) limiting AWI's liability under 46 U.S.C.App. § 183 to compensate him for his injury by holding that the jury finding of no negligence precluded consideration of whether AWI had privity or knowledge, and that no evidence supported a presumption of privity or knowledge; (2) determining that AWI's insurer could receive the benefit of AWI's limitation of liability; and (3) granting interest on the award from the date of the judgment instead of from the date of the accident, or in the alternative, from the date of the judicial demand. In addition, AWI cross-appeals the district court's supplemental judgment awarding Brister $40,747.52 in maintenance and cure benefits in addition to the limitation fund. We vacate the decision of the district court on the first ground, affirm on the remaining issues, and remand for fact findings as instructed herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Brister injured his back while "tripping pipe out of the hole" on AWI Rig # 4 on December 5, 1988. This procedure involves lifting segments of pipe from the drilling hole and then removing and racking the topmost segment. Wedge shaped blocks, known as "slips," prevent the lower segments of pipe from slipping. While Brister was pulling a slip handle to loosen these blocks, he lost his footing on the uneven matting covering the drill floor and fell, injuring his back. The accident left him permanently disabled from performing manual labor.

Rubber safety mats cover the entire drill floor. One mat, called the rotary mat, surrounds the rotary where the pipe goes into the hole. Other mats mesh against this rotary mat. Before Brister's accident, the rotary mat on Rig # 4 had been damaged. On September 20, 1988, the company had replaced the damaged mat with the rotary mat from Rig # 7. Because the drill floor of each rig has a different size and dimension, however, the rotary mat from Rig # 7 did not mesh properly with the other mats on Rig # 4. After installing the mat, AWI "stacked" the rig (took it out of service) until late November 1988 because it did not have work for it. When Brister's accident occurred in early December, the rotary mat from Rig # 7 was still being used on Rig # 4.

Brister charged that AWI's failure to replace the defective mat caused his accident. He alleged negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. He also sought maintenance and cure. His wife, Karen Brister, joined in the suit to seek damages for loss of consortium.

AWI denied that the vessel was unseaworthy or that they had been negligent. In the alternative, AWI pleaded comparative negligence and limitation of liability. The district court conducted a bifurcated trial, trying all issues to the jury except for those pertaining to limitation of liability. The jury found that AWI was not "negligent in a manner that was a cause of injury to the plaintiff," but found the vessel was "unseaworthy in a manner that was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff." The jury awarded damages of $385,000 to Brister and $25,000 to his wife. The court entered judgment on these amounts, with legal interest from the date of the judgment.

The district court subsequently conducted a bench trial on the limitation issue based on the record from the Jones Act trial, supplemented by the parties. In viewing the record from the Jones Act trial, the court reasoned that it was collaterally estopped from considering whether AWI had privity or knowledge of the unseaworthy condition that caused Brister's injury because the jury had already determined that AWI had not been negligent. The district court found in the alternative that the facts failed to show that AWI had privity or knowledge of the vessel's unseaworthy condition. Because AWI succeeded on its limitation defense, the court limited AWI's liability to $108,635, the value of the vessel. 749 F.Supp. 749. After AWI deposited this amount with the court, Brister moved for a supplemental judgment, arguing that he was entitled to $40,747.52 in past medical expenses (or "cure") in addition to the $108,635 limitation fund because an employer's liability for maintenance and cure may not be limited to the amount of the vessel. The district court agreed and awarded Brister $40,747.52 with legal interest from the date of judgment. AWI cross-appeals from this supplemental judgment.

Brister moved to modify the judgment to include interest from the date of the accident, or in the alternative, from the date of judicial demand. The district court denied the motion. Brister appeals from this ruling and from the district court's judgment limiting his award to the value of the vessel.

II. ANALYSIS

We independently review a district court's conclusions of law. We may reverse its findings of fact, however, only if we determine that they were clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Finally, we review the district court's decision to deny prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. See Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir.1980).

A. Limitation of liability

Brister argues that the district court erred in holding that the jury finding of no negligence precluded consideration of AWI's privity or knowledge in the limitation proceeding because the issues of negligence under the Jones Act and "privity or knowledge" under the limitation of liability provision are not identical. We agree. Although the issues can be, and were in this case, formulated in nearly identical language, the disparate policies underlying each inquiry have resulted in definite differences in application and result.

In Diplomat Electric, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 430 F.2d 38, 45 (5th Cir.1970), we declared that collateral estoppel "is limited to matters distinctly put in issue, litigated, and determined in the former action." An important aspect of determining whether a previously litigated matter has collateral estoppel effect is the identity of that matter with the issue currently before the court. ¹ To resolve the question of whether the jury finding of no negligence in Brister's Jones Act claim estops inquiry into whether AWI had privity or knowledge of Rig # 4's unseaworthiness in the limitation proceeding, we must examine what was litigated in the jury trial and what was left to litigate in the limitation proceeding.

At the jury trial, Brister claimed that AWI was liable for his injury under the Jones Act, and also claimed that the unseaworthiness of the vessel proximately caused his injury under general maritime law. Since the jury found AWI was not negligent, Brister did not prevail in his Jones Act claim. However, he succeeded in establishing that the vessel was unseaworthy under general maritime law, enabling him to receive damages for his injury. He also received an award for maintenance and cure under general maritime law.

Because an employer is liable for the negligence of his employees under the Jones Act, the Jones Act generally provides a broad basis for liability. In addition, the Jones Act contains a liberal causation requirement. If the defendant's negligence played any part, however small, in producing the seaman's injury, it results in liability. Chisholm v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.1982). Other than this generous construction, though, the issue is essentially the same as in all personal injury cases: whether the employer acted or failed to act in a way that legally caused the seaman's injury determines whether, as a matter of policy, the seaman should be entitled to a remedy. In considering Brister's claim, the jury was instructed that "where the employer or his agents knew or should have known of dangerous conditions, and those conditions cause injury to a seaman, the employer is liable under the Jones Act." The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that AWI did not act negligently. Although Brister argues to the contrary, the jury's finding that AWI was not negligent was fully and fairly litigated, and necessary to the outcome of the Jones Act trial.

Unlike a Jones Act claim, unseaworthiness is "predicated without regard to fault or the use of due care." Lee v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 566 F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir.1977). A shipowner has an absolute nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95, 66 S.Ct. 872, 877, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). Accordingly, the seaworthiness issue is treated like a breach of warranty, rather than the narrower duty-breach inquiry for negligence. See In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir.1991). Also in contrast to a Jones Act claim, "[t]he standard of causation for unseaworthiness is a more demanding one and requires proof of proximate cause." See Chisholm, 679 F.2d at 62. "To establish the requisite proximate cause in an unseaworthiness claim, a plaintiff must...