Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton

Decision Date18 June 1956
Docket NumberNo. 4485,4485
Citation198 Va. 171,93 S.E.2d 288
PartiesBRISTOL REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY, ET AL. v. J. B. DENTON, ET AL. Record
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

William H. Woodward (Stant & Roberts, on brief), for the appellants.

H. E. Widener and H. E. Widener, Jr. (Ralph H. Brumet, Dick B. Rouse and Widener & Widener, on brief), for the appellees.

JUDGE: EGGLESTON

EGGLESTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

In August 1953, J. B. Denton and others filed their bill in the court below against Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Authority, and the City of Bristol, alleging that the plaintiffs are owners of real estate in that area within the city known as 'Sullins Street Redevelopment Project;' that purporting to act under the Virginia Housing Authorities Law (Code, §§ 36-1 to 36-55, both inclusive), the city council by ordinance had approved a slum clearance and redevelopment plan proposed by the Authority for the area and had entered into a written agreement with the Authority in furtherance of the project; that the redevelopment project contemplates the acquisition by the Authority, by purchase or by eminent domain, of all of the real estate in the area including that owned by the plaintiffs, the removal of the buildings therefrom, and the devotion of portions of the area for street purposes, off-street parking facilities, and commercial and residential purposes; that the plaintiffs are not willing to part with the titles to their properties in furtherance of the project and consequently the Authority is threatening to acquire these properties by eminent domain; that the statute under which the proposed redevelopment is to be carried out is unconstitutional and void; that even if the statute be constitutional yet the proposed redevelopment project does not constitute a 'valid undertaking within the meaning' of the statute; that a judicial determination of the facts will demonstrate that 'the conditions in said area, as a whole, are not detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community;' and that unless enjoined the defendants will in furtherance of the plan or project 'proceed to invoke the power of eminent domain in an effort to condemn the lands' of the plaintiffs and others in the area.

The prayer of the bill was, 'That all the acts of said defendants or either of them in furtherance of' the project 'be declared null and void,' and that the defendants be enjoined from proceeding with the project and from acquiring title to plaintiffs' lands 'by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise.'

The defendants demurred to the bill on the grounds, among others, that (1) The Housing Authorities Law is constitutional, and (2) The approval of the plan by the city council is 'a legislative act which the court has no power to disturb under allegations of the bill.'

The lower court sustained the first ground of the demurrer upon the authority of Hunter v. Norfolk Dedevelopment & Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78 S.E.2d 893, which was decided while the court had the demurrer under consideration. It overruled the second ground of the demurrer.

The Authority and the city filed a joint answer in which they alleged that 'the predominant and primary purpose of the redevelopment project is to eliminate a blighted and deteriorated area, a part of which is a slum area;' 'that the area within the said project is a blighted area; that a substantial portion of said area is a slum area; that the conditions existing therein are detrimental to the safety, health, morals and welfare of the community, and that it is necessary to acquire all of the area within said project in order to eliminate said conditions;' and that the Authority, the planning commission and the city council having 'in good faith determined' that these conditions exist, 'this court has no right, power or jurisdiction to make any original or independent examination of those questions.'

After the issues had been thus framed there was an ore tenus hearing at which numerous witnesses were heard. In a written opinion the lower court held that (1) Whether the city council had exceeded its authority in determining that the area was a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area and available for redevelopment under the terms of the statute was subject to judicial review; (2) 'The overwhelming weight of evidence' showed that the area was not in fact a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area; and (3) The evidence showed that the 'primary purpose' of the proposed redevelopment was for 'commercial' uses and not the clearance of slum, blighted, or deteriorated areas. Consequently, it entered a decree enjoining the Authority and the city from further prosecution of the project. To review that decree the present appeal was allowed.

The precise questions presented in the present appeal were not involved in the Hunter case. There we held that the statute which empowered the housing authority to acquire by eminent domain and rehabilitate properties in a slum, blighted or deteriorated area as defined in Code, § 36-49, is constitutional; that the local authority had been legally constituted; and that the project had been properly approved by the city council. In that case there was no dispute as to whether the area was a slum or a blighted or deteriorated area as defined in section 36-49(1). There, we said, 'The plan contemplated the eradication of what is characterized as two of the worst 'slum and blighted areas' in the city, * * *.' (195 Va., at page 333, 78 S.E.2d, at page 898.)

In the present case the underlying question is whether the area proposed to be redeveloped is in fact a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area within the meaning of Code, § 36-49(1), and therefore subject to acquisition and redevelopment by the local Authority under the terms of the statute. No point has been made that the project was not initiated by the local Authority or approved by the city council in the manner required by the statute. These required steps were outlined in the Hunter case and need not be repeated here.

Code, § 36-48, is a finding and declaration '(a) that there exist in many communities within this Commonwealth blighted areas (as herein defined) which impair economic values and tax revenues, cause an increase in and spread of disease and crime, and constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the Commonwealth; (b) that the clearance, replanning, rehabilitation and reconstruction of such blighted areas and the sale or lease of land within such areas for redevelopment in accordance with locally approved redevelopment plans are necessary for the public welfare and are public uses and public purposes for which public money may be spent and private property acquired by purchase or the power of eminent domain, and are governmental functions of grave concern to the Commonwealth; (c) that there are also certain areas where the condition of title, diverse ownership of the land to be assembled, the street or lot layouts, or other conditions prevent a proper development of the land and that it is in the public interest that such areas, as well as blighted areas, be acquired by eminent domain and made available for sound and wholesome development in accordance with a redevelopment plan, and that the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the financing of acquisition and preparation of the land by a public agency for such redevelopment is likewise a public use and purpose.'

In the Hunter case we held that this legislative declaration that the taking of property for the stated redevelopment purposes constitutes a public use, while presumptively correct, is subject to judicial review. 195 Va., at page 335, 78 S.E.2d, at page 899.

Code, § 36-49, with which we are primarily concerned in the present case, defines undertakings constituting redevelopment projects which 'any authority now or hereafter established' is specifically empowered to carry out. Among these are:

'(1) To acquire blighted or deteriorated areas, which are hereby defined as areas (including slum 1 areas) with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement of design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community;

'(2) To acquire other real property for the purpose of removing, preventing, or reducing blight, blighting factors or the cause of blight;

'(3) To acquire real property where the condition of the title, the diverse ownership of the real property to be assembled, the street or lot layouts, or other conditions prevent a proper development of the property and where the acquisition of the area by the authority is necessary to carry out a redevelopment plan; * * *.'

The appellants' first contention is that in approving the project, in accordance with Code, § 36-51, the council made a finding of fact that the area is a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area; that such finding is legislative in character and conclusive upon the court in the absence of allegation and proof that it is arbitrary, capricious, or was induced by fraud or bad faith.

With respect to this contention it should be noted that under the statute the primary responsibility of investigating the conditions in an area proposed for redevelopment, and determining whether it is a slum, blighted or deteriorated area, is delegated to the local redevelopment authority and not to the city council. Code, §§ 36-19, 36-50. The functions of the council are to approve or disapprove the 'redevelopment plan' as outlined by the authority (Code, § 36-51), and if approved, to cooperate with the authority in its execution. Code, § 36-52. Assuming that the approval of the project by the council...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Dilley v. City of Des Moines
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 17, 1976
    ...supra; Crawford v. Redevelopment Authority, 418 Pa. 549, 555, 211 A.2d 866, 869 (1965); Bristol Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 178--179, 93 S.E.2d 288, 294 (1956). He recognizes an area can be slum and blighted though it contains sound structures with no deficienc......
  • Urban Renewal Agency of City of Reno v. Iacometti
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1963
    ...186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33; Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171; Bristol Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288. The scope of review was not an issue in Offen, for there the appeal was from an order overruling the defendants' demurrer to pl......
  • Charleston Urban Renewal v. Courtland Co.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 30, 1998
    ...immediately after they were passed, on the grounds that there was no blight in the project area. In Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288 (1956), the court concluded that an initial determination by a redevelopment authority that there was a bligh......
  • State Through Dept. of Highways v. Bradford
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1961
    ...v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 626; Virginia: Dillon v. Davis, 201 Va. 514, 112 S.E.2d 137, Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288; Washington: State v. Superior Court for King County, 33 Wash.2d 76, 204 P.2d 514; Wisconsin: Schumm v. Milwaukee C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT