Bristol v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 03 November 2006 |
Docket Number | Record No. 060263. |
Citation | 636 S.E.2d 460 |
Parties | Joshua BRISTOL v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Timothy V. Anderson (Anderson & Good, on brief), for appellant.
Josephine F. Whalen, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KINSER, LEMONS, and AGEE, JJ., and RUSSELL, S.J.
OPINION BY Justice BARBARAMILANO KEENAN.
In this appeal involving two criminal convictions based on a defendant's alleged operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, we consider whether the circuit court erred in admitting a certificate of blood analysis.
Joshua Bristol was tried in the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), in violation of Code § 18.2-266, and for maiming another as a result of driving under the influence, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.4. At a bench trial, the Commonwealth offered in evidence a certificate of analysis of Bristol's blood alcohol content (BAC) to establish a rebuttable presumption under Code § 18.2-269 that Bristol was intoxicated at the time of the offenses. Over Bristol's objection, the circuit court admitted the certificate of analysis, which showed that Bristol had a BAC of 0.11 by weight by volume.
Bristol was convicted of both offenses. The circuit court sentenced Bristol for the felony maiming offense to a term of five years' imprisonment, with two years and six months suspended. The court also sentenced Bristol to 12 months in jail for the DUI offense.
Bristol appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the circuit court improperly admitted the certificate of analysis into evidence. A panel of the Court of Appeals agreed and reversed Bristol's conviction, holding that the certificate of analysis had been improperly admitted into evidence because Bristol had not been arrested within three hours of the offenses as required by Code § 18.2-268.2(A). Bristol v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 534, 612 S.E.2d 244 (2005).
The Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's petition for rehearing en banc and stayed the panel's decision. Bristol v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 673, 613 S.E.2d 480 (2005). On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court properly admitted the certificate of analysis because Bristol was under arrest within three hours of the offenses as a result of submitting to a police officer's authority at the hospital. Bristol v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 584, 603, 625 S.E.2d 676, 685 (2006). Bristol appeals from the Court of Appeals' judgment.
The evidence at trial showed that on July 4, 2003, Bristol and his friends were drinking alcoholic beverages and playing pool at the Three Cheers Lounge in Portsmouth. When Bristol left the lounge around 1:45 a.m., he agreed to give Debra Fly a ride on his motorcycle. Bristol drove his motorcycle around the lounge parking lot with Fly seated behind him as a passenger. Bristol's vehicle reached speeds estimated between 50 and 80 miles per hour.
While still in the parking lot, Bristol drove directly into a crowd of people without reducing his vehicle's speed. His motorcycle struck April Mapp, who was standing on the curb, causing her to be thrown into the air. As a result of the collision, Bristol fell off the motorcycle.
When City of Portsmouth Police Officer J.M. Doyle responded to the scene about 1:56 a.m., Bristol and Mapp were both lying in the parking lot. Mapp had head and brain injuries and a broken leg. Bristol was conscious, but had abrasions and bruises on his face. According to a paramedic who responded to the scene, Bristol smelled of alcoholic beverages.
At 2:50 a.m., Doyle went to the hospital to see Bristol, who was in a trauma unit waiting to be examined. Doyle observed that Bristol's speech was slurred and that he smelled strongly of alcoholic beverages.
At 2:56 a.m., Doyle told Bristol he was under arrest and informed him of the implied consent provisions of Code § 18.2-268.2. Bristol indicated that he understood those provisions and, at 3:05 a.m., signed a form authorizing the hospital to draw a blood sample. Doyle did not take any measures at that time to restrain Bristol.
Shortly thereafter, hospital personnel moved Bristol from the trauma unit to the hospital's emergency room. Doyle accompanied Bristol to the emergency room and sat with him until a lab technician, Teresa Whitfield, arrived to draw Bristol's blood. However, Doyle took no measures to restrain Bristol or his movements. When Whitfield asked Bristol if he understood that she was drawing a blood sample at the request of the police, Bristol indicated that he understood. Whitfield drew the blood sample from Bristol.
After taking possession of the vials containing Bristol's blood, Doyle returned to the police station to write a report of the parking lot incident. In that report, Doyle did not indicate that Bristol had been arrested.
Soon after Doyle left the hospital, Officer James Eberts arrived and attempted to interview Bristol. However, Bristol was incoherent, his speech was slurred, and he was in pain from the accident. Eberts left the hospital without taking any further action regarding Bristol. When Bristol was released from the hospital later that day, he was not taken into police custody or brought before a magistrate.
Two days later, Eberts telephoned Bristol and asked Bristol to come to the police station to be interviewed. Bristol went to the police station and, after Eberts conducted an interview there, Bristol left without any further action by the police. About a month later, Bristol telephoned the police to inquire about Mapp's condition. On none of these occasions did the police tell Bristol that he was under arrest or indicate that he would be charged with a criminal offense.
In August 2003, the Division of Forensic Science completed a certificate of analysis after performing tests on the blood sample drawn from Bristol at the hospital after the accident. The certificate of analysis indicated that Bristol's blood alcohol content at the time the sample was taken was 0.11 by weight by volume.
A grand jury indicted Bristol on September 4, 2003. On September 11, 2003, Bristol presented himself at the police station and was taken into custody.
On appeal, Bristol argues that the circuit court improperly admitted the certificate of analysis into evidence. Bristol contends that he was not arrested at the hospital on the date of the offenses, because he was not restrained by the police or taken before a magistrate. He asserts that because he was not validly arrested within three hours of the offenses as required by Code § 18.2-268.2(A), he did not impliedly consent to have his blood drawn. Therefore, Bristol maintains, a rebuttable presumption of intoxication did not arise under Code § 18.2-269.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the certificate of analysis was properly admitted into evidence. The Commonwealth contends that by "telling Bristol that he was under arrest and advising him of the implied consent law, [Officer] Doyle asserted his lawful authority to arrest Bristol." Therefore, the Commonwealth maintains, Bristol was under arrest at the hospital as soon as he consented to have his blood drawn, because that consent constituted a submission to Officer Doyle's authority. We disagree with the Commonwealth's arguments.
We review de novo the issue of law whether the undisputed facts before us establish that the officers effected an arrest of Bristol. See United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir.2003); United States v. Sinclair, 983 F.2d 598, 601 (4th Cir.1993). The mere words of an officer stating to a suspect that he is "under arrest" are not sufficient to constitute an arrest. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300, 1309-1310 (1992). An arrest occurs when an officer physically restrains a suspect or, in the absence of physical restraint, the suspect submits to the officer's assertion of authority and purpose to arrest. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547; White v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 96, 104, 591 S.E.2d 662, 666 (2004); Howard v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 674, 677, 173 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1970).
An arrest completed by a suspect's submission to police authority must manifest the suspect's complete surrender of his personal liberty to the officer's authority. As we explained in Howard, "an arrest is made by the actual restraint of the person of the defendant or by his submission to the custody of an officer." Id. at 677, 173 S.E.2d at 832; see also White, 267 Va. at 104, 591 S.E.2d at 666. Thus, after an arrest, a suspect's liberty is completely constrained, at least until a judicial officer has determined the issue of bail. Commonwealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 547, 570 S.E.2d 805, 808 (2002).
In the present case, it is undisputed that neither Officer Doyle nor Officer Eberts physically restrained Bristol at the hospital after Officer Doyle told Bristol that he was "under arrest." Therefore, Bristol was arrested at the hospital only if his consent to the blood test constituted a complete surrender of his personal liberty in submission to Officer Doyle's assertion of authority. We conclude that Bristol's consent to the blood test was not such a surrender of his personal liberty.
Bristol merely agreed to submit to a blood test. He did not make any statement nor did he act in a manner demonstrating a complete surrender of his personal liberty to Officer Doyle's control.
The events that occurred at the hospital confirm the limited nature of Bristol's acquiescence. After Officer Doyle informed Bristol of the implied consent provisions of Code § 18.2-268.2 and Bristol agreed to have the blood sample drawn, Doyle did not restrict Bristol's movements in any manner. Officer Doyle merely accompanied Bristol to...
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