Bristol v. Town of Camden
| Decision Date | 19 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 6:22-CV-845 (TJM/ML) |
| Parties | TODD BRISTOL, KIMBERLY BRISTOL, and SUGAR SHACK'S WATER, INC., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF CAMDEN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
DECISION & ORDER
Before the Court are the motions to dismiss of various Defendants in this case, which involves disputes over the enforcement of zoning ordinances by Defendant Town of Camden. See dkt. #s 31, 40, 45. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated their constitutional rights and their state-law rights by interfering with their ability to operate certain businesses on property in the Defendant Town. The parties have briefed the issues and the Court will decide the matter without oral argument.
Plaintiff Todd Bristol owns real property located at 9776 Shady Lake Road in the Town of Camden, New York. Complaint (“Cmplt.”), Exh. A to dkt. # 1, at ¶ 18. Todd Bristol and his wife, Plaintiff Kimberly Bristol, are sole shareholders and officers of Plaintiff Sugar Shacks. Id. at ¶ 19. Kimberly Bristol is sole shareholder of the company, and both individual Plaintiffs are employees of Sugar Shacks. Id. Sugar Shacks leases the property on Shady Lake Road from Todd Bristol for the purpose of conducting the company's business operations. Id. at ¶ 20.
Plaintiff Todd Bristol obtained the property in February 2016 for the purpose “of conducting commercial, industrial and related business operations.” Id. at ¶ 21. He acquired the property “specifically because it is located in the ‘Rural District' established by the Town of Camden Zoning Map[.]” Id. at ¶ 22. He “relied on” that zoning designation. Id. Plaintiff alleges that under the Town of Camden Zoning Law, “the purpose of the Rural District is to ‘provide areas for commercial industrial, agricultural and forestry uses in a low-density rural environment without the need for being constrained due to residential uses.'” Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting Town of Camden Zoning Law § 30.21 (emphasis added in Complaint)).
The property in question consists of more than 22 acres of land, most of which is wooded. Id. at ¶ 24. The land surrounding the property is “farmland and wooded lots which are frequently used for agricultural purposes (such as mowing and baling hay, and planting and harvesting corn) and forestry uses (such as logging or cutting trees for firewood).” Id. Sugar Shacks operates two “separate and distinct primary lines of business.” Id. at ¶ 25. The first business is a trucking company that “primarily hauls and delivers water.” Id. The second business uses “a sawmill to saw logs into cants for . . . crane mats[1] and drilling equipment to drill and assemble the crane mats.” Id. At ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs obtained a Special Use Permit (SUP) from the Camden Zoning Planning Board on July 11, 2018 that permitted the construction of a 40'x64' building for commercial truck storage on the property to support the trucking business. Id. at ¶ 27. The Planning Board issued a second SUP on July 7, 2021 for the same purpose, but which includes restrictions and conditions: Id. at ¶ 28. The second SUP superseded the one issued on July 11, 2018 “‘to clarify the repair/maintenance of vehicles and equipment.'” Id. at ¶ 29.
Todd Bristol obtained an SUP for the crane mat business on October 7, 2020. Id. at ¶ 30. That SUP's purpose was “‘[t]o construct a 20'x26' three sided pole barn for the purpose of drilling and assembling crane mats.” Id. at ¶ 30. That SUP contained restrictions and conditions: “‘[h]ours of Operation shall be 7:00am till dark Monday-Friday from Memorial Day to Labor Day and 8:00am till dark Monday-Friday the rest of the year.'” Id. at ¶ 31.
Before 2021, Plaintiffs purchased pre-cut parts for crane mats (“cants”) and drilled and assembled the mats on-site. Id. at ¶ 51. A lumber shortage in 2020 made it difficult for Plaintiffs to obtain the pre-cut cants necessary to meet orders for crane mats. Id. at ¶ 52. To address this issue, Plaintiffs in early 2021 acquired a portable sawmill to begin to saw logs into cants. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the portable sawmill “constituted a ‘nonstructural forestry use' which did not require a Special Use Permit or any zoning permit under the Zoning Law.” Id. at ¶ 53 (quoting Zoning Law § 30.92.B.7).
Plaintiff alleges that, after they began using the portable sawmill, Defendant Tyler Henry, who was a member of the Planning Board, came to the Plaintiffs' property at the end of March or beginning of April 2021 and “wrongfully informed Todd [Bristol] that he was required to amend the” SUP for the crane mat “to include the sawmill.” Id. at ¶ 54. Despite his belief that such an amended SUP was not required by the zoning law, Plaintiff Todd Bristol submitted an application to amend the SUP “to appease the Planning Board, with the understanding that Plaintiffs could continue operating the sawmill while such application was pending.” Id. at ¶ 55. Plaintiff contends that filing this application for an amended SUP “was the first of many instances” where he “submitted to unlawful requirements and restrictions imposed by the Town Board and the Planning Board in the spirit of cooperation and compliance, and in an attempt to accommodate and appease the Town so . . . he could carry on his business without further interference from the Town.” Id. at ¶ 56. Plaintiffs allege that the Town Board unanimously voted on April 7, 2021 to permit them to continue operating the sawmill until a hearing on the issue scheduled for May 5, 2021. Id. at ¶ 57.
The May 5, 2021 Planning Board public hearing was contentious, “with members of the public,” mostly Plaintiff's neighbors, “shouting their objections to” Plaintiffs' “expanded activity that did not pertain to the addition of the sawmill subject to the application before the Planning Board.” Id. at ¶ 58. Members of the public who complained at the meeting did not complain about the proposed addition of the sawmill, but instead complained about “all noise and dust related to the operation of loaders, chainsaws and trucks.” Id. at ¶ 59. Despite these irrelevant complaints, the Planning Board ordered that Plaintiffs cease operating the sawmill on or before May 21, 2021, when the Planning Board would meet to provide “final approval for the operation of the sawmill.” Id. at ¶ 60. Defendants made their decision to order the sawmill to cease operations after the meeting ended, and only informed Plaintiffs two days later during a visit from two Board members. Id. at ¶ 61.
Plaintiff Todd Bristol tried several times to contact the Code Enforcement Officer and the Planning Board to ask for relief to allow him to continue operations until the Planning Board reached its final determination. Id. at ¶ 62. Neither responded. Id. at ¶ 63. Instead, the Code Enforcement Officer issued a Stop Work Order dated May 21, 2021. Id. Despite disputing that the Order could be enforced, “Plaintiffs respectfully and cooperatively ceased operating the sawmill as required by” the Order. Id. at ¶ 64. Work stopped for three weeks “until the Planning Board made a determination on the application to amend the” first crane mat SUP. Id. The Planning Board permitted operation of the sawmill to resume “after certain fencing was constructed.” Id.
After two more Planning Board meetings on June 2, 2021 and June 9, 2021, the Planning Board issued an SUP to Plaintiff Todd Bristol that allowed “use of a band sawmill for producing lumber for crane mats.” Id. at ¶ 65. The SUP contained a number of restrictions and conditions, providing that Plaintiffs must:
Plaintiffs “worked diligently to meet and comply with” the restrictions in the new SUP in a timely manner, even though they allege that these restrictions were “unlawful.” Id. at ¶ 67. Though the terms of the SUP “unfairly and unlawfully limited Plaintiffs' businesses and Plaintiffs never accepted them as a legitimate and lawful act of the Planning Board,” Plaintiffs “believed they could accept the economic harm caused to them personally and to the Crane Mat Business” if they could “operate in peace by appeasing the Planning Board” and the neighbors who had complained about their use of the property. Id. at ¶ 68.
Plaintiffs attempted to meet the time frames required by the new SUP but...
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