Bristol West Ins. Co. v. Landry

Decision Date19 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 07-cv-199-GZS.,07-cv-199-GZS.
Citation577 F.Supp.2d 459
PartiesBRISTOL WEST INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Melanie LANDRY and Rollin H. Small, Jr., Defendants, and Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, Intervenor.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

James D. Poliquin, Norman, Hanson & Detroy, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

Carl F. Rella, Rella & Lister, Bangor, ME, for Defendants.

Melissa A. Hewey, Peter C. Felmly, Drummond, Woodsum & MacMahon, Portland, ME, for Intervenor.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment: Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company (Docket # 30) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 32). As explained herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 32) and DENIES Wawanesa's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 30).

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004). "In this regard, `material' means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. By like token, `genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party." Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 93-94 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995)).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Santoni, 369 F.3d at 598. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must "produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue." Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (citation and internal punctuation omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party." In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter this standard. See Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17 n. 5 (1st Cir.2002); Blackie v. State of Me., 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir.1996). In fact, summary judgment is appropriate where, as here, the Court must "determine the content of foreign law." Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 713 (5th Cir.1999); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 ("The court's determination [of foreign law] must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.").

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This declaratory judgment action arises from an automobile accident, and the parties' disagreement about the liability insurance limit applicable to that accident. To resolve this disagreement, the Court must determine whether foreign law triggered an expansion of the insurance policy issued to Defendant Melanie Landry ("Landry") by Plaintiff Bristol West Insurance Company ("Bristol West").

The underlying facts in this case are undisputed.1 Bristol West issued to Landry insurance policy number G000173103 for the policy period November 20, 2003 to May 20, 2004 (the "Bristol West policy"). (See Intervenor's Statement of Material Facts ("Intervenor's SMF") (Docket # 31) ¶ 1.) On or about November 28, 2003, Landry was involved in a car accident in the Canadian Province of New Brunswick with Keith Savoie ("Savoie"). Consequently, Savoie filed suit against Landry and Defendant Rollin H. Small, Jr. ("Small")2 in the Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick, Judicial District of Saint John. Savoie also filed an action against Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company ("Wawanesa"), which issued an insurance policy to Savoie's father, under an SEF 44 underinsured motorist policy.3

The Bristol West policy contains a liability insurance limit of $50,000 (U.S.) per person. (Compl. (Docket # 1) ¶ 10.) It also contains an "Out of State Coverage" provision, which provides in relevant part:

If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any state or province other than the one in which "your covered auto" is principally garaged,4 we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows:

A. If the state or province has:

1. A financial responsibility or similar law specifying limits of liability for "bodily injury" or "property damage" higher than the limit shown in the Declarations, your policy will provide the higher specified limit.

2. A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident to maintain insurance whenever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or province, your policy will provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage.

(Intervenor's SMF ¶ 2.)

New Brunswick, the site of the accident, has both financial responsibility and compulsory insurance5 laws which, under certain circumstances, require a minimum liability insurance limit of $200,000 (Can.). See generally R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-17 et seq. In relevant part, the New Brunswick Financial Responsibility law ("NBFRL") provides that:

proof of financial responsibility in the amount of at least two hundred thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, against loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to or the death of one or more persons and loss of or damage to property in any one accident shall be given by each driver and in the case of an owner, by each owner, for each motor vehicle registered in his name, to whom this Part applies.

See R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-17 § 282 (emphasis added). Other sections of the statute specify to whom this requirement applies, and in what circumstances. See, e.g., id. §§ 276(1) (unsatisfied judgment for damages on account of bodily injury or property damage in excess of $1,000 (Can.) "occasioned by a motor vehicle" triggers suspension of motor vehicle privileges, which may be reinstated upon furnishing proof of financial responsibility), 281(1) (motor vehicle accident causing bodily injury or property damage in excess of $1,000 (Can.) triggers suspension of motor vehicle privileges, which may be reinstated upon furnishing proof of financial responsibility).

In effect, the parties dispute whether these provisions apply retrospectively to claims arising out of Landry's accident with Savoie, or only prospectively to any future accident. Defendants rely on a letter sent by Bristol West to Landry, in which Claims Analyst Curtis Lemmerbrock indicated that Landry's available coverage increased to $200,000 (Can.).

The letter explained:

Your policy, policy number G00-0173103-00-17, issued to Melanie Landry, provides the following coverage:

Bodily Injury: $50,000 per person, $100,000 per accident

However, since this accident happened in Canada, your policy limits automatically deem to the minimum amounts of liability limits as outlined via Canadian law, which is $200,000CA per person.

(Ex. 1 to Defs.' Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J (Docket # 39-2).)

Bristol West asserts that this was simply an "erroneous statement" made "in ignorance of applicable law," whereas Defendants contend that the letter reflects a correct interpretation of the applicable law and/or "an admission" by Bristol West. (See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 32) at 4 n.1; Defs.' Obj. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J (Docket # 39) at 6.)

III. DISCUSSION
A. The Bristol West Policy

Before considering the relationship between the Bristol West policy and New Brunswick law, the Court must first examine the language of the policy itself.6 The meaning of language in an insurance contract "is a question of law." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Levesque, 868 A.2d 244, 246 (Me.2005). The Bristol West policy, like all insurance contracts, must be construed in accordance with the intention of the parties. See Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir.2002); Pine Ridge Realty, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 595, 601 (Me.2000). In seeking to determine the intention of the parties, the Court must consider "the language of the agreement viewed in the light of all the circumstances under which it was made.... Such intention must be gathered from the written instrument, construed in respect to the subject matter, the motive and purpose of making the agreement, and the object to be accomplished." Hodgkins v. New England Tel. Co., 82 F.3d 1226, 1230 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Baybutt Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 919 (Me.1983) (overruled on other grounds)). Finally, although Wawanesa concedes that the relevant policy provision is unambiguous,7 the Court notes that any ambiguities "must be resolved against the insurer and in favor of coverage." Foremost Ins. Co., 868 A.2d at 246.

Wawanesa appeals to "the clear and unambiguous language" of clause A. 1. (Wawanesa's Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 37) at 2.) Specifically, it observes that New Brunswick simply "has" a financial responsibility law "specifying limits of liability ... higher than the limit shown in the Declarations." The mere existence of that statute, Wawanesa asserts, triggers clause A.1 and mandates the higher liability insurance limit of $200,000 (Can.).

In advancing this interpretation, Wawanesa...

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2 cases
  • Bristol West Ins. Co. v. Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co.
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    ...coverage only "to the extent required by a financial responsibility law to which the insured is subject." Bristol West Ins. Co. v. Landry, 577 F.Supp.2d 459, 464 (D.Me.2008). It then construed the New Brunswick financial responsibility statute and concluded Landry was not entitled to the ex......
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