Britt Green Trucking, Inc. v. Fedex Nat'l, LTL, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:09-cv-445-T-33TBM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | BRITT GREEN TRUCKING, INC. and Donna Isham, Administratrix of the Estate of Lanny D. Whitson, Plaintiffs, v. FEDEX NATIONAL, LTL, INC., Defendant. |
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs Britt Green Trucking, Inc. and Donna Isham, Administratrix of the Estate of Lanny D. Whitson's1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 153), filed on November 12, 2013, and Defendant FedEx National LTL, Inc.'s Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 158), filed on November 15, 2013. Both Motions are ripe for this Court's review. Upon due consideration and for the reasons that follow, both Motions are denied and FedEx's request for oral argument on its Motion is further denied.
In August of 2006, FedEx took control of Watkins Motor Lines, an interstate motor carrier based in Lakeland, Florida, which employed individuals and trucking companies as independent contractors ("ICs"). (Doc. # 153 at 3-4; Doc. # 158 at 5). Watkins used both employees and ICs to provide local pickup and delivery service at service centers in several states across the country and to provide line haul service to move freight from one service center to another across the country. (Doc. # 158 at 5).
FedEx's acquisition of Watkins closed on September 3, 2006. (Id.). "Immediately after the Watkins acquisition," FedEx entered into Equipment Lease and Operating Contracts ("ELOCs") with ICs, including Plaintiffs, in various locations throughout the United States. (Doc. # 153 at 4; Doc. # 153-1; Doc. # 153-2; Doc. # 158 at 5). The ELOCs were drafted by FedEx. (Doc. # 153 at 5).
The ELOCs described both the manner in which FedEx would lease transportation equipment from ICs and the manner in which ICs would provide transportation services. (See Doc. # 153-1; Doc. # 153-2). The ELOCs provided as follows:
[FedEx] desires to lease, on an as-needed basis, transportation equipment it does not own from [IC] and desires that [IC] provide transportationservices, as needed, for the transportation of certain commodities provided by [FedEx] or its customers; and [IC] desires to contract with [FedEx] to transport such commodities.
(Id. at 1). The ELOCs further stated:
[FedEx] agrees to make commodities available to [IC] for shipment, from time to time, although this shall not be construed as an agreement by [FedEx] to furnish any specific number or types of loads or units, pounds, gallons, or any other measurements of weight or volume, quantity, kind or amount of freight, for transport by [IC] at any particular time or place.
The ELOCs ran until July 31, 2007, and were subject to automatic annual renewal thereafter unless terminated by either party. (Doc. # 153 at 5; Doc. # 153-1 at ¶ 15(a); Doc. # 153-2 at ¶ 15(a); Doc. # 153-3 at 105-06). As to termination, the ELOCs provided:
Either Party may terminate this Operating Contract (1) at any time, without cause, by giving written notice [to] the other Party at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective termination date or (2) immediately and at any time, by giving written notice to the other Party in the event of a material breach of any provision of this Operating Contract by such other Party.
(Doc. # 153-1 at ¶ 15(a); Doc. # 153-2 at ¶ 15(a)). Therefore, "According to the ELOCs, if a written notice was not sent atleast thirty days prior to termination, the contract would continue in full effect." (Doc. # 153 at 7; Doc. # 153-3 at 11). FedEx concedes that the 2006 ELOCs contained a thirty-day written notice requirement. (Doc. # 158 at 6).
The ELOCs also leased equipment that was described in one or more Exhibit A's to the ELOCs, titled "Receipt of Equipment." (Id. at 7). The Receipt provided written acknowledgement of the date when FedEx took receipt of the equipment, and the bottom half of the Receipt served as the written notice terminating the lease of that piece of equipment. (Id.). Therefore, "[o]nce an [IC] signed the bottom half of the Receipt acknowledging termination and receipt of Equipment, and the [IC] then had no other Equipment leased to FedEx, the ELOC was considered cancelled." (Id. at 7-8).
According to Plaintiffs, in 2007, FedEx "suddenly and unilaterally" terminated Plaintiffs' ELOCs by immediately cutting off all hauling work to ICs. (Doc. # 153 at 6). Plaintiffs submit that "[t]his occurred without any written notice to the Plaintiffs, let alone the thirty days' written notice required under the ELOCs, and well before the July 31, 2007[,] expiration date." (Id.).
FedEx, on the other hand, contends that after the Watkins acquisition "freight levels began dropping." (Doc. # 158 at 8). "As a result, the amount of excess line haul freight needed to be moved by [ICs] began diminishing." (Id.). Therefore, "in February 2007, Cory Thompson, Line Haul Manager for the Orlando service center, informed the Orlando [ICs] that it appeared FedEx may not have loads to offer the Orlando [ICs] on a regular basis; however, FedEx was not terminating the ELOCs." (Id.). Thereafter, in February of 2007, Whitson cancelled his ELOC with FedEx by signing the Receipt acknowledging receipt and termination of each piece of equipment he had previously leased to FedEx. (Doc. # 158 at 8; Doc. # 137-4 at ¶¶ 19-21). Furthermore, after discussions with Cory Thompson, Green found "alternative work" and turned in his FedEx termination paperwork. (Doc. # 158 at 10). The parties disagree, however, as to whether FedEx had already breached the ELOCs by its failure to provide the requisite thirty days' written notice of termination to Plaintiffs prior to Plaintiffs submitting their termination paperwork.
This action arises from FedEx's alleged termination of Plaintiffs' ELOCs without the required written notice oftermination. On November 19, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint against FedEx (Doc. # 1), and filed an amended class action complaint on March 15, 2010, setting forth the following counts: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. (Doc. # 48).
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on March 12, 2010. (Doc. # 46). On March 29, 2011, this Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification finding that Plaintiffs failed to meet the typicality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) and the predominance requirement of 23(b)(3). (Doc. # 60). Thereafter, the Court granted FedEx's motion for summary judgment, and judgment was entered in favor of FedEx. (Doc. ## 98, 99).
On February 28, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit reversed this Court's Orders granting summary judgment in favor of FedEx and denying class certification and remanded the case for further review. (Doc. # 116).
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification (Doc. # 134) on July 15, 2013, requesting certification of the following class:
All persons and entities throughout the United States operating as independent contractors (ICs) with Equipment Lease and Operating Contracts (ELOCs) who contracted to carry freight for FedEx National LTL, Inc. (FedEx) and whose ELOCs were terminated by FedEx without 30 days' written notice.
(Id. at 2).
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on November 12, 2013. (Doc. # 153). Thereafter, FedEx filed its Second Motion for Summary Judgment on November 15, 2013. (Doc. # 158). Also on November 15, 2013, this Court denied Plaintiffs' second motion for class certification. (Doc. # 155). Subsequently, on December 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a stay pending the outcome of Plaintiffs' Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) appeal to the United States of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Doc. # 164), which this Court granted on December 23, 2013 (Doc. # 169).
On April 1, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). (Doc. # 170). In light of the Eleventh Circuit's Order, this Court lifted the stay of this action on April 2, 2014, and returned the case to active status. (Doc. # 171). At this juncture, the Court determines that it has jurisdiction to rule on the pending Motions (Doc. ## 153,158), which are ripe for this Court's review. The Court has reviewed the Motions, the responses thereto, and the timely filed replies, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256,1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then 'go beyond the pleadings,' and by its own affidavits, or by 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate specific facts...
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