Britton v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc.

• Citation: 127 F.3d 616
• Decision Date: 14 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-4216,96-4216
• Parties: Richard BRITTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 616

127 F.3d 616

39 Fed.R.Serv.3d 130

Richard BRITTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-4216.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 15, 1997.

Decided Oct. 14, 1997.

Michael Barry Marker (argued), Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy & Glass, East St. Louis, IL, Stephen M. Tillery, Carr Korein, Belleville, IL, Christine J. Moody, Carr Korein, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Timothy S. Richards (argued), Ellen M. Edmonds, Neville, Richards, Defranco & Wuller, Belleville, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

On October 8, 1993, Plaintiff-Appellee Richard Britton, an Illinois state trooper, was injured in an automobile accident involving a truck owned by Defendant-Appellant Swift Transportation Company and driven by one of its employees. He sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and (after considerable discovery) trial was scheduled for August 5, 1996.

In April 1996, Britton, who had returned to his regular duties as a trooper in June 1994, suffered a setback. The pain from his injuries worsened, and his treating physician, Dr. David Schreiber, restricted him to light duty. Supplemental deposition testimony by Britton, Dr. Schreiber, and Britton's Lieutenant suggested that Britton would be permanently unable to return to full duty, and established that the State Police would not let him remain indefinitely on light duty. On July 23, 1996, the parties concluded a settlement agreement under which Swift agreed to pay Britton $450,000, prompting the district court to dismiss the case pending a sixty-day period during which the parties could seek relief from the court if the settlement were not carried out. That period expired, and the court entered final judgment on October 3, 1996.

Two weeks later, on October 17, Swift moved to have the judgment vacated and the settlement agreement rescinded. Swift also moved, in the alternative, to be allowed to reopen discovery concerning Britton's physical condition and the circumstances surrounding his return to full duty. Swift based its motions on the fact that Britton had, on July 24 (the day following the district court's dismissal of the case pursuant to the settlement agreement), received clearance from Dr. Schreiber to return to full duty status with the Illinois State Police, and had soon thereafter returned to that status (albeit in a position that consisted of only fifty percent patrol duty, with the remainder devoted to liaison work with local police departments). Because it had allegedly agreed to settle based on the representations of Britton, Dr. Schreiber, and Britton's Lieutenant that Britton's injuries from the accident rendered him physically unable to perform the functions of full duty employment as a state trooper, Swift claimed that the settlement must be rescinded (or, at a minimum, discovery reopened) upon grounds of mutual mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation.

The district court held a hearing on the motion to rescind and the alternative motion for discovery on November 14, 1996, and denied them in an Order dated November 19. The court summarily declared that "there is no evidence in the record to support fraud or material misrepresentation by Britton or his counsel." It then went on to determine that no mutual mistake existed prior to the settlement regarding Britton's physical condition. The court noted that the parties had vigorously contested the question of Britton's ability to perform his duties as a state trooper throughout the litigation. Based on this fact, the court concluded that the parties did not uniformly believe Britton to be permanently unable to return to full duty, and thus that no mutual mistake existed. In rather summary fashion, the district court also decided that there was nothing "clandestine or unseemly about Britton's 'Return to Work.' " Despite the fact that the very doctor who had earlier restricted Britton to light duty released him to resume full duty on the day after the settlement was announced, the court found the release and its timing unremarkable.

Swift appeals the district court's denial of its motion to vacate the judgment and rescind the settlement, as well as the court's denial of its motion for further discovery as to the circumstances surrounding Britton's return to full duty.

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review to be applied in reviewing the district court's denial of Swift's motion to vacate the judgment based on the settlement agreement. Swift, attempting to characterize its motion as one cognizable under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, directs our attention to authority it believes supports a de novo standard of review for motions under Rule 59. Britton argues that Swift's motion is cognizable only under Rule 60(b), and not under Rule 59(e), and in any event that the denial of a motion under either Rule is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.

This Court has held that the key factor in determining whether a "substantive" motion is cognizable under Rule 59 or Rule 60 is its timing. United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.1992) ("[S]ubstantive motions to alter or amend a judgment served more than ten days after the entry of judgment are to be...