Britton v. Winfield Public Library

• Decision Date: 09 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-61,81-61
• Parties: , 57 Ill.Dec. 100 Richard M. BRITTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The WINFIELD PUBLIC LIBRARY, the Winfield Library Board of Directors; Robert J. Lee, Michael W. Saad, William M. Kellens, Josephine Baucke, Richard Stenzel, Paul Plefka and Rose Szczepaniak, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 650

428 N.E.2d 650

101 Ill.App.3d 546, 57 Ill.Dec. 100

Richard M. BRITTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The WINFIELD PUBLIC LIBRARY, the Winfield Library Board of

Directors; Robert J. Lee, Michael W. Saad, William M.

Kellens, Josephine Baucke, Richard Stenzel, Paul Plefka and

Rose Szczepaniak, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 81-61.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Nov. 9, 1981.

David S. Miller and Michael S. Britton, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Fawell, James & Brooks, Gerald J. Brooks and Heidi A. Katz, Naperville, for defendants-appellees.

SEIDENFELD, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff, the former Winfield Village Administrator, filed a complaint against the defendants on May 20, 1980, for libel per se as the result of the publication on November 21, 1979, of the following letter composed and approved by the defendants and addressed to local newspapers and members of the Village and Library Boards:

"In the November 14, 1979 issue of The Examiner there appeared an article in which it was stated 'Winfield Village officials have expressed some concern about the upcoming November 17 referendum in which voters will decide on the issuance of public library building bonds'.

Although we respect and expect that our elected Village officials be concerned with any project involving our Village and increases in taxes, we expected and would have appreciated having these concerns expressed to the Winfield Library Board of Directors. This would have allowed us to satisfy any questions.

The Library Board, along with its attorney, architect and financial consultant, attended several meetings of the Board of Trustees in order to answer questions. None of the concerns outlined in the November 14, 1979 article were raised by any of the trustees at these meetings.

We as a Board do not feel we were treated fairly by your expressing these concerns without giving us a chance to answer before the referendum was held.

In checking on the article, we found that Mr. R. Britton, Village Administrator, called the press release into the Examiner on Monday, November 12. This type of cheap and dishonest government is not needed nor should be allowed in the Village of Winfield.

Mr. Britton was so concerned about the future of the Village, in which he does not reside nor pay taxes, that he made himself a spokesman for the other Village officials who are all residents and tax payers, and resorted to 'dirty tricks'.

Therefore, the Winfield Library Board of Directors asks that Mr. Britton be reprimanded, instructed as to proper procedures in dealing with the press and publicly apologize so that honest and upright government can come back to our Village.

Passed by motion, Winfield Library Board of Directors November 21, 1979."

Plaintiff's complaint alleged, in substance, that the words concerning plaintiff in the letter were false, malicious and defamatory, imputing plaintiff's want of skill and integrity, dishonesty, collusion and conspiracy to violate statutes and ordinances for personal gain; were published concerning plaintiff in his capacity as a public official, and falsely and maliciously impugned plaintiff's ability and fitness to serve the community in a position of trust; charged plaintiff with dishonest, illegal conduct, and with fraudulent and unethical practices, and with collusion and conspiracy to defraud the taxpayers and residents of the Village of Winfield.

It further alleged that defendants made such statements knowing that they were false; that the statements prejudiced plaintiff and injured his reputation for honesty, integrity and ability in the performance of his duties as a public official and the conduct of his business as a Village Administrator; and that they subjected plaintiff in his capacity as a public official and in his capacity as a Village Administrator to public hatred, contempt, ridicule and distrust.

The defendants' amended motion to dismiss with prejudice, filed pursuant to Section 45 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 45), raised three legal defenses to the complaint: failure to allege actual malice, the rule of innocent construction, and privilege and fair comment. The court granted the motion, basing the decision on the rule of innocent construction, and plaintiff's timely filed notice of appeal limited the issue to the court's finding that the letter was not actionable because it came within that rule.

Essentially the rule of innocent construction provides that an allegedly defamatory writing must be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and that all words which could be libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. John v. Tribune Company, 24 Ill.2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105 (1962).

Certain classifications of words have been found to be so naturally and obviously hurtful that damage is presumed and no allegations or proof of special damages are necessary. Words falling within these four classes are considered to be libel per se : (1) words which impute the commission of a criminal offense; (2) words which impute infection with a communicable disease which, if true, would exclude one from society; (3) words which impute the inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) words which prejudice a particular party in his profession or trade. Richardson v. Dunbar, 95 Ill.App.3d 254, 259, 50 Ill.Dec. 756, 419 N.E.2d 1205 (1981); Coursey v. Greater Niles Tp. Pub. Corp., 82 Ill.App.2d 76, 81-82, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1967), aff'd., 40 Ill.2d 257, 239 N.E.2d 837 (1968).

In its letter of December 15, 1980, directing that an order dismissing the complaint be drafted and submitted for its approval, the trial court found that: "Defendants' letter does not impute the commission of any crime to plaintiff but clearly relates to the discharge of the duties of his office as Village Administrator and to his profession." The court then found that: "Read as a whole, however, defendants' letter complains only of a news release shortly before a library referendum to which the library board had no opportunity to respond." Thus, the trial court held that "defendants' letter is not actionable because it comes within the rule of innocent construction."

We agree that the defendants' words, read in the context of the entire letter and surrounding circumstances, must be declared nonactionable under that rule. Although harsh and uncomplimentary, these words amount to criticism of the plaintiff's conduct in a particular instance and not a personal attack on the plaintiff's honesty or character in general. Earlier cases have held nonactionable similar attacks that were, if anything, more easily read as defamatory and dismissed suits for libel per se based on these attacks.

Read in context, the defendants' accusations of "cheap and dishonest government" and "dirty tricks", and the charges that the plaintiff did not follow "proper procedures" or practice "honest and upright government" are simply harsh criticisms of the plaintiff's conduct in this particular instance rather than attacks on his honesty or character in general. This case thus appears nearly on "all fours" with two earlier cases, in each of which the appellate court upheld a motion to dismiss a suit for libel per se that was based on a publication calling the plaintiff a "liar" in connection with a specific incident.

In Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co., 56 Ill.App.2d 101, 205 N.E.2d 44 (1965), the plaintiff, a candidate for mayor, published an advertisement in the defendant's newspaper charging that the defendant had denied him the right to reply to assertions made by one of the newspaper's writers. The defendant retaliated by running an editorial entitled "NO WORD TAKES PLACE OF 'LIAR'!" which stated that the plaintiff's charge was "a 'lie' of the common garden variety, which means that (plaintiff), in the parlance of the street, is an 'unadulterated liar.' " (56 Ill.App.2d 101, 104, 205 N.E.2d 44.) The court defined libel per se as words that are "clearly defamatory on their face, * * * unambiguous and incapable of innocent meaning," (56 Ill.App.2d 101, 106), and held defendant's editorial nonactionable as a matter of law. The court stressed that the editorial "did not brand the plaintiff as a liar in general terms, and one who was unworthy of belief under any circumstances, but stated that he was untruthful in a particular instance. * * * (T)he word 'liar' is not a complimentary name, however, it does not follow that its use is libel per se." (56 Ill.App.2d 101, 107-108, 205 N.E.2d 44.) While the court's exact rationale is somewhat unclear, it upheld a motion to dismiss a suit for libel per se involving a publication that, if anything, was more personally insulting to the plaintiff than the one at issue here.

The innocent construction rule was explicitly involved in Delis v. Sepsis, 9 Ill.App.3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972). There the defendant was sued for libel per se for writing a letter that accused the plaintiff of sabotaging the installation of a statute in a city square by surrounding the statute with self-promoting "advertising plaques," resulting in the division of the ethnic organization of which plaintiff was secretary into warring camps. The defendant's letter stated in part that

" 'The dishonorable Secretary of the New Association of Pianotans attempts through his publication to conceal the entire historical truth of the subject and to shift the blame for his false step and the resulting disgrace of the entire affair to the treachery and wickedness of a few Pianotans. The deluded Secretary and the adviser who is concealing himself behind him, writing and publishing lies, cast elsewhere his responsibilities * * *." 9 Ill.App.3d at 218, 292 N.E.2d 138.

The letter further described the plaintiff as " 'sly, coy and evasive,' * * * 'deluded, deceptive and possessing...