Broaddus v. Grout

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SMEDLEY; WILSON; CULVER
• Citation: Broaddus v. Grout, 152 Tex. 398, 258 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1953)
• Decision Date: 13 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. A-3979,A-3979
• Parties: BROADDUS et al. v. GROUT.

Page 308

258 S.W.2d 308

152 Tex. 398

BROADDUS et al. v. GROUT.

No. A-3979.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 13, 1953.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1953.

Sam G. Croom, Houston, for petitioners.

Strong, Moore, Strong & Nelson, Beaumont, for respondent.

SMEDLEY, Justice.

The one question presented is as to the sufficiency of the description of land in a deed executed by petitioner Mrs. Lois Vaughn Broaddus, then Mrs. Vaughn, as grantor, to respondent E. A. Grout as grantee. We omit the last part of the deed, which includes the habendum clause, the general warranty, signatures and acknowledgment, and here set out the first part to and including the description:

'The State of Texas

County of Jefferson

Know All Men By These Presents:

'That I, Homer Vaughn, joined by my wife, Lois Vaughn, of the County of Jefferson, State of Texas, for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable consideration to us in hand paid by E. A. Grout, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and confessed, have granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, sell and convey, unto the said E. A. Grout of the county of Jefferson, State of Texas, our undivided interest amounting to a 1/7th, of the below described tract or parcel of land, as follows:

'Beginning at a stake in the west line of said 160 acre survey 172. 8/11 varas from its northwest corner. Thence south with west line of said survey 86. 4/11 Varas to a stake in west line of said survey from corner. Thence east 950 Varas to east line of said survey, stake for corner. Thence north with said east line 86. 4/11 Varas to south east corner of lot #2, thence west with said south line of lot #2, 950 Varas to place of beginning, containing 14. 6/11 acres of land. Said land is undivided.'

This suit was brought by respondent Grout against petitioner Mrs. Broaddus and her husband for a judgment declaring that the deed is a valid conveyance of an undivided one-seventh interest in a tract of land in Hardin County, particularly described in the petition by metes and bounds, and quieting respondent Grout's title.

The trial court rendered judgment for respondent Grout in accordance with the prayer in his petition, setting out in the judgment the following findings '* * * that the defendant, Lois Vaughn Broaddus at the time of executing the above described deed, owned an undivided 1/7th interest in a tract of County, Texas, containing 14 6/11ths County, Texas, containing 14 3/11 ths acres of land, and lying South of a tract of land known as Lot No. 2, and having the identical metes and bounds description as contained in the above described deed of June 11, 1937, said tract of land owned by the defendant, Lois Vaughn Broaddus, at the time of executing said above described deed, being Lot No. 3 of the Isaac Gore 160 acre Survey in the O. C. Nelson League in Hardin County, Texas, and being the same land hereinafter described in this judgment by metes and bounds; and that at the time of the execution of said deed afore-described, the defendant, Lois Vaughn Broaddus, and her then husband, H. A. Vaughn, did not own an undivided 1/7th interest in any 14 6/11ths acres tract of land in any state in the Union other than the said Lot No. 3 out of the Isaac Gore 160-Acre Survey in the O. C. Nelson League in Hardin County, Texas, as more particularly hereinafter described by metes and bounds.'

The findings were based upon extrinsic evidence offered by respondent and admitted by the court over petitioners' objections that the deed was void on its face for uncertainty of description, and that to permit the use of extrinsic evidence in aid of and to explain the description would add to and vary the description in violation of Article 1288 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, the statute of conveyances. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 253 S.W.2d 74.

The deed was executed in Beaumont on June 11, 1937, and was acknowledged before a notary public of Jefferson County. It was filed for record in Hardin County about three months after its execution. The land which respondent asserts and the trial court found to have been conveyed by the deed is a one-seventh interest in a tract of 14 6/11ths acres of land, a part of the Isaac Gore 160-acre survey in the O. C. Nelson League in Hardin County.

The deed contains no reference whatever to a survey, county or state in which the land intended to be conveyed is situated. There are no words of description except the words 'our undivided interest amounting to a 1/7th, of the below described tract or parcel of land', and a metes and bounds description. The metes and bounds description has no place of beginning except that it begins at a stake in the west line of 'said 160 acre survey', a certain distance from its northwest corner. There is no 'said 160 acre survey' described or identified in the deed. The metes and bounds description, in addition to calls for the west and east lines of 'said survey', calls also for a corner and a line of 'lot #2', and there is no description or identification of 'lot #2'. The deed recites that the tract in which the one-seventh interest is conveyed contains 14 6/11ths acres of land.

This description shows that the undivided one-seventh interest intended to be conveyed is in a rectangular tract of land of 14 6/11ths acres, which is a part of a 160-acre survey, but the deed supplies no means and no data to indicate what 160-acre survey or where it is located, whether in Jefferson County or Hardin County, or some other county of the State of Texas, or in some county of some other state of the Union or elsewhere in the world, no means or data for identifying the land, unless the words 'our undivided interest' are sufficient for that purpose.

The established test in determining the sufficiency, for compliance with the statute of conveyances and the statute of frauds, of the description of land in deeds and in contracts to convey land is thus stated in Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56-57, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152: 'the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.' (Emphasis added.) See also W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Ewers, 133 Tex. 616, 131 S.W.2d 86, 123 A.L.R. 908; Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222; Phillips v. Burns, Tex.Sup., 252 S.W.2d 927; Adams v. Abbott, Tex.Sup., 254 S.W.2d 78; Hoover v. Wukasch, Tex.Sup., 254 S.W.2d 507.

A recital of ownership in a deed may be used as an element of description and may serve as a means, together with some other element, of identifying the land with reasonable certainty. For example, in one of the decisions cited by respondent, Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222, 223, the contract or memorandum described the land as 'my property * * * 20.709 acres out of John Stephens 640 acre survey in Tarrant County, Texas'. Without the words 'my property' the description would have been insufficient because it did not show what 20.709 acres out of the designated survey were intended to be conveyed. It was held, however, that 'such a description (having reference, of course, to the whole of the description, including the number of acres, the survey, county and state, as well as the words 'my property') by reason of the use in the memorandum or contract of such words as 'my property', * * * is sufficient when it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the party to be charged and who has signed the contract or memorandum owns a tract and only one tract of land answering the description in the memorandum.' Similarly, the contract involved in Sanderson v. Sanderson, 130 Tex. 264, 109 S.W.2d 744, described the land as Mrs. Kelton's farm in Haskell County. It was held that such a description would be sufficient if the evidence established the fact that Mrs. Kelton owned only one farm in Haskell County at the time the contract was executed. In those cases the statement of ownership, together with the descriptive data in the instrument, the survey, county and state in the one instance, and the county in the other, afforded the means in the writing for the direct and certain identification of the land by the use of extrinsic evidence within reasonable limitations, subject to verification, and not wholly dependent upon parol evidence.

In the instant case the deed contains no such definite element of description to aid the reference to ownership in directly and certainly identifying the land. We have only the use of 'our undivided 1/7th interest' in a tract of land described by metes and bounds, which have no value for identification because they tie to no designated survey and call for no natural objects. We are not told by the description in what county or in what state the land lies. 'Our undivided interest' in a tract of land standing alone identifies no land. A search of records, when there is a reference in the deed to the survey or to the county, would reveal ownership and thus support the statement of ownership in the deed. Here a search of records would be impossible or futile. In what counties of what states would the search be made? So it seems necessarily to follow that the trial court's finding and conclusion could not be supported without parol evidence that the grantor 'did not own an undivided 1/7th interest in any 14 6/11 acres tract of land in any state in the Union other than' the tract of land described in respondent's petition and in the trial court's judgment. The trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals permitted respondent to take the part of the deed describing the grantor's ownership of an undivided interest in 14 6/11 acres of land and by parol evidence to identify the land as being the tract described in respondent's petition. In this way the land is identified only by the statement of ownership and by parol evidence not directly...