Broadnax v. State, 1 Div. 726
| Decision Date | 22 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | 1 Div. 726 |
| Citation | 455 So.2d 205 |
| Parties | Leslie BROADNAX v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Arthur P. Clarke, Mobile, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Jane LeCroy Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Leslie Broadnax was indicted and convicted for theft of property in the first degree. Alabama Code § 13A-8-3 (1975). He was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual offender. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The facts are as follows:
July 6, 1981 Theft committed and
Broadnax arrested.
August 18, 1981 Indictment.
September 2, 1981 Speedy trial requested.
September 3, 1981 Arraignment.
February 11, 1982 Motion for Discharge for
violation of "speedy trial
rule"("180 days had passed
and the petitioner has not
been to trial yet").
October 10, 1981 Broadnax's probation in
another case is revoked.
August 26, 1983 Motion to dismiss filed.
Denied on August 30, 1983.
September 21, 1983 Trial.
The length of time from arrest to trial is two years and two and one-half months. Immediately before the trial started, Broadnax's appointed counsel renewed his motion to dismiss and the following occurred:
(Emphasis added.)
Broadnax was given credit on his sentence for the time he had already served since his arrest. A second charge of theft was nol prossed.
In applying the four-part test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we find that the delay of over two years is presumptively prejudicial and sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining three factors.
The record contains little information on the reasons for the delay. Although Broadnax was in custody during the entire period, the State has offered no valid reason for the delay. The record shows that Broadnax was facing other criminal charges and in fact was tried and convicted while awaiting trial in this particular case. Although the record does not show when defense counsel requested a continuance, there is evidence that least one continuance was necessary to allow counsel time for preparation. Another delay was attributable to a request for psychiatric examination. The State is not responsible for delays that result directly from the defendant's actions. United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir.1982) (); United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856, 869 (10th Cir.1982) (); Byrd v. State, 421 So.2d 1344 (Ala.Crim.App.1982) (). Delays occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length of delay and are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker. Walker v. State, 386 So.2d 762, 763 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Walker, 386 So.2d 765 (Ala.1980). "Where the delay in bringing a defendant to trial ... is caused by continuances or postponements requested by the defendant, or by counsel on his behalf, his right in that respect is usually regarded as having been waived, and he may not complain of the delay." Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, § 5 (1958 and 1984 Later Case Service).
Although Broadnax has made timely assertions of his right to a speedy trial, none of the written motions contains any indication of specific prejudice. There has never been advanced the contention that the delay impaired the defense.
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Coral v. State
...of the appellant, for "[t]he State is not responsible for delays that result directly from the defendant's actions," Broadnax v. State, 455 So.2d 205, 207 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) . The appellant was granted continuances to accommodate his counsel's schedule, to obtain witnesses, and to obtain a p......
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Weaver v. State
...of defense counsel. "The State is not responsible for delays that result directly from the defendant's actions." Broadnax v. State, 455 So.2d 205, 207 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). In the hearing on the speedy trial motion, defense counsel argued that the appellant was prejudiced because he was not tr......
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Ex Parte Walker
...(Ala.Crim.App.1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State, 455 So.2d 253, 254 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (16-month delay); Broadnax v. State, 455 So.2d 205, 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (more than 26-month delay); but see Ex parte Apicella, 809 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala. 2001)(14-month delay not presumptively......
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Ex Parte Hamilton
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