Broadwater v. State
Decision Date | 13 September 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 123, September Term, 2006.,123, September Term, 2006. |
Citation | 401 Md. 175,931 A.2d 1098 |
Parties | Lorinda Ann BROADWATER v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Amy E. Brennan, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for Petitioner.
Kathryn Grill Graeff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of MD, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for Respondent.
BELL, C.J., RAKER, CATHELL*, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to consider two questions: (1) whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County was correct in finding that, as a matter of law, a defendant in a criminal case may be held to have waived validly by inaction, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-215(a) and (d), his or her right to be represented by counsel where the required preliminary litany of advisements under (a) was provided to the defendant by various judges in a piecemeal and cumulative fashion over the course of multiple appearances before the District Court and Circuit Court because the case was initiated in the District Court pursuant to that court's exclusive original jurisdiction and the defendant removed the case to the Circuit Court by praying a jury trial; and (2) whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by finding that Lorinda Ann Broadwater, defendant below and Petitioner here, waived her right to counsel, despite her proffered excuses for failing to engage counsel? The Court of Special Appeals found no reversible error with the piecemeal approach to rendition of the litany of Rule 4-215(a) advisements and concluded that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Broadwater waived her right to counsel by inaction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Through the Fourteenth Amendment,1 the duty to provide all criminal defendants with counsel applies to individual states because such provision is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Similarly, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states "that in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; [and] to be allowed counsel." MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 21. These constitutional provisions "guarantee a right to counsel, including appointed counsel for an indigent, in a criminal case involving incarceration." Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262, 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987) (quoting Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 357, 464 A.2d 228, 234 (1983)).
As part of the implementation and protection of this fundamental right to counsel,2 we adopted Maryland Rule 4-215,3 which explicates the method by which the right to counsel may be waived by those defendants wishing to represent themselves, the modalities by which a trial judge may find that a criminal defendant waived implicitly his or her right to counsel, either by failure or refusal to obtain counsel, and the necessary litany of advisements that must be given to all criminal defendants before any finding of express or implied waiver of the right to be represented by counsel may be valid.4 The Rule "provides an orderly procedure to insure that each criminal defendant appearing before the court be represented by counsel, or, if he is not, that he be advised of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his correlative constitutional right to self-representation." Wright v. State, 48 Md.App. 185, 191, 425 A.2d 1385, 1388, cert. denied, 290 Md. 724 (1981). Any decision to waive counsel (or to relinquish the right to counsel through inaction) and represent oneself must be accompanied by a waiver inquiry designed "to ensure that [the decision] is `made with eyes open'" and that the defendant has undertaken waiver in a "knowing and intelligent" fashion. State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 414, 676 A.2d 513, 518 (1996).
As a threshold requirement to finding a valid waiver of counsel by a defendant, a trial judge first must find that all requisite Rule 4-215(a) advisements have been rendered previously. Advisements (a)(1) through (3) are required to be given to a defendant upon his or her first appearance in court without counsel, or when a defendant appears before the District Court, demands a jury trial, and the record does not reflect prior satisfaction of the required advisements. Advisements (a)(4) and (5), on the other hand, are contingent in that they are required to be given only when a defendant expresses a desire to waive counsel or when trial is to be conducted on a subsequent date, respectively. Md. Rule 4-215(a).
Subsections (b) through (e) of the Rule provide four separate modalities by which the assistance of counsel may be waived. The right to counsel may be waived expressly, by inaction in the District Court, by inaction in the Circuit Court, or by discharge of counsel. If, upon the occurrence of one of the aforementioned events, the record reflects that subsection (a) has been fully satisfied, the trial court then must follow the directives of the appropriate waiver modality before finding that a defendant waived his or her right to counsel. A court may not find an effective waiver pursuant to (b)-(e) unless the record demonstrates compliance with subsection (a). McCracken v. State, 150 Md.App. 330, 348, 820 A.2d 593, 604 (2003).
Because the right to counsel is a "basic, fundamental and substantive right," the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-215 are "mandatory and must be complied with, irrespective of the gravity of the crime charged, the type of plea entered, or the lack of an affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused." Taylor v. State, 20 Md.App. 404, 409, 411, 316 A.2d 296, 299, 300 (1974) ( ); see also State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 155, 395 A.2d 475, 477 (1978) ( ). Strict, not substantial, compliance with the advisement and inquiry terms of the Rule is required in order to support a valid waiver. Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 411, 663 A.2d 593, 596 (1995) ( ); Webb v. State, 144 Md.App. 729, 741, 742, 800 A.2d 42, 49 (2002) ( ); Evans v. State, 84 Md.App. 573, 580, 581 A.2d 435, 438 (1990). A failure to comply with the Rule constitutes reversible error. Moten, 339 Md. at 411, 663 A.2d at 596.
The facts material to the issues raised in Petitioner's petition for certiorari are not in dispute. On 25 June 2004, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Montgomery County Police Officer James Geary, a resident of Frederick County, was driving home, northbound on Route 15 in Frederick County. Officer Geary observed a vehicle, with its headlights unlit, traveling directly towards him in his lane of traffic. He swerved in order to avoid a head-on collision. He subsequently called for assistance from Frederick County law enforcement personnel, made a U-turn, and followed the vehicle. As he pursued the vehicle, Officer Geary observed the car narrowly miss other vehicles in oncoming traffic and saw its headlights flickering on and off. Eventually, the car pulled into the parking lot of a townhouse development. Geary approached the vehicle and identified Lorinda Ann Broadwater as the driver. She admitted to him to drinking at a bar that night.
Within minutes, Frederick County Deputy Sheriff Chris Schreiner arrived on the scene. He observed that Broadwater's eyes were watery and bloodshot and that an odor of alcohol emanated from her vehicle. He attempted to administer standard field sobriety tests, but Broadwater, who had difficulty keeping her balance, could not perform the tests as instructed. A preliminary breath test revealed that she had a breath alcohol content of .19.5 As a result, Deputy Sheriff Schreiner placed Broadwater under arrest.
Later that same day, Broadwater was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Frederick County,6 with negligent driving, failing to illuminate headlights, driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving while impaired by alcohol. She was taken promptly before a District Court Commissioner and received copies of the charging document and a Notice of Advice of Right to Counsel.
Approaching three months later, on 21 September 2004, Broadwater appeared, without counsel, for trial before the Honorable Janice Ambrose of the District Court. At this initial appearance, the following colloquy occurred:
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