Broadway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asselin

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROBERTS; FROST; PER CURIAM; FROST
• Citation: Broadway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asselin, 93 R.I. 403, 176 A.2d 714 (R.I. 1961)
• Decision Date: 18 December 1961
• Docket Number: Nos. 2926-2930,s. 2926-2930
• Parties: BROADWAY AUTO SALES, INC. et al. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar. HURD & GOLDBERG, INC. et al. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar. IMPERIAL CAR RENTAL CORP. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar. DUNNE LEASES CARS AND TRUCKS, INC. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar. EASTERN LEASING CORPORATION v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar. Ex.

Page 714

176 A.2d 714

93 R.I. 403

BROADWAY AUTO SALES, INC. et al. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar.

HURD & GOLDBERG, INC. et al. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar.

IMPERIAL CAR RENTAL CORP. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar.

DUNNE LEASES CARS AND TRUCKS, INC. v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar.

EASTERN LEASING CORPORATION v. Romeo D. ASSELIN, Registrar.

Ex. Nos. 2926-2930.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 18, 1961.

Motion for Reargument Denied Jan. 11, 1962.

Israel Press, Providence, for Broadway Auto Sales, Inc., and others.

Waldman & Waldman, Providence, for Hurd & Goldberg, Inc., and others.

DeSimone & DeSimone, Providence, for Imperial Car Rental Corp.

Arcaro, Belilove & Kolodney, Abraham Belilove, Providence, for Dunne Leases Cars and Trucks, Inc. and Eastern Leasing Corporation.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Joseph L. Breen, Chief Sp. Counsel, Providence, for State.

ROBERTS, Justice.

These five petitions of appeal from an order of the registrar of motor vehicles in each cause denying the relief prayed for were originally brought against Romeo D. Asselin, Registrar, but now by stipulation are against Laure B. Lussier, Registrar, as the successor in office of the respondent Romeo D. Asselin. They were filed in the superior court pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, § 31-2-19, wherein it is provided specifically that such petitions will follow the course of equity. They were heard by a justice of the superior court, who thereafter reversed the decision of the registrar and entered an order in each cause granting certain of the petitioners' prayers for affirmative and injunctive relief. From that order in each cause the respondent registrar has appealed to this court.

It is agreed by the parties that the same issue of law is raised in each cause and that the right of each petitioner to the relief sought, both affirmative and injunctive, will be determined by the decision of this court in the appeal of Dunne Leases Cars and Trucks, Inc. Therefore, in discussing the questions raised for our consideration, we will refer only to this petitioner, it being understood, however, that such decision will be given full force and effect in each of the other causes.

The material facts are not in dispute. The petitioner is a Rhode Island corporation engaged in the business of renting and leasing motor vehicles for the use of its customers. The pertinent transactions are not sales of the vehicles, for title remains in it and the vehicles are registered in its name. It is the custom of petitioner to designate as 'rentals' those agreements for the use of the vehicles for short periods of time, while such agreements covering a year or more are designated as 'leasings.' It does not itself engage in the business of transporting persons or goods for hire, and in every contract pertinent to the issue herein raised the use of the vehicles for the transportation of goods or persons for hire is prohibited for reasons arising out of limitations set out in its insurance coverage.

In G.L.1956, title 31, the legislature has provided, inter alia, for the registration of motor vehicles by the registry. In § 31-6-1 thereof there is established a schedule of the fees to be paid to the registry for the registration of such vehicles. The primary determination of the amount of the fee to be paid for such registration of any particular vehicle is predicated upon the basis of its weight. However, in subparagraph E of said § 31-6-1 it is provided that the registration fee to be paid for a motor vehicle 'for hire' is to be double the amount of the fee established in the schedule for that particular vehicle, specifically excepting citizens of the town of New Shoreham from this requirement of the payment of double fees. Subparagraph E reads as follows: 'For the registration of every motor vehicle for hire, double the above rates. Except that any citizen of the town of New Shoreham shall not be required to pay the double rate specifically provided for in this section; provided, however, that the motor vehicle so used by such citizen of New Shoreham shall be properly registered in accordance with chapters 3 to 9, inclusive, of this title.'

It appears from the record that the respondent registrar, holding that the vehicles rented by petitioner are vehicles 'for hire' within the meaning of subpar. E, required petitioner to pay the double fee provided for in § 31-6-1. In 1960 petitioner, apparently intending to pursue the remedy provided in § 31-6-14(b), filed with the respondent registrar a petition for a refund of that portion of the registration fee by it paid in excess of the regular fees prescribed for its motor vehicles in § 31-6-1. In February 1960 a hearing was held on this petition by the respondent registrar, who thereafter issued the order denying the petition for the refund sought by petitioner.

The petitioner then filed the instant petition of appeal to the superior court under the pertinent provisions of the statute. After a hearing thereon the superior court found, in substance, that petitioner's vehicles were not motor vehicles for hire within the meaning of that term as defined in § 31-1-3(g) and therefore were not subject to the double registration fee provided in § 31-6-1(E). From an order entered pursuant thereto the respondent registrar has appealed to this court. He contends that the finding of the trial justice that petitioner's vehicles were not motor vehicles for hire within the meaning of the statute was error.

This court subscribes to the proposition that ordinarily when the legislature undertakes to define a term used in its statutory enactments, the court is bound by the definition therein set out. Landry v. Cornell Construction Co., 87 R.I. 1, 137 A.2d 412; Mount Pleasant Cab Co. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Board, 73 R.I. 7, 53 A.2d 485. In the instant case G.L.1956, title 31, known as the motor vehicle code act, in § 31-1-2 provides that certain definitions set out in § 31-1-3 are to be applied to the term so defined whenever it is used in the code. In view of the directive set out in § 31-1-2 this court is bound by the definition of a motor vehicle for hire in § 31-1-3(g) when seeking to ascertain whether a particular vehicle is for hire within the purview of the double registration fee provisions of § 31-6-1(E).

Subsection (g) of § 31-1-3 reads: 'Motor vehicle for hire. Every motor vehicle other than jitneys, public busses, hearses and motor vehicles used chiefly in connection with and the conduct of funerals, used for transporting persons for which compensation in any form is received, or motor vehicles rented for transporting persons either with or without furnishing an operator.' In pressing his appeal from the decision below, respondent concedes that the motor vehicles of petitioner here are not within the purview of the first clause of the definitional statute, that is, they are not motor vehicles 'used for transporting persons for which compensation in any form is received * * *.' The respondent does, however, contend that these vehicles do come within the purview of the second clause of the statute, that is, they are motor vehicles 'rented for transporting persons either with or without furnishing an operator.'

The petitioner, as we understand it,...