Brock v. Connecticut

• Decision Date: 01 March 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-CV-1889 (CSH)
• Parties: TAMIKA BROCK, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES DMHAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

TAMIKA BROCK, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES DMHAS, Defendant.

No. 3:20-CV-1889 (CSH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 1, 2022

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT [DOC. 22]

CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tamika Brock, an African American, black, and Latina licensed social worker, brings this action against her former employer, defendant State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (“DMHAS, ” also herein “Defendant”), for, inter alia, violations of her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. Doc. 22, ¶¶ 3, 5-6. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. Although this motion has been labeled on the docket as Plaintiff's “Second Motion to Amend/Correct” her Complaint [Doc. 22], the current motion is actually her third motion to amend. Because she sought to substitute a new complaint twice while her prior motions to amend were pending, the Court will deny the prior motions [Doc. 16 & 18] as moot and refer to the currently proffered pleading [Doc. 22] simply as her proposed “Amended Complaint.”

Plaintiff states that she seeks to amend to include the recent “release of jurisdiction from the [Connecticut] Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities dated January 26, 2022.” Doc. 22, at 1, Doc. 22-1. She further asserts that she “alleges on-going acts related to the same nucleus of operative facts.” Doc. 22, at 1. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to add a claim against a new defendant, Lori Orend, “an employee and supervisor of Defendant, ” who allegedly physically assaulted Plaintiff, thereby committing common law “assault and battery” upon her, on or about March 21, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 2, 22, and “Count Five, ” ¶¶ 78-80.

Before addressing the motion to amend, it is incumbent on the Court to assess its subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g. Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (a federal court has “an independent obligation to consider the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1282 (2007). Upon reviewing the proposed Amended Complaint, the Court finds that it has “federal question” subject matter jurisdiction over claims asserted against Defendant. In the first three counts, Plaintiff alleges that while employed by Defendant, she suffered racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII. Because these first three claims arise under a federal statute, the case falls within this Court's “federal question” subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.^[1]

Moreover, with respect to Connecticut state law claims, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Count Four. That count, alleging disability discrimination against DMHAS under Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-60, is so related to Plaintiff's Title VII claims that it forms part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). As to jurisdiction over the proposed fifth count, a Connecticut common law battery claim against Lori Orend, the Court will address that claim separately below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Amendment under Rule 15, Fed. R. Civ. P.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a plaintiff may amend its complaint “once as a matter of course” within twenty-one days after service or within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading (i.e., answer or motion to dismiss), whichever is earlier. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A) and (B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Id. 15(a)(2). Moreover, if the court's permission is necessary, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id.

In the present case, Plaintiff has filed repeated motions to amend and has filed this last motion well beyond twenty-one days after service of the complaint. Therefore, she may not amend “as a matter of course” under Rule 15(a)(1). Nonetheless, defendant DMHAS has provided “written consent” to Plaintiff's motion under Rule 15(a)(2). In particular, in her current motion to amend, Plaintiff represents that she “queried” counsel for Defendant on January 3, 2022, who “indicated no opposition to the motion but reserve[ed] her right to file a dispositive motion.” Doc. 22, at 1. Thereafter, Defendant's counsel filed the prescribed “written consent” in a “Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend Her Complaint.” Doc. 23. In that pleading, Defendant's counsel indicated that the Defendant “does hereby consent to the filing of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint [Doc. 22] but respectfully reserves its right to contest the merits of the complaint by virtue of a dispositive pleading.” Doc. 23, at 1. However, as to the addition of Lori Orend as an individual defendant, Defendant stated that it “does not and cannot consent to any amendment . . . concerning the addition of [that individual defendant], . . . who is not yet a party to this action.” Id.

Given Defendant's written consent to Plaintiff's present Amended Complaint against Defendant, that pleading will be accepted by the Court as the operative pleading as it pertains to the claims against DMHAS, Counts One to Four. However, to the extent that Defendant provides no consent to the proposed claim against Lori Orend, Count Five, the Court reviews that claim to determine whether to grant leave for its addition.

B. Addition of Defendant Lori Orend - Foman Review of Count Five: Battery

The Court notes that because the amendments with respect to individual Lori Orend require her addition as a defendant, Federal Rule 21 of Civil Procedure governs. That Rule, captioned “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties, ” provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. However, “[w]ith respect to the interaction of Rules 15(a) and 21, it has been held that Rule 15(a) generally governs the amendment of complaints.” Braham v. Perelmuter, No. 3:15CV01094(JCH), 2016 WL 6910256, at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2016) (quoting Meyers v. Kishimoto, No. 3:14CV535(CSH), 2015 WL 4041438, at *3 (D. Conn. July 1, 2015)). Therefore, to the extent that Rule 21 governs when new defendants are to be added, that “perceived supremacy of Rule 21 is . . . of no practical consequence, since it is generally held that the standards governing motions to amend under Rule 15 apply with equal force to motions to add parties under Rule 21.” Braham, 2016 WL 6910256, at *3 (quoting Meyers, 2015 WL 4041438, at *3).

As discussed supra, absent opposing parties' written consent, a plaintiff may only amend “with the court's leave, ” which shall be “freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). In that event, whether to grant leave to amend lies within the court's discretion, taking into account factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Under Foman, “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave sought [to amend] should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.' ” 371 U.S. at 182.

In the case at bar, there is no indication of any undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by Plaintiff. In each of her motions to amend her complaint - including her first attempt to amend, on July 15, 2021 - Plaintiff has included a proposed battery claim against Lori Orend. Plaintiff has not delayed, exercised bad faith, or been dilatory in proposing this amendment. Moreover, she has not repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in her complaint.

Furthermore, there is no evidence of undue prejudice to DMHAS in allowing the addition of Lori Orend as a defendant. In determining what constitutes prejudice, the Court considers whether the amendment would: “(i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.” Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Here, there is no indication that the addition of Orend will require the Defendant to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery or prepare for trial. Due to her former position as Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, Orend will likely be a witness in the proceedings anyway. Also, the “battery” claim against Orend is a limited, discrete claim against her in her individual capacity, which allegedly arises out of a singular incident on or about March 21, 2019. Doc. 22, ¶ 22. Additionally, there is no significant delay in adding Orend as a party because the proceedings remain at an early stage. Discovery has not yet ensued.^[2]

Finally as to futility, the Court reviews the battery claim against Orend to determine whether it states a plausible claim, one upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting leave to amend may be denied when amendment is “unlikely to be productive, ” such as when an amendment is “futile” and “could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).”) (citations omitted); Dorlette v. Iozia, No. 3:16-CV-1882 (VAB), 2020 WL 509564, at *2 (...