Brock v. Logsdon

Decision Date07 December 2022
Docket Number19-CV-6082
PartiesCASSANDRA LEE BROCK, as Administratrix of the ESTATE OF NOEL X. COLON and Guardian of the Property of Mercedes Colon, Plaintiff, v. DEP. STEPHANIE LOGSDON, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

DECISION AND ORDER

HON FRANK P. GERACI, JR. United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Cassandra Lee Brock (Plaintiff) brings this action as Administratrix of the Estate of Noel X. Colon (“Colon”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, inter alia, Defendants Livingston County Sheriff's Deputies Stephanie Logsdon, Amber Pellicane Connor Sanford, William Schwan, and Shawn Whitford (collectively, Defendants). ECF No. 1 (complaint); ECF No. 23 (amended complaint). Presently before the Court are the parties' competing motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 140, 141, and Plaintiff's motion to set aside a Decision and Order of Magistrate Judge Mark W Pedersen, ECF No. 161.

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion to set aside the decision of Magistrate Judge Pedersen, ECF No. 161, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 141, is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's federal-law claim. The Court intends to decline to exercise pendant supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, but will afford the parties with an opportunity to be heard.[1]

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court draws the following facts from the parties' statements of undisputed facts, which, for the most part, are indeed undisputed.[2] The Court will highlight where the parties disagree.

At the time of the relevant events, Plaintiff and Colon had been in a relationship for eight years and shared one daughter. On November 2, 2017, the Livingston County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to a southbound portion of I-390 in the Town of Avon upon a complaint that a black Chevy was driving erratically. ECF No. 140-1 ¶ 4. Livingston County Sheriff's Deputy Pilkenton (a non-party) stopped the vehicle at approximately 9:54 p.m. ECF No. 141-22 ¶ 23. Deputy Whitford arrived on-scene shortly thereafter. Upon approaching the vehicle, Deputy Whitford observed Colon in the driver's seat “having issues” and crying. ECF No. 140-1 ¶ 6. Plaintiff's brother, Nick Brock (Brock), was in the passenger seat of the vehicle. ECF No. 14122 ¶ 25. Colon and Brock were immediately separated. Id. ¶ 27. Deputy Pilkenton searched Brock and discovered drugs; Brock was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. Id. ¶ 28.

Meanwhile Deputy Whitford observed that Colon's pupils were constricted. ECF No. 141-22 ¶ 31. Deputy Whitford asked Colon to exit the vehicle and, as he was doing so, Deputy Whitford observed a white glassine bag-like those that typically hold drugs-fall from the vehicle; the bag was empty. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Deputy Whitford performed a pat down search of Colon, wherein he recovered one hypodermic needle concealed in Colon's left shoe. Id. ¶ 35. Colon admitted that he did not have a needle card. Id. ¶ 36. At 10:03 p.m., Deputy Whitford placed Colon under arrest for possession of a hypodermic instrument. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.

After his arrest, Deputy Whitford searched Colon's pockets, socks, shoes, and waistband, id. ¶ 40, but Deputy Whitford did not ask Colon to remove his shoes and socks, ECF No. 140-1 ¶ 9. Deputy Whitford did not locate any drugs. ECF No. 141-22 ¶ 41. Deputy Whitford placed Colon in the back of his patrol car and later administered five field sobriety tests; Colon failed four of them. ECF No. 141-22 ¶¶ 42-45. In Deputy Whitford's view, Colon's performance on the tests was consistent with a typical person who is showing signs of possible impairment. Id. ¶ 46. Before placing Colon back in the patrol car, Deputy Whitford asked Colon if he had anything illegal on him, and Colon indicated that he did not. Id. ¶ 47. Deputy Whitford then handcuffed Colon and transported him to the Sheriff's Office to undergo a drug recognition evaluation. Id. ¶ 52. During the transport, Colon was calm, cooperative, and lucid. Id. ¶¶ 54-57.

At the Sheriff's Office, Deputy Sanford, a trained Drug Recognition Expert, performed a drug recognition evaluation on Colon, beginning at approximately 11:40 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 58, 67. During the evaluation, Colon was cooperative, polite, friendly, and forthcoming. Id. ¶ 68. Colon admitted that he was addicted to fentanyl and that he had snorted a bag of fentanyl at approximately 4:30 p.m. that evening. Id. ¶¶ 71, 74. Deputy Sanford did not observe any fresh injection sites on Colon's hands; he only observed old scars, which were consistent with Colon's admission that he did not inject fentanyl but snorted it. Id. ¶¶ 72-73. In a report transmitted to the District Attorney's Office, Deputy Sanford opined that Colon only showed a slight impairment during the evaluation but he nevertheless concluded that Colon could not operate a vehicle safely. Id. ¶¶ 75-76. As a result, Colon was charged with driving while impaired. Id. ¶ 77.

At 1:28 a.m., Deputy Whitford transported Colon to the adjacent jail to be booked by Deputy Schwan. Id. ¶¶ 85-86. Deputy Whitford sent Colon's arrest report electronically to the jail and hand-delivered Colon's tickets and accusatory instruments to Deputy Schwan. Id. ¶ 87.

Deputy Whitford did not tell Deputy Schwan that Colon and Brock had been arrested together, or that Colon had been found with a needle or had consumed drugs earlier that day. Id. ¶ 92. However, the paperwork indicated that Colon was accused of consuming drugs, and Deputy Schwan knew that Colon and Brock were in the same car when they were arrested. Id. ¶¶ 94, 97.

Colon was searched again at the jail. As part of the search, Colon removed his belt and shoes and non-defendant Deputy Pellicane searched the inside liner of the shoe and underneath it. Id. ¶ 101. Colon emptied his pockets and Deputy Schwan patted Colon down, shook his shirt and pant legs, ran his fingers around Colon's waistband, and looked inside Colon's mouth. Id. ¶¶ 10106. No contraband was found. Id. ¶ 110.

Deputy Schwan also administered a suicide and risk assessment, which determines whether an inmate should be placed on constant watch. Constant watch would require that an officer continuously monitor Colon. Id. ¶ 123. Based on the assessments, Deputy Schwan determined that Colon was not a suicide risk and he placed him on general watch, which required checks every 30 minutes. Id. ¶¶ 127-38. Colon was not visibly intoxicated. Id. ¶ 147.

Colon was placed in a cell directly in front of the booking officer's desk at 1:48 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 151-52. As a result, deputies were able to look into the cell. Id. Deputies checked on Colon at the required intervals but did not hear or observe anything out of the ordinary. Id. ¶¶ 158-61. At 6:26 a.m., Colon was discovered unresponsive. Id. ¶ 162. Empty bags of fentanyl were discovered that morning in Colon's cell. Id. ¶ 163.

The medical examiner ruled that Colon's death was the result of fentanyl he had secreted into the jail. Id. ¶ 164. The medical examiner indicated that, when Colon overdosed, he entered a respiratory depression, which gave the appearance of sleeping, without any visual evidence of distress. Id. ¶¶ 167-69.

DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge Pedersen's Order

Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Pedersen's order denying Plaintiff's motion for a spoliation instruction and sanctions, and Magistrate Judge Pedersen's award of fees and costs associated with Defendants responding to the motion. ECF No. 161.

A. Legal Standard

Section 636(b)(1)(A) of Title 28 of the United States Code permits a district judge to “designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any [nondispositive] pretrial matter” not otherwise expressly excluded therein. Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting another source). Any party may serve and file objections to a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive pretrial matter within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). Upon consideration of any timely interposed objections and “reconsideration]” of the magistrate judge's order, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the district judge must modify or set aside any part of the order that “is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Williams, 527 F.3d at 264; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). However, a party may not assign as error any defect in a magistrate judge's order to which no timely objection has been made. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). “This standard of review is highly deferential, and magistrate judges are afforded broad discretion in resolving nondispositive disputes[;] reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused.” Rouviere v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 560 F.Supp.3d 774, 783-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Spoliation of Forms

Plaintiff contends that two signed forms were missing from Defendants' disclosures to Plaintiff: Colon's intake questionnaire and suicide risk assessment. As a result, she argues, she is entitled to an adverse jury instruction indicating that Defendants engaged in spoliation. Magistrate Judge Pedersen disagreed, a ruling which the Court cannot find clearly erroneous. See ECF No. 160.

The Second Circuit has held that a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must establish:

(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed “with a culpable state of mind”; and (3) that the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.

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