Brock v. State, 111519 NVSC, 76902
|Opinion Judge:||GIBBONS, C.J.|
|Party Name:||DEMETRIUS LAMAR BROCK, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.|
|Judge Panel:||Silver, J., Douglas, J. Hon. William D. Kephart, District Judge|
|Case Date:||November 15, 2019|
|Court:||Supreme Court of Nevada|
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; William D. Kephart, Judge. Appellant Demetrius Lamar Brock argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied his petition after conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an, objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland); see also Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113-14 (1996) (applying Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). For purposes of the deficiency prong, counsel is strongly presumed to have provided adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Both components of the inquiry must be shown, id. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts of his or her claims by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We defer to the district court's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly wrong but review its application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).
First, Brock argues that counsel should have introduced evidence of the victim's child abuse convictions to prove he was the likely aggressor and support Brock's claim of self-defense. We conclude that counsel was not deficient. A defendant may "present evidence of a victim's character when it tends to prove that the victim was the likely aggressor," however, he may not prove that character evidence with specific instances of conduct. Daniel v. State, 119 Nev. 498, 514, 78 P.3d 890, 901 (2003); see NRS 48.055(1). While a defendant may introduce specific acts of violence if he was aware of those acts, Daniel, 119 Nev...
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