Brock v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 05 March 1952
• Citation: 241 P.2d 283,109 Cal.App.2d 594
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: . WEST LOS ANGELES MILLING CO. et al. v. BROCK. Civ. 15052. District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California

Page 283

241 P.2d 283

109 Cal.App.2d 594

BROCK v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.

WEST LOS ANGELES MILLING CO. et al. v. BROCK.

Civ. 15052.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 5, 1952.

Doyle & Clecak, San Francisco, Tom F. Chapman, San Francisco, for Superior Court and West Los Angeles Milling Co.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., W. R. Augustine, Deputy Atty. Gen., for A. A. Brock.

BRAY, Justice.

This petition for a writ of prohibition and a writ of supersedeas raises the questions (1) whether section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a review by the courts of quasi legislative acts of administrative agencies, (2) whether, independently of that section there can be such a review, and (3) the extent of that review.

Record.

On the 14th day of September, 1950, petitioner, the Director of Agriculture, acting pursuant to the California Marketing Act of 1937 (Chapter 10, Division 6 of the Agricultural Code, comprising sections 1300.10 to 1300.29) upon the written request of a committee of lima bean producers, processors and handlers, called a public hearing to consider a proposed marketing order for standard lima beans. It is conceded that said hearing was called, held and conducted in all respects as required by law. Thereafter, and on or about the 3rd day of October, 1950, petitioner executed and issued a marketing order for standard lima beans to be submitted to producers and handlers for written assent as required by section 1300.16 of the Agricultural Code. Thereafter and on the 2nd day of March, 1951, a finding was made that said marketing order for standard lima beans had been assented to in writing by the requisite number of producers and handlers of lima beans, and petitioner issued an order making said marketing order for standard lima beans effective as of March 10, 1951. Pursuant to said California Marketing Act of 1937 and said marketing order for standard lima beans, and after nominations were received from the industry, the Director of Agriculture, on or about March 19, 1951, appointed the members and alternate members of the advisory board provided by the act. All of the members so appointed have qualified and accepted such appointments and are now members of said advisory board.

Thereafter a mandate proceeding was filed in the San Francisco Superior Court for a review of the marketing order on the ground that the findings of the Director of Agriculture are not supported by the weight of, or substantial, evidence. Petitioners therein (referred to here as respondents) include dealers in and growers of lima beans. Several are members of the advisory board. A restraining order was issued restraining the enforcement of the marketing order pendente lite. At the hearing respondents offered, in addition to the record of the proceedings upon which the marketing order was based, certain new evidence. The court refused to admit such evidence but issued a peremptory writ of mandate, commanding the director to call a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Division 6, Chapter 10 of the Agricultural Code and at such hearing to permit the introduction of said evidence, and to reconsider his decision issuing the marketing order in the light of such evidence, and to make due return of his actions to the court. The restraining order was continued in force. The director appealed and the appeal is now pending. Thereafter the director filed this petition to prohibit the superior court from further proceedings other than to annul its previous actions. He also seeks a writ of supersedeas staying the enforcement of the superior court orders. A stay pending determination of the issues has been granted.

Does Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure Apply?

Although respondents contend that the action of the director in issuing a marketing order under the procedure provided in the Agricultural Code is quasi-judicial and not quasi-legislative, it is obvious that it is in the latter category. See Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal.2d 275, 101 P.2d 665. Pertinent sections of the Agricultural Code are known as 'the California Marketing Act of 1937.' The purposes of the act are declared to be: to enable agricultural producers, with the aid of the state, to correlate more effectively their commodities with marketing demands therefor; to establish their orderly marketing, uniform grading, and proper preparation; to provide means for maintenance of present, and development of new or larger, markets, and to prevent, modify or eliminate trade barriers in agricultural commodities; to eliminate or reduce economic waste in the marketing thereof, and to restore and maintain adequate purchasing power for California agricultural producers. It is not a price fixing statute. It provides for the promulgation of marketing orders after a public hearing. It sets forth the facts to be considered by the director at the hearing, the circumstances authorizing the issuance of a marketing order, the findings required to be made by him, and the provisions that may be contained in such order. It provides for the appointment of an advisory board of members of the industry to be appointed by the director. This board is to assist in the administration of the order. The order must be assented to in writing by 65 per cent of persons affected thereby. The act provides for administration, finances, enforcement, etc., in connection with the order.

While the language of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is broad enough to include the acts of the director in making the findings and marketing order, an examination of the legislative history of the section convinces us that it was not intended that the section apply to such acts or any quasi-legislative acts of an administrative body. This section, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act, was drawn and proposed by the Judicial Council under a directive of the 1943 Legislature to undertake a study of the procedure of California administrative agencies and of the judicial review of their decisions. Its Tenth Biennial Report, dated December 31, 1944, sets forth the scope of its study and the intent and purpose of the legislation proposed. That report makes it crystal clear that section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act, was not intended to apply to the situation here. The value of the report in interpreting the legislation which the Judicial Council proposed is well stated by Mr. Justice Peters in Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal.App.2d 384, 397, 184 P.2d 323, 331: 'This report is a most valuable aid in ascertaining the meaning of the statute. While it is true that what we are interested in is the legislative intent as disclosed by the language of the section under consideration, the Council drafted this language at the request of the Legislature, and in this respect was a special legislative committee. As part of its special report containing the proposed legislation it told the Legislature what it intended to provide by the language used. In the absence of compelling language in the statute to the contrary, it will be assumed that the Legislature adopted the proposed legislation with the intent and meaning expressed by the Council in its report.'

There are many statements in the report dealing with the subject and demonstrating that the council and the legislation did not deal with quasi-legislative action. It is only necessary to make a few extracts from the report. 'Because of the primarily judicial interest of the Council, it was thought that its most valuable contribution could be made in the field of administrative adjudication rather than in the field of quasi-legislative action. For that reason no attempt has been made in this report to include the agencies which are primarily rule-making in nature. * * *

'* * * It was not possible to cover this extensive field of administrative activity in complete detail, and the Council considered it far more desirable to offer a careful and detailed proposal with respect to a portion of the field of administrative adjudication than to attempt to cover the entire field with a general, less precise statute. It was determined, therefore, to select a portion of the field of administrative adjudication which seemed most in need of improvement. This, the Council concluded, was the one occupied by the agencies engaged in licensing and disciplining the members of the various professions and occupations. The decisions of such agencies have been challenged frequently before the California courts and this group seemed to furnish the largest single category of State agencies.

'The Council's survey of administrative procedure has been limited, therefore, to this particular type of administrative adjudication. The proposed legislation is designed to provide a solution for many of the difficulties and injustices arising in the administrative licensing and disciplining of private citizens. The theories underlying the Council's proposals in this limited field are susceptible, of course, of adaptation to other kinds of administrative action; and it is the Council's hope that this adaptation and extension of its work will be undertaken in the future.'

'* * * the Judicial Council, concerned primarily with judicial administration, would not be an appropriate body to supervise work in the field of quasi-legislative action.' Pp. 10, 11-12.

Preceding the proposed section 1094.5 to be added to the Code of Civil Procedure appears: 'Part 3. Act Providing Procedure for Judicial Review by Mandamus. This proposed amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure sets forth the procedure by which judicial review can be had by the writ of mandate after a formal adjudicatory decision by any administrative agency. It would apply specifically to cases arising under the Administrative Procedure Act (Part 2 of this appendix), but would also apply to the...