Brock v. Town of Farmington

• Decision Date: 01 July 1953
• Citation: 98 A.2d 162,98 N.H. 275
• Parties: BROCK v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON. HALL et al. v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 162

98 A.2d 162

98 N.H. 275

BROCK v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON.

HALL et al. v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 1, 1953.

Errol S. Hall, Farmington, and Cooper, Hall & Cooper, Rochester, for plaintiffs.

Eugene F. Nute, Farmington, for defendant.

Warren E. Waters, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Tax Commission, as amicus curiae.

GOODNOW, Justice.

One of the principal issues raised by these cases involves the standard by which the stumpage value at the time of cutting, on which a yield tax is assessed, is to be determined. On this question, the statute, Laws of 1949, c. 295, § 1, provides as follows: "Stumpage value' means the amount determined by the assessing officials in the same manner as other property values for the purposes of taxation. The assessing officials shall give full consideration to the amounts received from stumpage sales in the vicinity, prices offered for logs, pulpwood and fuel wood, current operating costs and similar data, taking into consideration the difficulties of operating in each case.'

It is the position of the defendant that the language of this statute permits the fixing of stumpage value by the use of a formula. In general, it would fix that value as the difference between the value of the logs on the brow at roadside and the owner's actual cost of cutting the timber trees, reducing them to logs and hauling the logs to the brow. In the particular cases at bar, the plaintiffs did not haul the logs to a roadside brow but processed the timber 'from stump to stick'. That is, the trees were cut, reduced to logs and then hauled to a portable sawmill operated by the plaintiffs rather than to a roadside brow. The logs were there sawed into both round and square edge lumber. This manufactured lumber was then removed from the mill to a storage filed where it was stacked in piles with sticks between each layer of lumber to permit the entry of air and the seasoning and drying of the lumber. Under these circumstances, the defendant would modify the general formula by fixing the value as the difference between the value of the manufactured lumber on sticks and the owner's actual cost of operating the lumber from stump to stick. It is contended that a determination of value by either formula meets the requirements of the statute since, in the language of its second sentence, they each give consideration to 'prices offered for logs', either directly or as part of the value of manufactured lumber on sticks, and to both 'current operating costs' and 'the difficulties of operating' by reflection of those factors in the owner's actual operating costs. With this position, we are not in agreement.

Value for tax purposes is normally a question of fact. Unless the statute requires the use of specific matters as exclusive measures for its determination, consideration is to be given to all relevant factors. No such limitation exists in the statute before us. The first sentence not only defines the meaning of stumpage value, but, in effect, prescribes that its amount shall be determined 'in the same manner as other property values for the purposes of taxation'. Since 1872, our statute, now R.L. c. 76, § 1, has required that 'all taxable property' be appraised 'at its full and true value in money as [the selectmen] would appraise the same in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor'. This statute has been consistently construed to give to value the meaning of sale value or market value, Trustees of the Phillips-Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 92 N.H. 473, 481, 33 A.2d 665, in the determination of which all relevant factors are to be considered, supra, 92 N.H. 486, 33 A.2d 665. On the other hand, while the language of the second sentence of the statute now before us states certain matters bearing on value, it neither requires nor authorizes the assessing officials to fix values upon these factors alone or within the limits of any specific formula. Its language directs the attention of assessing officials to certain considerations but not to the exclusion of others. We conclude that its provisions are not sufficiently explicit to limit the broad and general basis for determination of stumpage values established by the first sentence.

The tax is to be assessed upon 'stumpage value at the time of cutting'. Section 2. While price received, or 'value,' at the brow, less actual operating costs may have some tendency to indicate market value on the stump, provided suitable allowance is made for operating overhead and profit, it can hardly be relied upon as an exclusive test. A determination thus made will obviously be affected by such variable factors as the efficiency of the particular operator and the lapse of time between cutting and sale at the brow, or in a case like this one, sale of the finished lumber.

In short, whether the method suggested should be used in a particular case must depend upon whether it can be found to furnish a reliable index of market value in the case. It may not...