Brockington v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 22 October 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 31,31 |
| Citation | 396 U.S. 41,90 S.Ct. 206,24 L.Ed.2d 209 |
| Parties | Paul M. BROCKINGTON, Appellant, v. James A. RHODES, Governor of Ohio, et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mandamus proceeding to compel Governor of Ohio and others to place plaintiff's name on ballot for November, 1968 election as an independent candidate for United States House of Representatives from a particular district. The Court of Common Pleas denied writ of mandamus, and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District affirmed the judgment, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court held that case was moot because congressional election was over.
Judgment of Supreme Court of Ohio vacated and cause remanded for such proceedings as that court might deem appropriate.
Benjamin Sheerer, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.
Robert D. Macklin, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees.
The appellant sought to run in the November 1968 election as an independent candidate for the United States House of Representatives from the Twenty-first Congressional District of Ohio. His nominating petition bore the signatures of 899 voters in the congressional district, a little over 1% of those in the district who had voted in the gubernatorial contest at the last election. The Board of Elections ruled that the appellant's petition was insufficient to put his name on the November ballot, because it did not contain the signatures of 7% of the qualified voters, as Ohio law then required.1 The appellant petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for a writ of mandamus, challenging the 7% requirement as 'unreasonably high and excessive, * * * disproportionate when compared to the 100 signatures required for party candidates,2 * * * arbitrary and capricious, * * * [and] an invidious discrimination without any relationship to constitutionally justified ends * * *.' He urged as the proper standard for determining the sufficiency of his nominating petition the 1% requirement that had prevailed for over 60 years until the enactment of the 7% rule in 1952. He prayed for an immediate order restraining the Board of Elections from printing the election ballots; also for a writ of mandamus commanding the Board 'to certify the sufficiency of relator's nominating petition' and directing the appellees 'to do all things necessary to place relator's name upon the ballot as an independent candidate for United States House of Representatives from the Ohio Twenty-First Congressional District in the November 5, 1968, general election * * *.' His suit did not purport to be a class action, and he sought no declaratory relief.
On August 22, 1968, the Court of Common Pleas denied the writ of mandamus. On October 1 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District affirmed that judgment, and on October 23 the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial constitutional question. The appellant then appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 393 U.S. 1078, 89 S.Ct. 877, 21 L.Ed.2d 771. While the appeal was pending here, Ohio amended the controlling statute, effective October 30, 1969, reducing the signature requirement from 7% to 4%.
We do not think the recent statutory amendment has rendered this case moot. For the appellant has consistently urged the unconstitutionality of any percentage requirement in excess of the 1% that Ohio imposed prior to 1952, and he obtained the signatures of only about 1% of the voters in his district. He thus could not have won a place on the ballot even under the statute as currently written. Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214.
Rather, in view of the limited nature of the relief sought, we think the case is moot because the congressional election is over. The appellant did not allege that he intended to run for office in any future elections. He did not attempt to maintain a class action on behalf of himself and other putative independent...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schall v. Martin Abrams v. Martin
...detention section identical to former § 739(a)(ii), see FCA § 320.5(3), the appeal is not moot. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969). 3. Although the pretrial detention of the class representatives has long since ended, see infra, at 257-261, this......
-
Richardson v. Ramirez 8212 1589
...and respondents, whose continuing controversy in the State Supreme Court still continues in this Court. Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 90 S.Ct. 206, 24 L.Ed.2d 209, distinguished. P. 2. California, in disenfranchising convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles, doe......
-
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan 8212 21
...v. Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032, 92 S.Ct. 729, 30 L.Ed.2d 725 (1972), aff'g 337 F.Supp. 1405 (N.D.Ohio 1971); Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 90 S.Ct. 206, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), aff'g sub nom. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhode......
-
Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole
...hearings is a live one, and the change in statutory authority consequently does not moot the case. See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969).3 Appellees phrase this argument in terms of standing as well as mootness. There is no question, however, that p......