Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-CV-76429-DT.,92-CV-76429-DT. |
| Parties | Karl D. BROCKLEHURST, Plaintiff, v. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Jamil Akliter, Birmingham, MI, for plaintiff.
James R. Kohl, Detroit, MI, for defendant.
Plaintiff, Karl Brocklehurst, a former employee of Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. ("PPG"), instituted this wrongful discharge and age discrimination action in Wayne County Circuit Court on October 2, 1992. Defendant timely removed the action to this Court on November 2, 1992, on diversity grounds.
In his original two-count complaint, Mr. Brocklehurst alleged: (1) that PPG breached an employment contract when it terminated him on January 3, 1992; and (2) that PPG discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.
On July 23, 1993, Defendant moved for summary judgment on both counts pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff was an at-will employee; (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie age discrimination case. Plaintiff filed responses opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 30, August 10, and September 22, 1993. Defendant filed replies on August 9, August 19, and September 22, 1993.
Having reviewed the parties' respective briefs and the exhibits attached thereto, and having heard oral arguments on September 23, 1993, the Court is now prepared to rule on Defendant's Motion, and this Memorandum Opinion and Order sets forth that ruling.
Plaintiff was recruited by Bart Coxon, a PPG executive, in May or June of 1984. At the time, Plaintiff was employed and was forty-one years old. Mr. Coxon requested that Plaintiff meet with him to discuss the possibility of his leaving his employer and coming to work for Defendant at less than his then $50,000 annual salary. Because of this possible cut in pay, Plaintiff wanted to know what type of job security he would have, and Mr. Coxon advised him that nobody was fired from PPG. Brocklehurst Deposition, p. 135. Within a month of meeting Mr. Coxon, Plaintiff met with the automotive group vice president, Fred Rhue, and the manager of coatings and resins, Edward Horvath. Plaintiff received an offer of employment at that time. Plaintiff filled out an employment application on June 18, 1984. A portion of the employment application indicated to the applicant "that misrepresentations will be considered as just cause for rejection of his application or dismissal from employment."
Defendant hired Plaintiff as a manufacturer's representative and soon promoted him to head PPG's Ford team. In 1988, Defendant consolidated its metropolitan Detroit operations at its Troy office and issued employees new employment handbooks. These employment handbooks made several pertinent declarations, encompassing the following concepts:
In September of 1991, Defendant, in order to maintain profitability, instituted certain economic cost reductions. These included the termination of about 200 employees and the elimination of some positions. Plaintiff's position was not among those scheduled to be eliminated.
Thomas Siegele, an executive with Defendant, indicated in his deposition that Defendant discharged those employees who, in comparison to other employees at their level, did not possess the strongest set of skills. He stated that this determination was based upon performance evaluations, rank order as to compensation, and managerial opinion. Siegele Deposition, p. 76. Kears Pollack, a PPG vice-president, further explained in his deposition that:
Within each of these groupings of people that are roughly comparable in levels within the organization, we attempted to look at the total group of people and treat it much like the NFL would treat a necessity to go to a smaller roster. We tried to look at the organization as it would appear with the team of individuals that would be left after the necessary reduction in force took place....
Pollack Deposition, p. 69. Mr. Pollack and Mr. Horvath decided to fire Plaintiff, then age 48, and replace him with Phil Johnson, age 38, who at that time was Director of Automotive Marketing at PPG's Chemfil subsidiary. Pollack and Horvath allegedly determined that Plaintiff was not the most effective person for his job and that he lacked the ability to lead the Ford team into the future.
On January 3, 1992, Plaintiff met with Mr. Horvath who advised him that the Ford team needed new vitality and direction and that Plaintiff was being fired. Marv Leedom, manager of human resources, made notes of the meeting which reflect that Plaintiff was fired because the Ford team needed new vitality and direction. PPG replaced Plaintiff with Mr. Johnson.
Just prior to oral argument, the Court asked counsel to provide it with information on the relative performance of Mr. Brocklehurst and Mr. Johnson. Information provided by counsel revealed the following. Plaintiff received two performance evaluations, the first in January of 1989 and the second in March of 1991. These evaluations placed employees in one of three grades: "Level 1 — needs improvement; Level 2 — fully meets job requirements; and Level 3 — exceeds job requirements." Plaintiff's January 19, 1989 evaluation placed Plaintiff in Level 2, fully meets job requirements. The evaluation did note, however, that Plaintiff needed to improve relationships he had with customers and to exercise greater control over certain programs. Plaintiff's March 1, 1991 performance appraisal also placed Plaintiff in the Level 2, fully meets job requirements, category, but it added the following written statements by Mr. Horvath, Plaintiff's immediate supervisor:
The court has reviewed Mr. Johnson's evaluations dated January 16, 1991, and January 10, 1992. The 1991 evaluation placed Mr. Johnson in Level 3, exceeds job requirements. However, in 1992, just a week after he replaced Mr. Brocklehurst, Mr. Johnson dropped to a Level 2 score, the same score Plaintiff received in 1989 and 1991. Plaintiff did not receive an evaluation in early 1992 because he was terminated.
In addition to the above evaluations, PPG also grades its employees on a 0-15 scale for its Incentive Compensation Plan. Mr. Brocklehurst received a 10, 9, and 8/7 for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991 respectively. Mr. Johnson received a 14, 12, and 10 for those years respectively.
Finally, both parties submitted evidence on Mr. Brocklehurst and Mr. Johnson's dealings with their unit's chief customer, Ford Motor Co. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pollack testified that T.J. Young, the top Ford executive who dealt with PPG, did not think very highly of Mr. Brocklehurst. Plaintiff for his part, however, submitted affidavits from Howard Payne, Design Manager of Ford's Color and Trim Department, and Donald Dopierala, a management employee in Ford's coatings and resins application process. Both men claimed that their dealings with Plaintiff demonstrated him to be an extremely competent representative of PPG Industries.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Three 1986 Supreme Court decisions — Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.1 According to the Celotex Court:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cole v. Knoll, Inc.
...because too vague and not made in circumstances, such as pre-hire negotiations, that would satisfy Rowe) and Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., 836 F.Supp. 1354, 1360 (E.D.Mich.1993) (statement that "No one gets fired at PPG" insufficient under Rowe because of lack of negotiations covering job sec......
-
Bracco v. Michigan Technological University
...without more, is too vague to judicially enforce." Rood, supra at 141, 507 N.W.2d 591.14 Similarly, in Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc., 836 F.Supp. 1354, 1358-1360 (E.D.Mich., 1993), a company executive's statement that "[n]o one ever gets fired" was found not to be clear and unequivoc......
-
Mannix v. County of Monroe
...579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court established a significant exception to this rule. See Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., 836 F.Supp. 1354, 1359 (E.D.Mich.1993) (recognizing modification of Lynas by Toussaint). The Toussaint court held that "a provision of an employment contr......
-
Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc.
...judgment on the wrongful-discharge claim but denied summary judgment on the age discrimination claim. See Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc., 836 F.Supp. 1354 (E.D.Mich.1993). The case proceeded to trial and at the close of Brocklehurst's case in chief, PPG moved for judgment as a matter of l......