Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 81-2024

Citation325 N.W.2d 70,109 Wis.2d 44
Decision Date10 September 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-2024,81-2024
Parties, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4029 Charles J. BROCKMEYER, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. DUN & BRADSTREET, a foreign corporation with registered agent being C. T. Corporation System, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. *
CourtWisconsin Court of Appeals

Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S. C. by Reuben W. Peterson, Jr., and Lydia Y. Cooley, Milwaukee, for defendant-appellant and cross-respondent.

Cape & Jones by Kent C. Jones, Milwaukee, for plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant.

Before DECKER, C. J., MOSER, P. J. and WEDEMEYER, J.

WEDEMEYER, Judge.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment entered on October 19, 1981, in the circuit court for Milwaukee county, in favor of the plaintiff, Charles J. Brockmeyer (Brockmeyer), against the defendant, Dun & Bradstreet. We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the merits.

In this appeal we are asked to decide:

(1) whether Wisconsin has judicially abolished the employment-at-will doctrine;

(2) whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged;

(3) whether the trial court erred in submitting the question of punitive damages to the jury; and (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the damages award to stand.

Our answer to question number two disposes of the remaining questions or at least renders them moot.

Recently this court accepted the proposition that a cause of action exists for wrongful discharge. 1 In so doing, however, we did not intend the acceptance to be the death knell of the employment-at-will doctrine. 2 We acknowledge that under certain circumstances private contract rights must assume a secondary position to the public interest. The development of this principle is not without foundation nor earlier scholarly examination. 3 Presently, although the public interest concept in employment relations law has not been exhaustively defined, certain touchstones have emerged from other jurisdictions that afford us some guidance. Recovery will be permitted if termination offends clearly defined public policy, or results from the exercise of bad faith, or results from malicious or retaliatory activity on the part of the employer. 4

In June, 1977, Dun & Bradstreet promoted Charles J. Brockmeyer to the position of district manager of the credit service division for the state of Wisconsin. The terms of his employment agreement were such as to constitute an employment at will. On May 27, 1980, after a discussion between four national officers of Dun & Bradstreet and its corporate president, a decision was made by the president to terminate Brockmeyer. Reasons given for Brockmeyer's termination were, among other things: (1) smoking marijuana in front of employees; (2) lack of attention to job duties; (3) an open affair with his secretary; and (4) low morale among employees in his office. The meeting of May 27, 1980, was called only to determine whether to settle a civil rights suit filed by Brockmeyer's former secretary. At that meeting, the president of Dun & Bradstreet asked about the Milwaukee office. After discussing the problems in the Milwaukee office, the president decided to terminate Brockmeyer's employment. The national office informed the regional office on May 29, 1980, that Brockmeyer was to be immediately fired. A regional officer informed Brockmeyer of his termination at a Milwaukee meeting on May 30, 1980.

The events that occurred between June, 1977, and May 30, 1980, are the subject of this review to determine if the record contains sufficient evidence for a finding of wrongful discharge. We are mindful of the rigid standard of review established in reviewing a judgment on the sufficiency of the evidence. 5

Brockmeyer first asserts that the conduct of Dun & Bradstreet violated the clearly defined public policy of the state of Wisconsin as promulgated in sec. 111.01, Stats. (the objectives of the State Employment Relations Act), sec. 134.01 (restraint of trade) and sec. 134.03 (preventing pursuit of work). Brockmeyer requested the trial court to take judicial notice of secs. 111.01, 134.01, and 134.03; a request for which there was never a ruling. Brockmeyer also asked to include these statutes in the jury instructions, which request was denied.

We believe the trial court correctly denied the jury instruction request. There is no evidence from which to infer any application of the three statutes relating to a violation of clearly defined public policy.

Brockmeyer next suggests a violation of perjury (sec. 946.31(1), Stats.). Dun & Bradstreet personnel made a series of requests for a statement from Brockmeyer concerning his relationship with his secretary, who had been asked to and who did resign from the company. A review of the entire record reveals the following: On five separate occasions Brockmeyer was asked to submit a written statement regarding the circumstances of his involvement with his secretary. Brockmeyer refused to make a written statement. The record is barren of any requests directed to him by Dun & Bradstreet personnel to either tell a falsehood or suggesting the same. Brockmeyer did not say he was told to lie. The only mention in the record of possible lying is posited by Brockmeyer himself, when in response to questions, he volunteered that he told the individuals who made requests for statements that he would not lie, but only tell the truth. This is not a reasonable basis from which an inference can be drawn that he was encouraged to utter a falsehood. Rather, it is sheer speculation without foundation. A wrongful discharge claim cannot be based on such speculation.

Brockmeyer's career with Dun & Bradstreet as a district manager may be characterized as inconsistent. For a time in 1978, he was on employment probation. By improving his performance Brockmeyer removed himself from probation. His sales ability potential was considered quite good. His income production was above average, but nevertheless, his superiors in Chicago were not satisfied with the performance of his other duties as a manager.

The events of the weekend of February 16, 1980, caused his immediate superiors some concern. They were informed that Brockmeyer, who was married but separated, was vacationing in Montana with his secretary when it was believed that he was performing his normal duties as district manager. Additional inquiries revealed that Brockmeyer had also smoked marijuana in the presence of company personnel. Supervisory personnel in Chicago sought permission from the national office to terminate or reassign Brockmeyer should they receive verification of these reports. Because of Brockmeyer's above average performance record, permission for termination or reassignment was denied. Instead, the supervisory personnel were directed to confront Brockmeyer with the information received to attempt to resolve the problem. Brockmeyer was called to a meeting in Chicago for this purpose. At that meeting he acknowledged a relationship with his secretary. He apologized for his absenteeism without notice. He admitted smoking marijuana and promised not to do it again. He further vowed to be attentive to business and to discharge his duties in a responsible and professional manner. In dating his secretary, Brockmeyer had violated company policy. It was suggested at this meeting that Brockmeyer consider a sales job in another city in order to eliminate this violation of company policy. As an alternative, he was told to either find another position for his secretary within the company or she would have to seek employment elsewhere. At the conclusion of the meeting, Brockmeyer was firmly told that if there was not improvement in existing conditions, he would be terminated or reassigned.

Brockmeyer attempted to find a position for his secretary elsewhere within the company, but without success. He reported this to the Chicago office and was told that the only alternative left was to obtain her resignation. This was accomplished on February 25, 1980. The company told Brockmeyer to inform his secretary that it would, if asked,...

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7 cases
  • Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • June 20, 1997
    ...This question and the accompanying instruction was derived from the court of appeals decision in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis.2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct.App.1982). The second question concerned the tortious interference with contract claim. The jury did not answer the second questi......
  • Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1983
    ...results from the exercise of bad faith, or results from malicious or retaliatory activity on the part of the employer." 109 Wis.2d 44, 46-47, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct.App.1982). However, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the merits ......
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    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 26, 1992
  • Corcoran v. Corcoran, 81-1817
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Court of Appeals
    • September 10, 1982
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