Brockway v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 26 October 1888 |
| Citation | 40 N.W. 192,72 Mich. 122 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | BROCKWAY v. PATTERSON. |
Error to circuit court, Kent county; R. M. MONTGOMERY, Judge.
Action by Nettie Brockway against Robert Patterson, under the civil damage act of 1883, for injury to her means of support by reason of the death of her husband, caused by a person intoxicated with liquor sold by defendant. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $500, and both parties bring error. MORSE, J.
The plaintiff brought her action in this case under act 191 of the Session Laws of 1883, known as the "Civil Damage Act," claiming damages by injury to her means of support as the wife of Adam Brockway, who, it is alleged, by reason of his own intoxication and the intoxication of one Louis Lane, received injuries at the hands of said Lane resulting in death; both of said persons receiving the liquor which caused such intoxication from the defendant, an hotel keeper at Cascade, Kent county, in this state. The cause was tried in the Kent circuit before a jury, and the plaintiff had verdict and judgment in the sum of $500. Both parties come into this court upon bills of exceptions, alleging errors at the trial, which were argued and submitted together. The facts, in brief, are as follows: Adam Brockway, the husband of plaintiff, lived about one and one-quarter miles from the hotel of the defendant, where he had resided since 1884, and was in the habit of drinking occasionally, sometimes bringing liquor home with him. For the last year before his death he was a frequent visitor at the hotel, and had several drunken sprees. Louis Lane worked and boarded a mile or so from defendant. On the 22d day of May, 1886, Lane and one Druce came to defendant's place about 6 P. M., and commenced drinking. It being on Saturday night, other persons, as the hour grew later, dropped in. Brockway was among them, getting in about 8 o'clock. A great deal of drinking was done by the crowd, and both Lane and Brockway, before they left became intoxicated. Defendant was present, and dealt out the liquor. Lane and Brockway were the last to leave the premises. They went away together about half past 11. About midnight, John Brass, who lived about three- quarters of a mile from the hotel, on the road towards Brockway's home, heard a rap at his door, and a call for help. He found it to be Brockway, and let him in. He appeared to be badly injured, and in great pain, with a lump or swelling near the left temple. He soon became unconscious. The next day he was taken home, and put under medical treatment. He died from the injuries received Saturday night on the morning of the next Tuesday, May 25th. On the road it appears that Lane and Brockway had a quarrel. Brockway struck Lane twice, and Lane hit Brockway with a stone just above and back of the left temple. Upon a post mortem examination it was the conclusion of the physicians that Brockway's death resulted directly and necessarily from this blow. Both Lane and Brockway were sober when they went to defendant's place.
The first claim upon the part of the defendant is that the statute does not extent far enough, in terms or in spirit, to allow any recovery for the death of a husband; that it does not create any right of action in behalf of a widow; that the purport and meaning of the statute confines the recovery to damages resulting from injuries that do not end in death. It is argued that at common law no action could be brought by a widow on account of the death of the husband, that the legislature, recognizing this fact, has provided by statute when recovery may be had for loss of life; and that within such statutory provisions, directly aimed at injuries resulting in death, is included all the remedy known to the law for civil damages growing out of the death of any person. See How. St. �� 3313, 3314, 3391, 3392, 3494. The statute upon which plaintiff grounds her action does not mention the widow, or speak of the death of an intoxicated person, or of death resulting from intoxication. It gives a right of action, however, to the "wife" or other person "injured in person, property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person." Pub. Acts 1883, No. 191. This language is broad enough to include the widow, who must be considered a "person," and who is certainly injured in her "means of support" by the death of her husband from intoxication, or by reason of the intoxication of himself or any other person. In this view we are supported by decisions in other states under similar statutes. See Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493; Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, 2 N.W. 715; Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Iowa, 195; Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 110.
It is further contended upon the part of the defendant that the injury must be the direct, necessary, or probable result of the intoxication. It is argued that the liquor drank by Lane and Brockway was beer, a mild stimulant at best, and one not likely ordinarily to cause such intoxication as would naturally lead to a quarrel or conflict between the parties. But the fact that intoxication did result to both these parties from the drinking of beer alone must have been found by the jury, under the charge of the court, or their verdict would have been for the defendant, if they followed, as we must presume they did, the instructions of the circuit judge. There was certainly evidence tending to show such intoxication. It is claimed that the injury to Brockway, which resulted in his death, being conceded to have occurred in an affray between him and Lane, cannot be said to have been the necessary or probable result of the intoxication of either; that under all the testimony of the case the death of Brockway cannot be considered as the "natural and legitimate" result of either the selling of the beer, or the intoxication that resulted from the drinking of it. The following cases are cited in support of this claim: Flynn v. Fogarty, 106 Ill. 263; Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195; Krach v. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517; Collier v. Early, 54 Ind. 559; Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 529. We have examined these cases. The statutes of these states are different from ours. In Illinois the opinion of the court in 83 Ill. is based upon the assumption that the words "all damages sustained" should be construed with reference to their known legal signification; that is, such damages as, in legal contemplation, are to be regarded as the result of the wrongful act. See 83 Ill. 57. In Indiana the right of action is given to any "person who shall sustain any injury or damage to his person or property or means of support on account of the use of such intoxicating liquors" sold in violation of law. The decisions in that state are expressly based upon the words "on account of the use." See Dunlap v. Wagner, 85 Ind. 531. The plaintiff's counsel in this respect contends that it is not necessary to trace the injury to the intoxication: the fact of intoxication is enough; that if Lane was intoxicated when he struck the blow that caused the death of Brockway, the case comes within the express words of the statute, which reaches any injury to her means of support by any intoxicated person. He cites the following cases: Neu v. McKechnie, 95 N.Y. 632; King v. Haley, 86 Ill. 106; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195. The first case fully supports the contention of the plaintiff. It is there expressly held that it is not essential to maintain an action of this kind that the plaintiff must show that the act of the intoxicated person, which caused the injury, was the natural, reasonable, or probable consequence of his intoxication. It is sufficient if it appears that the act was done while the person was intoxicated, in whole or in part, by liquors sold by the defendant. In my opinion, this construction of the statute is the only proper one. The statute provides, as plain as the English language can state it, that this action shall lie for any injury occasioned by an intoxicated person. It is not for the injured party to produce proof, or for the jury to speculate upon the probabilities whether the intoxication was the natural cause of the act which caused the death. The act itself by a person intoxicated fixes the liability for the damage upon the person selling or furnishing the liquor which caused the intoxication. But the court did not go so far as this. The jury were plainly instructed that they must find the injury to have resulted from the intoxication of Lane. The court said that they must find that the intoxication of Lane was so connected with his act of striking the blow that they could say that, "according to reason, observation, and experience, the intoxication of Lane was the efficient cause of the blow; that the result must be fairly traced to Lane's intoxication." This instruction was sufficiently favorable to the defendant under all of the authorities.
It cannot be claimed that the selling of the beer was lawful. It was, perhaps, in the first instance, if the defendant did not know that either Lane or Brockway was in the habit of getting intoxicated; but there was evidence tending to show that both of them were furnished liquor after they had become intoxicated. It is therefore not necessary to examine into the liability under the statute where...
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