Brodhead v. Minges
| Decision Date | 25 October 1902 |
| Citation | 64 N.E. 998,198 Ill. 513 |
| Parties | BRODHEAD v. MINGES et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Suit by Lucas Brodhead against John H. Minges and others. From a judgment of the appellate court (99 Ill. App. 435) dismissing an appeal by complainant, he appeals. Affirmed.N. M. Jones and Wm. Annan Taylor (N. M. Jones, of counsel), for appellant.
W. H. Wilkins, Louis Zimmerman, and William F. Momeyer, for appellees.
This is a proceeding in chancery by Lucas Brodhead, in the superior court of Cook county, to foreclose two trust deeds in the nature of mortgages. The property against which foreclosure is sought is in litigation in another proceeding. The bill alleges that the first mortgage was made by William A. Herting, in his lifetime, for $13,000, and was by him indorsed, and afterwards transferred and delivered to the complainant for a full and valuable consideration; that, by agreement made with Julia H. Herting, the time of payment was extended for a period of five years; that the second mortgage was made by Julia H. Herting for $10,000 to one Miles Almy, but has been assigned and transferred to complainant for a full and valuable consideration; and that the principal and interest on both mortgages are now due and unpaid. A large number of persons interested in the property were made defendants, and several answers were filed, setting up their interests. The answer of John H. Minges and others, the principal defendants, sets up that they believed the incumbrances set forth in the bill were executed by the parties named therein, but prayed proof of the amounts due thereon. The answer alleges that immediately prior to the filing of said bill both of said incumbrances were the property of one C. K. Miller, and were both then past due; that an arrangement and agreement was then perfected between the holder of the notes and defendants that a foreclosure of the two incumbrances should not be instituted until the defendants could institute and prosecute a proceeding, and clear the title to the property involved of certain defects; that in pursuance of that agreement, and relying upon the same, Minges, on behalf of the owners of the property, filed a burnt-records proceeding in the circuit court, which is undetermined. Subsequently an amendment was filed to the answer of Minges and others, in which it was charged that the $10,000 loan was usurious. Upon the hearing the court found that first incumbrance to be due and unpaid, and stated the amount due thereon to be $26,174.92; that the second incumbrance was also due, but that it was usurious, and that, after applying all the payments of interest to the reduction of the principal, there was nothing due upon said note, but that it had been fully paid, and that as to both mortgages the proceeding to foreclose had been prematurely brought; that there had been a valid agreement between the holder of the incumbrances and the defendants not to foreclose until the burnt-records proceeding had been consummated; that, the notes being past due when Miller sold the same to the new holder thereof, the latter took them subject to that agreement; that not exceeding nine months from the entry of the decree would be a reasonable time for the prosecution of such burntrecords proceeding, in accordance with said contract, provided that unnecessary delays caused by solicitors for complainant should not be included in said time, and provided, further, that the supreme court did not unduly delay action in the burnt-records proceeding. A decree was entered finding that the sum of $26,174.92 was due on the first incumbrance; that the second incumbrance was paid in full and the same was ordered removed as a cloud upon said premises; and the cause was ordered to be ‘retained in court for a reasonable time, pursuant to the above findings.’ The record shows that on the date this decree was rendered the superior court was asked to enter an order that, in default of the payment of the sums found due to the complainant upon the first incumbrance within nine months from the date of the entry of the decree, the property...
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Brauer Mach. & Supply Co. ex rel. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Parkhill Truck Co.
...of the judgment. Rogers v. Barton, 375 Ill. 611, 32 N.E.2d 135;Rosenthal v. Board of Education, 239 Ill. 29, 87 N.E. 878;Brodhead v. Minges, 198 Ill. 513, 64 N.E. 998. While this general definition is well settled, and ordinarily applicable, as expressing the meaning of those words, neverth......
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Sheaff v. Spindler
...the previous decisions of Dreyer v. Goldy, 171 Ill. 434, 49 N. E. 560,Pain v. Kinney, 175 Ill. 264, 51 N. E. 621, and Brodhead v. Minges, 198 Ill. 513, 64 N. E. 998, which were cited in the opinion. In addition to them may be cited the cases of Bucklen v. City of Chicago, 166 Ill. 451, 46 N......
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Phillips v. O'Connell
...might be brought up for review. Dreyer v. Goldy, 171 Ill. 434, 49 N.E. 560;Pain v. Kinney, 175 Ill. 264, 51 N.E. 621;Brodhead v. Minges, 198 Ill. 513, 64 N.E. 998.’ A similar practice prevails under the Civil Practice Act. In Walters v. Merc. Nat. Bank of Chicago, 380 Ill. 477, 44 N.E.2d 42......
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...Ill. 555); and the refusal of the judge to enter a final judgment does not justify an appeal from an interlocutory order (Brodhead v. Minges, 198 Ill. 513, 64 N. E. 998). The appellants have again cited authorities alleged to hold that the action of drainage commissioners in annexing lands ......