Brodie v. City of Jonesboro

Decision Date12 January 2012
Docket Numberno. 11-563,11-563
PartiesMONICA BRODIE APPELLANT v. CITY OF JONESBORO APPELLEE
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CV08-913]

HONORABLE DAVID N. LASER,

JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice

In this employment-discrimination case, appellant Monica Brodie appeals the order of the Craighead County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Jonesboro ("the City"). On appeal, she contends that the circuit court erred in using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate her case. She further contends that, even assuming the application of the framework was appropriate, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on her failure-to-promote claim because she presented undisputed evidence that she was at least as qualified as the person eventually hired to fill the position, and the City presented no admissible evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for not promoting her. Finally, she contends that the circuit court erred in analyzing her claim as a constructive-discharge claim because she did not allege a constructive-discharge claim in her complaint. We reverse and remand.

Brodie, an African-American female, was employed by the City from March 2006through December 2007 as Transit Accounting Technician in the Jonesboro Economical Transportation System ("JETS"), the public transportation system for the City. Brodie was responsible for providing bookkeeping and auditing support for JETS.

In 2007, the City decided to create an administrative supervisor position within JETS. The City, through Transportation Coordinator Joel Gardner, publicly announced that an interim Administrative Transit Supervisor would be appointed until the position was fully developed.1 Gardner named Brodie to fill this position, and shortly thereafter, Gardner told Brodie that several bus drivers had complained that they did not favor her for the position and that they believed she received the position because she was having a sexual relationship with Gardner. Gardner told Brodie that even though these claims were untrue, in order to calm suspicions, he and Brodie were to have only open-door meetings in the JETS office. According to Brodie, Gardner then "took back" the interim responsibilities he had assigned to her.

Brodie, along with other applicants, interviewed for the newly proposed position. According to Brodie, after she was interviewed, Gardner told her that she would not be receiving the promotion, that he was going to offer the position to another applicant, and that she would have to train this applicant. Brodie submitted a letter of resignation to Gardner.

Brodie later filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City failed to promoteher on account of her race in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Brodie could not pursue a failure-to-promote claim because she voluntarily removed herself from the pool of applicants before a final decision had been made and that her claim was more akin to a constructive-discharge claim. The City further argued that Brodie's allegations were not sufficient to survive summary judgment as a constructive-discharge claim. Brodie responded, contending that she had alleged a failure-to-promote claim, not a constructive-discharge claim. She also contended that the circuit court should not use the McDonnell Douglas framework when evaluating her claim. After a hearing, the circuit court issued an order with the following findings:

Assuming the Court considers the case to be properly analyzed as a constructive-discharge claim, as the City of Jonesboro contends, there is a failure of proof to any degree that there was any sort of hostile work environment in the Plaintiff's work place; or in addition, that there was any sort of race-based motivation for what occurred in this case.
Assuming the case is considered as being a case for failure to promote based on racial discrimination, the Court believes there is insufficient proof of record that any failure to promote between the City of Jonesboro and the Plaintiff was based on any race-related basis.

Brodie now brings this appeal.

Brodie first contends that the circuit court erred in using the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate her case. She states that the framework is inappropriate at the summary-judgment stage of proceedings for employment-discrimination claims because it is incompatible with prior Arkansas jurisprudence and the statutory text of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proofin a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. Pursuant to the three-stage burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant carries this burden, then the plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

This court has previously applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in reviewing the grant of a summary-judgment motion in an employment-discrimination case, see, e.g., Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt Transport Servs. Inc., 2009 Ark. 506, ____ S.W.3d ____, and Brodie fails to provide convincing argument that would cause us to reconsider our use of the framework. We hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework...

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