Brody v. Brody

• Decision Date: 28 August 2000
• Citation: 758 A.2d 1274
• Parties: Jeanianne C. BRODY, Appellee, v. Michael C. BRODY, Appellant (at 1698). Jeanianne C. Brody, Appellant (at 1807), v. Michael C. Brody, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

758 A.2d 1274

Jeanianne C. BRODY, Appellee, v. Michael C. BRODY, Appellant (at 1698).

Jeanianne C. Brody, Appellant (at 1807), v. Michael C. Brody, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 17, 2000.

Filed August 28, 2000.

Joanne R. Wilder, Pittsburgh, for Michael C. Brody.

Gary G. Gentile, Pittsburgh, for Jeanianne C. Brody.

Before: KELLY, FORD ELLIOTT, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

OLSZEWSKI, J.:

¶ 1 Both Jeanianne Brody ["Wife"] and Michael Brody ["Husband"] appeal from the order entered below. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

The parties were married on April 19, 1986, separated on March 10, 1995, and divorced on December 29, 1997. The parties are the parents of Benjamin (d.o.b. September 30, 1987) and Jordan (d.o.b. April 16, 1993). Wife has primary custody of the parties' children and Husband has partial custody. Husband remarried on May 25, 1998. Husband's current wife is not employed and they have no children. Wife is not remarried.

At the time of trial, Husband was forty-five (45) years old and was an anesthesiologist and shareholder of Beaver Anesthesia Associates, Inc. Husband's compensation from Beaver Anesthesia Associates was $415,547 in 1998, $424,898 in 1997, and $438,817 in 1996. In 1996 Husband had additional income of $4,384.

At the time of trial, Wife was thirty-nine (39) years old. Wife earned a high school diploma, attended the University of Pittsburgh for two (2) years, completed a Barbizon modeling course, took a Wilma Boyd training program, and studied one (1) semester at Chatham College in 1989. Wife previously was employed as a dental assistant, a receptionist at a hospital, at a daycare center, and for her father in one of his companies. Wife earned $3,800 in 1993, $20,048 in 1994, and $8,000 in 1995. Wife quit her employment when the parties separated and had no income in 1996 or 1997. Wife resumed working part-time as a receptionist at one of her father's companies in Fall 1998. Wife's family is wealthy and has provided abundant support to Wife and her family, even during the marriage. Wife had agoraphobic symptoms that are now controlled by medication.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/00, at 2-3. The procedural history of this case is as follows:

[t]he parties filed an earlier appeal [Brody v. Brody, 701 A.2d 773, unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. 1997) ] to [the trial court's] July 12, 1996 order concerning exceptions to the Master's Recommendation for the support of [Wife's] and [Husband's] minor children. On July 14, 1997, the Superior Court affirmed [the trial court's] July 12, 1996 order.

Judge Max Baer, by order dated July 30, 1998, appointed Master Patricia G. Miller to resolve claims pertaining to the parties' divorce action. By order dated July 20, 1997, Judge Ronald Folino deferred Wife's modification petition to equitable distribution. Pursuant to a March 1, 1996 order, Husband paid alimony pendente lite and child support of $10,500 per month based on Husband's monthly net income at $20,107 per month and Wife's monthly net income at zero. Seven (7) days of trial were held before Master Miller on January 11, 12, 25, 27, 28, February 22, and March 15, 1999.

On March 29, 1999, Master Miller filed her Report and Recommendation. Husband filed exceptions to the Master's Recommendation, and Wife filed cross-exceptions. On September 28, 1999, [the trial court] sustained Husband's exceptions in part and dismissed them in part. Husband's exceptions were sustained as to the termination of alimony pendente lite. [The trial court] ordered alimony pendente lite to terminate as of the date of the order. Husband's other exceptions and Wife's cross-exceptions were dismissed. Husband appealed from the September 28, 1999 exceptions order and Wife filed a cross-appeal.

Id. at 1-2. Those appeals are before us now.

¶ 2 Wife frames several issues for our review:

I. With regard to Wife's temporary ownership in Cost Company, whether the lower court abused its discretion in the following respects:

A. Whether the lower court erred in failing to classify Wife's temporary, seven (7) month ownership interest in Cost Company as a "sham" and over which she had no control, access and/or entitlements?

B. Whether the lower court erred in attributing realizable value to Wife related to her temporary sham ownership interest in Cost Company?

C. Whether the lower court erred in failing to recognize that all disbursements to Wife from Cost Company were offset by an equal amount of tax liability resulting in no net gain to Wife for her sham ownership interest in Cost Company?

D. Whether the lower court erred in assuming that the redemption of Wife's sham ownership interest in Cost Company was actually paid to Wife or was to be paid to Wife in the future?

II. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in failing to award Wife equitable reimbursement by way of alimony in recognition of her contributions to Husband's increased earning capacity and career?

III. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in awarding Wife only 55% of the marital estate in light of Husband's earning power and other related factors?

IV. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in failing to award Wife reasonable counsel fees and expenses?

V. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in failing to modify Wife's APL, pursuant to her petition for modification?

VI. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in terminating Wife's APL award as of September 28, 1999?

VII. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in failing to assign Husband 100% responsibility for tuition and various unreimbursed expenses of the parties' two children?

Brief for Wife at 4.

¶ 3 Husband raises four issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court fail to properly calculate the children's reasonable needs and consequently enter a confiscatory support order?

2. Did the trial court err in ignoring [H]usband's employment agreement and valuing his minority interest in his medical practice as a going concern?

3. Did the trial court incorrectly calculate the marital value of the [W]ife's interest in her family business?

4. Did the trial court err in finding that [W]ife contributed to [H]usband's increased earning power as to justify a distribution of marital property in her favor?

Brief for Husband at 2. We address each in turn and combine some for simplicity's sake.

¶ 4 Wife first claims that the court erred in numerous ways regarding her alleged "sham" interest in her father's company. In 1993, Wife's father formed "Cost Company" with himself as settlor and trustee but with Wife owning 45% and Wife's sister owning 55%. See Brief for Wife at 10. Seven months later, "Wife's 45% interest was redeemed pursuant to the Redemption Agreement." Id. The master valued this at $251,114, minus $157,000, which Wife and Husband had already received. See Master's Report and Recommendation at 11. The trial court adopted this figure. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/00, at 11. Throughout litigation, Wife claimed that her father established the company in her name to shield it from litigation he was involved in with his brother. Thus, Wife now contends, she did not truly own the company; it was a "sham" and, consequently, not marital property. We agree with Husband, however, that "Wife confuses motive with intent." Brief for Husband at 14. Wife does not argue that her father did not intend to give her the company; she merely argues that he did so to hide it from his brother. Thus, it was his intent to give it to her, no matter what his motive may have been. Our Supreme Court has previously said, "once it is determined that donative intent was present, inquiry into the reason or motive for a gift becomes meaningless." Sutliff v. Sutliff, 518 Pa. 378, 543 A.2d 534, 539 n. 1 (1988). The trial court did not err in determining that Wife owned forty-five percent of Cost Company.

¶ 5 Second, Wife contends that even if she did have an interest in the company, the court below "erred in attributing realizible [sic] value to Wife." Brief for Wife at 24. She claims that Husband's expert came to an erroneous figure in reliance on incorrect data provided by her own expert. Husband's expert valued the increase in value of Wife's interest at $251,114. See Master's Report and Recommendation at 10. The master remarked: "it was difficult for [Husband's expert] to receive supporting documentary evidence. Indeed, during the hearing itself, [Wife's witness] testified to certain alleged facts but, when asked for documentary proof, asserted that the supporting documentary evidence was privileged and thus could not be revealed. Upon being confronted with the fact that the evidence would be stricken if the supporting documentation was not produced, it was immediately made available, the privilege having been waived." Id. at 10-11. The master further said, "[I] find[ Husband's expert's] value of $251,114 for the marital property component to be totally persuasive, credible and supported by the evidence." Id. at 11. Wife, however, asserts that Husband's expert relied on faulty information and that, even if it was the result of deliberate misinformation by her advisors, "the resultant conclusion reached by Husband's expert was inaccurate." Brief for Wife at 25. We are not convinced that Husband's expert relied on the wrong information; but if indeed Wife's advisor misrepresented facts to Husband's expert, Wife cannot now rely on that misinformation to her advantage. Indeed, equitable estoppel, which "`arises when one by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief'" would prohibit her from doing so. Zitelli v. Dermatology Education and Research Foundation, 534 Pa. 360, 633 A.2d 134, 139 (1993) (quoting In re Estate of Tallarico, 425 Pa. 280, 228 A.2d 736, 741 (1967)). The...