Broecker v. State, 1--474A53

CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana
Citation314 N.E.2d 428,161 Ind.App. 206
Docket NumberNo. 1--474A53,1--474A53
PartiesDennis Wayne BROECKER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
Decision Date07 August 1974

Malcolm G. Montgomery, Evansville, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant was convicted of the crime of auto theft by a jury in the Vanderburgh Superior Court. The court entered judgment on the verdict.

A motion to correct errors, together with memorandum, was timely filed and was by the court overruled.

The facts are that Officer Reed of the Evansville Police Department observed appellant driving an automobile at about 4 o'clock A.M., which had painted on the windshield 'For Sale' and $500.00.' The car lights were not burning and there was no license plate on the car. Appellant was stopped by Officer Reed and other police and was unable to provide a driver's license at that time or to produce a registration or bill of sale or license plates for the car. A subsequent investigation revealed that the tires on the car matched the tire marks left on the sales lot of Joe Sanders Motors in Evansville and it developed the car had been removed form the Sanders lot without the owner's permission.

Officer Reed, while a witness, was asked a question about a conversation between him and another police officer in another automobile who had joined in the attempt to run down and stop appellant's motor vehicle.

Appellant objected on the theory that the evidence to be elicited from the officer was hearsay and inadmissible. The court asked the prosecutor if he intended to call the officer to whom Officer Reed was talking. That officer was under subpoena and in the court room at the time and the prosecutor informed the court that he intended to call him. The court then overruled the objection.

The second objection to Officer Reed's testimony on the ground that it was hearsay was made when Officer Reed was asked what he did at a particular time and his partial answer, before objection was made, was that they checked the serial number of the car through the NCIC system, which is a national crime information center. The court then overruled the objection and permitted the officer to continue with his answer in which he stated that the officers checked the serial number of the car and the color and make through two separate computers available to them, the Idex system and the NCIC system, to see if the car was possibly stolen or wanted. He did not state that he learned the car was stolen.

Appellant objected further, his objection being overruled.

The officer then was asked if he did anything further, to which question his answer was not responsive, but related to a nearby disturbance near the place of apprehension, and that question was never answered by Officer Reed.

Appellant never moved to strike out the partial answers given by Officer Reed for the purpose of objection and not having moved to strike the partial answers for the purpose of objection and having the court instruct the jury to discregard the partial answers, appellant cannot now be heard to complain, as he did not properly save his objection.

This being a criminal case we shall, nevertheless, pass on the merits.

In answer to the claimed error that the evidence was hearsay our Indiana courts have defined hearsay in many instances. In Blue v. Brooks (1973), Ind., 303 N.E.2d 269, 273, the Supreme Court said:

'Out-of-court statements offered in court for the truth of the matter therein are hearsay. But where the statements are not offered for the purpose of proving the fact asserted, they are not hearsay. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields (1970), 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651. . . .'

In the case of Pennebaker v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 524, 530, 270 N.E.2d 756, 760, our Supreme Court discussed the reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence and went further to say:

". . . If, therefore, an extra-judicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to evidence the matter asserted, but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply. The utterance is then merely not obnoxious to that rule. It may or may not be received, according as it has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not received, this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule.

. . . The Hearsay rule excludes extrajudicial utterances only when offered for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted.' 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1766 (3d ed., 1940).'

See, also, Cain v. State (1973), Ind., 300 N.E.2d 89, 94 and Wells v. State (1970), 254 Ind, 608, 261 N.E.2d 865.

The evidence offered here was not made as proof of the crime but was made to show how the appellant was observed in the stolen motor vehicle and trapped by the two police cars and, further, how police officers attempted to determine if the car was stolen. The record further discloses that the car was determined stolen by the officers comparing tire tracks on the lot from which the car was stolen to tires on the car, which was by direct evidence. Thus, the evidence in question was not, in our opinion, offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein and it was not error to permit the witness to answer the questions.

Further, assuming arguendo it was error, then it was harmless error as the appellant was not prejudiced by the evidence and any error would be harmless. (Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 61.)

Appellant next argues that the court committed reversible error in giving the jury State's Instruction No. 1, which is in the words and figures as follows, to-wit:

STATE'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1

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5 cases
  • Norton v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 4 Agosto 1980
    ...think this instruction correctly stated the law regarding the weight to be given circumstantial evidence. Broecker v. State, (1974) 161 Ind.App. 206, 210-11, 314 N.E.2d 428, 430-31. There is no error Appellant also contends the trial court should not have given State's instruction number si......
  • Spears v. State, 179S13
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 27 Febrero 1980
    ...therefore, defendant's claim does not meet the third part of the test in Davis v. State, supra. The state cites Broecker v. State, (1974) 161 Ind.App. 206, 314 N.E.2d 428, as authority for the correctness of the instruction given in this case. The state apparently misconstrues defendant's a......
  • Vlietstra v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 30 Diciembre 2003
    ...Evidence Rule 802). In support of his claim that information received from the NCIC is hearsay, Vlietstra cites Broecker v. State, 161 Ind.App. 206, 314 N.E.2d 428 (1974), and Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). In Broecker, the defendant appealed his conviction for auto thef......
  • Burhannon v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 25 Abril 1977
    ...the jury what Officer Morgan said while on surveillance was to prove that a drug transaction had occurred. Citing Broecker v. State (1974), Ind.App., 314 N.E.2d 428, the State responds that the evidence was properly admitted for the 'limited purpose' of showing how and why Officer Hardin ac......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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