Broglan v. Owen

• Citation: 41 So.2d 434,34 Ala.App. 480
• Decision Date: 21 June 1949
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 743.
• Parties: BROGLAN v. OWEN.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

41 So.2d 434

34 Ala.App. 480

BROGLAN v. OWEN.

8 Div. 743.

Alabama Court of Appeals

June 21, 1949

Thomas W. Layne, of Huntsville, for appellant.

Griffin Ford, Caldwell & Ford, of Huntsville, for appellee.

The complaint is as follows:

'Count 1. Plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of Five Hundred and no/100 ($500.00) Dollars, for that heretofore on, to-wit the 29th day of September, 1947, the Defendant so negligently operated a motor vehicle on Hobbs Island Road in Madison County, Alabama about twelve miles south of Huntsville Alabama, that he ran it upon or against the motor vehicle of the Plaintiff who was then and there driving her motor vehicle upon the said public highway as she had a right to do, thereby damaging the motor vehicle of the Plaintiff.

'And the Plaintiff avers that her said damage was proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendant in the operation of his automobile as aforesaid.'

CARR Judge.

This is a suit for property damage incident to a collision between the plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's truck. In the court below there was a judgment in favor of the former.

It is urged that the complaint, which charged simple negligence was not sufficient in that it did not set out the quo modo of the negligence. This is not required. Under our decisions, negligence may be averred in general terms. Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Weir, 179 Ala. 227, 60 So. 851; Western Ry. of Ala. v. Mays, 197 Ala. 367, 72 So. 641.

Assignments of error 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are argued in group. Each relates to the rulings of the court while the evidence was being introduced. Only assignment number 5 is properly presented for review. As to the others, counsel for defendant failed to reserve exceptions when plaintiff's objections were sustained. York v. State, 21 Ala.App. 155, 106 So. 797; Senn v. Enterprise Banking Co., 30 Ala.App. 449, 7 So.2d 777.

On cross-examination of one of plaintiff's witnesses the trial judge sustained objections to this question: 'Did your company have the plaintiff's car insured?' Before counsel had ended the cross-examination of the witness, the court receded from his former ruling and allowed an affirmative answer to the question.

On direct examination the plaintiff was asked: 'To refresh your recollection, did you tell me a while ago that it was your right bumper that contacted his car?' After objections were overruled, the witness did...