Brokaw Hospital v. Circuit Court of McLean County
| Decision Date | 12 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 45067,45067 |
| Citation | 287 N.E.2d 472,52 Ill.2d 182 |
| Parties | , 68 A.L.R.3d 204 BROKAW HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. The CIRCUIT COURT OF McLEAN COUNTY et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria (Duncan B. Cooper III and Brent H. Gwillim, Peoria, of counsel), for petitioner.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Warren K. Smoot, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondents, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh District, McLean County, Illinois, and Hon. Samuel Glenn Harrodd III, Circuit Judge.
Joseph H. Kelley, Bloomington, for respondents spondents Hermena Ayers and Luther Ayers.
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of an order entered March 23, 1972, directing that costs in the sum of $75 be paid immediately by Brokaw Hospital to the attorneys for the plaintiffs in an action pending against the hospital in the circuit court of McLean County. That action was brought by Hermena Ayers and her husband to recover damages for personal injuries and loss of services suffered when she stepped in an ice-covered hole in the hospital's parking lot. A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed on behalf of the hospital. It was overruled after argument, and on the same day the trial court, purporting to act under the authority of section 41 of the Civil Practice Act, entered the order which is the subject of this proceeding.
Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act provides: 'Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and not in good faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other party by reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to be summarily taxed by the court at the trial.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 110, par. 41.
We consider first the propriety of the entry of any order assessing costs against the defendant. The complaint alleged that Mrs. Ayers was visiting her husband who was a patient in the hospital; that snow had fallen on the parking lot and that the defendant had pushed the snow into large piles on the north side of the lot which is at a higher elevation than the south side; that on three specified dates the snow melted and refoze, causing water to drain to the south side of the lot thereby creating ice patches; that the bituminous surface of the lot contained a hole which became filled with water and then froze; that the plaintiff stepped into the hole, slipped, fell, and was injured.
The first paragraph of the defendant's motion to dismiss stated that the 'complaint alleges only that an accumulation of snow and ice and removal thereof caused plaintiff's injuries.' The second paragraph of the motion stated that there is nothing in the complaint to allege that 'the condition on the parking lot is made more hazardous than that generally existing in the community,' and therefore there can be no liability. The third paragraph stated that it appears from the face of the complaint that the cause of the injury 'was a condition which was in existence throughout the community at the time and place alleged,' and therefore there can be no liability. The fourth and final paragraph of the motion to dismiss stated that it appeared from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff's use of the parking lot 'was gratuitous and the plaintiff became a licensee and cannot recover for ordinary negligence.'
An examination of the complaint shows that none of the statements made about it in the motion to dismiss was true. The record thus justifies the finding of the trial court that the 'defendant's motion: 1. was made without reasonable cause; 2. is not in good faith; and 3. is untrue.'
The position of the hospital is that the circuit court lacked authority to impose sanctions 'solely on the basis of the complaint and motion,' or as otherwise stated, that the court 'lacks the authority to base sanctions on a motion to dismiss.' The purpose of the ordinary motion to dismiss is to raise an issue of law as to the legal sufficiency of the allegations of the...
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