Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cnty.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–4497.,13–4497. |
| Citation | 804 F.3d 338 |
| Parties | Raymond BRONOWICZ, Appellant v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY; Probation Officer Karen Ollis; Probation Officer Jeffrey Cima; Thomas McCaffrey, Director of Allegheny County Adult Probation ; Judge Donald E. Machen. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Robert M. Owsiany, Esq., [Argued], Pittsburgh, PA, Counsel for Appellant.
Virginia S. Scott, Esq., [Argued], Dennis R. Biondo, Jr., Esq. Paul R. Dachille, Esq. Jake S. Lifson, Esq., Allegheny County Law Department Pittsburgh, PA, Counsel for Appellees, County of Allegheny and Probation Officer Karen Ollis, Probation Officer Jeffrey Cima, and Thomas McCaffrey, in their individual capacities.
Caroline P. Liebenguth, Esq., [Argued], Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellees, Probation Officer Karen Ollis, Probation Officer Jeffrey Cima, and Thomas McCaffrey, in their official capacities.
Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff–Appellant Raymond Bronowicz (“Appellant” or “Bronowicz”) is a former Pennsylvania state inmate and probationer. As a probationer, Bronowicz was repeatedly charged with probation violations and was ultimately sentenced to additional incarceration. Bronowicz successfully appealed that prison sentence in state court and then filed the present action seeking, inter alia, damages for his wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bronowicz appeals from the District Court's dismissal of his claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
This appeal raises a discrete issue involving claims for damages for unlawful incarceration brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We must decide whether an order from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. Humphrey —notwithstanding the fact that the order failed expressly to address the inmate's specific legal challenges to the sentence. For the reasons that follow, we hold that such an order constitutes a favorable termination of the proceedings against the plaintiff and that any § 1983 claims stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by Heck. Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's order dismissing Appellant's claims.
Bronowicz's § 1983 claims arise from a complicated series of sentencing and probation revocation proceedings that allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully imposing on Bronowicz additional penalties for criminal judgments that had already been satisfied. Because the sequence of events that culminated in his wrongful incarceration is complex, we must discuss the initial criminal charges and the events of each hearing in detail.
On July 5, 2000, Bronowicz was charged with several criminal violations of Pennsylvania law ranging from terroristic threats to driving under the influence.2 Bronowicz entered a negotiated plea and appeared before the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas (the “Court of Common Pleas”) for sentencing on June 6, 2001. Bronowicz was sentenced as follows:
Thus Bronowicz was sentenced to further imprisonment and /or probation for only Counts Four, Five, Eight and Nine. Counts One and Two were withdrawn per the plea agreement, and Bronowicz was assessed “no further penalty” for Counts Three, Six, Seven, and Ten—indicating that Bronowicz had fully served his sentence for these counts as of that hearing. With credit for time served, he was released from incarceration on June 6 and began serving a term of probation.
On July 21, 2005, Bronowicz appeared before the Court of Common Pleas for probation violations. The court revoked Bronowicz's probation and re-sentenced him for two counts. However, because at least one of the counts was numbered differently than in the original information, there was confusion as to which counts were available for resentencing.4 Bronowicz was sentenced to further incarceration and additional probation for “Count One,” DUI (which appeared as Count Five in the original information) and an additional probationary period for Count Three, terroristic threats. Bronowicz alleges that these sentences were imposed illegally because: (1) the additional sentence imposed for the DUI count exceeded the statutory maximum penalty of five years,5 and (2) the court had no authority to impose an additional sentence for Count Three since no further penalty was assessed initially.6
Bronowicz was re-incarcerated and then granted house arrest on December 20, 2005.
In July 2008, Bronowicz was arrested on other charges, and a bench warrant issued for alleged violations of probation. Bronowicz was again re-incarcerated.7 On July 20, 2010, Bronowicz appeared at a second probation revocation hearing. The court “continued” Bronowicz's probation for Count Four, terroristic threats—though there was no term of probation to “continue” for this count, as Bronowicz's five-year term of probation had expired on June 5, 2006. App. 275. The court also sentenced Bronowicz to additional imprisonment for Count Five, DUI (now correctly numbered as in the original information), and with credit for time served, he was released from incarceration and “paroled forthwith” on July 27, 2010. App. 269. Bronowicz alleges that the “[c]ourt concluded its interest in the DUI charge” at that time, as he had fully served his sentence for this count. App. 269–70.
In November 2010, another bench warrant issued for further probation violations,8 and Bronowicz was again re-incarcerated. Bronowicz's next revocation proceeding was scheduled for January 19, 2011 (the “January 2011 proceeding”). The day before the hearing, Bronowicz's lawyer told him that he would not be present for the hearing and informed Bronowicz that the probation office wanted to offer him a deal. Bronowicz adamantly objected to any plea deal because he believed his probationary term had expired before his arrest.
The next day Probation Officer Karen Ollis spoke with Bronowicz while he was waiting to be called for his hearing. Officer Ollis told Bronowicz that she had reached an agreement with Bronowicz's attorney whereby Bronowicz would plead and spend 18 to 36 months in prison. Bronowicz again rejected the deal, but Officer Ollis ignored Bronowicz's protests and told him that he did not need to appear before the judge in light of the plea agreement.
The revocation hearing was held with neither Bronowicz nor his attorney in the courtroom. Officer Ollis presented the purported plea agreement to the judge, and Bronowicz was sentenced to 18 to 36 months' incarceration pursuant to the alleged agreement. Bronowicz maintains that he never waived his right to counsel, to appear before the court, or to have a plea agreement colloquy in open court and on the record. No transcript of the January 2011 proceeding exists.
Bronowicz then appealed his sentence to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing, inter alia, that: (1) his due process rights were violated when his probation was revoked and he was re-sentenced in January 2011 in absentia, and (2) the sentence imposed was illegal for numerous reasons. The Commonwealth filed an answering brief essentially admitting to all allegations. Notably, the Commonwealth conceded that: (1) the January 2011 hearing revoking Bronowicz's probation and imposing a new prison sentence was conducted in absentia, (2) there was no indication that Bronowicz had waived his right to be present, (3) Bronowicz had been re-sentenced for counts as to which no penalty was initially imposed, and (4) Bronowicz was subject to sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum. The Commonwealth ultimately concluded that “remand for a new violation hearing and sentencing [was] required.” App. 321.
In light of the Commonwealth's concessions, the Superior Court issued a short order on January 13, 2012 (the “Superior Court's order”) vacating the sentence imposed in January 2011 and remanding for further proceedings. The order stated in relevant part:
App. 335–36. On remand, the Court of Common Pleas ordered Bronowicz “paroled forthwith,” and released Bronowicz from custody on May 1, 2012. App. 446.
Bronowicz filed the present action in District Court against ...
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