Bronsdon v. City of Naples, Mun. Corp.
| Decision Date | 22 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:13-cv-778-FtM-29CM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | JEFFREY BRONSDON, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NAPLES, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6) filed on December 4, 2013. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #11) on December 30, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is mostly denied.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegationsmust be "plausible" and "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. See also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), but "[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth," Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The facts set forth in the Complaint, which at this stage of the proceedings are presumed to be true, show the following:
Plaintiff Jeffrey Bronsdon (plaintiff or Bronsdon) was employed by the City of Naples (defendant or City of Naples) as a firefighter from April 1992 through June 2011. During his employment, the City of Naples obtained medical information indicating that Bronsdon had a strong family history of heart disease; that he suffered from hypertension, which was genetically related; and that plaintiff suffered from coronary artery disease related to his blood pressure, family history, and hyperlipidemia. The City of Naples also obtained confidential medical information pertaining to the medical condition of Bronsdon's mother without consent.
In or around December 2008, Bronsdon filed a claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits, but defendant denied the claim based upon Bronsdon's genetic information and family medical history. Bronsdon filed suit on the basis of the denial of his Workers' Compensation Benefits and the trial began on March 31, 2010. During the trial, the City of Naples disclosed plaintiff's family medical history and genetic information, including his mother's medical information, to its attorney, George A. Helm, III. At trial and in depositions, the City of Naples cited toBronsdon's genetic information and family medical history as the basis for denying his claim for medical benefits. Bronsdon ultimately prevailed on his claim for Workers' Compensation Benefits at trial and on appeal.
In or around October 2010, Bronsdon filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Counsel (EEOC) alleging that the denial of Workers' Compensation Benefits on the basis of his family medical history and genetic information violated the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA). After filing his charge of discrimination, Bronsdon was subjected to harassment, including the exclusion from daily shift meetings, the denial of educational opportunities, and the reassignment of duties. Following a complaint about these matters to his battalion chief in February 2011, Bronsdon began finding his "bunker gear" relocated, disassembled, and otherwise tampered with. Plaintiff also found improperly disposed of medical waste directly under his bunker gear.
Bronsdon frequently complained to the lieutenants assigned to his station regarding the tampering with his gear, but no action was taken and the harassment against Bronsdon intensified. On or about May 3, 2011, Bronsdon received a puncture wound on his arm when he was pricked by a hypodermic needle that was intentionally concealed in the sleeve of his fire jacket. The City of Naplesfailed to properly investigate or take proper action with respect to this incident.
On May 6, 2011, the City of Naples, in retaliation for the charge of discrimination and the complaints of retaliation, placed Bronsdon on administrative leave. Effective July 1, 2011, the City of Naples forced Bronsdon to take early retirement, constructively terminating his employment. Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC regarding the retaliation he experienced at work for the first charge he filed with the EEOC and for complaining about unlawful discrimination. On or about January 23, 2013, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination in Bronsdon's favor on the initial charge of discrimination. A second Letter of Determination was issued by the EEOC on February 4, 2013, finding in favor of Bronsdon regarding his subsequent charge of retaliation and harassment.
Plaintiff initiated this action against the City of Naples on October 31, 2013, by filing a two-count complaint. (Doc. #1.) In Count I, plaintiff alleges that defendant possessed and used confidential medical information pertaining to his mother's medical condition, his genetic information, and his family medical history in violation of GINA. Count II alleges that defendant knowingly and willfully retaliated against him for filing a chargewith the EEOC and complaining about unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of GINA.
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I on the grounds that it did not discriminate against plaintiff based upon genetic information, workers' compensation proceeding are excluded from GINA, and plaintiff has not suffered any damages. Defendant also asserts that plaintiff's request for punitive damages in Counts I and II should be dismissed or stricken. Plaintiff concedes that the requests for punitive damages should be stricken; thus, the Court will grant the requested relief. Plaintiff, however, asserts that the other arguments raised by defendant are without merit. The Court agrees.
GINA makes it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1). The term "genetic information" includes information about "(i) such individual's genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4). Genetic informationpertaining to the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members refers to an individual's family medical history. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(c)(iii).
The term 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g). If, however, the diagnosis depends on both the presence of signs and symptoms and genetic information, the condition will be considered manifested. Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 68912, 68917 (Nov. 9, 2010). The regulations make "it clear that genetic information of an individual with a manifested disease is protected genetic information under GINA and that discrimination against someone based on this information is prohibited." Id. at 68918. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1635.12(b).
Defendant asserts that "[p]laintiff cannot state a claim for...
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