Bronshtein v. Horn

Decision Date14 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. 01-9004.,No. 01-9005.,01-9004.,01-9005.
Citation404 F.3d 700
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
PartiesAntuan BRONSHTEIN, v. Martin L. HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> James Price, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview;<SMALL><SUP>**</SUP></SMALL>Gerald J. Pappert, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Appellants, No. 01-9004, Antuan Bronshtein, Appellant, No. 01-9005, v. Martin Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; <SMALL><SUP>***</SUP></SMALL> James Price, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph P. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Rockview;<SMALL><SUP>****</SUP></SMALL>Gerald J. Pappert, Attorney General of Pennsylvania.

Patrick J. O'Connor, Esq., Peter G. Rossi, Esq., Cozen O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, Louis M. Natali, Jr. Esq. (Argued), Turner & McDonald, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Patricia E. Coonahan (Argued), Assistant District Attorney Captain, Appellate Division, Mary MacNeil Killinger, Deputy District Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, Office of District Attorney, Norristown, PA, Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Before: ALITO, BARRY, and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALITO, Circuit Judge:

Antuan Bronshtein was convicted in a Pennsylvania court for first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After unsuccessful post-trial litigation in the state courts, he filed the habeas petition now at issue. The District Court found merit in some but not all of Bronshtein's claims and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be granted unless Bronshtein was retried within a specified time. The habeas respondent (hereinafter "the Commonwealth") appealed, and Bronshtein cross-appealed. We reverse the order of the District Court insofar as it required a new guilt-phase trial, but we affirm insofar as it required resentencing.

I.

In April 1994, Antuan Bronshtein was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on charges stemming from the robbery and shooting death of Alexander Gutman. The evidence at trial may be summarized follows. At about 5 p.m. on January 11, 1991, Montgomery County police investigated a robbery at a store called Jewelry by Alex in the Valley Forge Shopping Center. See Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 691 A.2d 907, 911 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 936, 118 S.Ct. 346, 139 L.Ed.2d 269 (1997). The police discovered that the proprietor, Alexander Gutman, had been killed by two gunshot wounds to the face. Id. Investigators found three fingerprints and a palmprint on one of the intact display cases in the store, and these prints were later identified as Bronshtein's. Id.

On February 27, 1991, Bronshtein contacted Philadelphia police investigators and said that he wanted to discuss the murder of another jeweler, Jerome Slobotkin, who had been killed in Philadelphia on February 19, 1991. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d at 912. After waiving his Miranda rights, Bronshtein signed a detailed written confession admitting to the Slobotkin murder, and in February 1992, he was convicted for that offense. Id.

About a month after Bronshtein confessed to the Slobotkin murder, Montgomery County police met with Bronshtein, at his request, to discuss the Gutman murder. During this interview, Bronshtein denied killing Slobotkin and said that both Slobotkin and Gutman had been killed by a "Mr. X," whom Bronshtein described as a high-level member of the "Russian mafia." Id. During this interview, Bronshtein did not disclose Mr. X's name, but he later identified him as Adik Karlitsky, another jeweler. Id.

Although Bronshtein told the Montgomery County police that he had not killed Gutman, Bronshtein admitted that he was acquainted with him and that he knew that he owned a jewelry store. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d at 912. However, Bronshtein denied knowing the location of the store or even that of the Valley Forge Shopping Center, and he claimed that he had not seen Gutman in more than two years. Id.

At trial, however, three witnesses identified Bronshtein as a man whom they had seen in or near Gutman's store on the day of his murder. Laura Sechrist stated that she had passed the store at approximately noon and had seen Bronshtein and another man talking to Gutman. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d at 912. Larry Bainbridge, a postal carrier, testified that he had walked by the store at 12:45 p.m. and had seen Bronshtein behind the counter. Id. Alexander Daniels testified that he had passed the store at about 3:15 p.m. and had seen Bronshtein standing outside the store. Id.

Finally, a man named Wilson Perez testified about an admission made by Bronshtein during January 1991. According to Perez, he and Bronshtein were riding in Bronshtein's car on Roosevelt Boulevard in Philadelphia when Bronshtein said that he had killed a man in a jewelry store "out past the boulevard" and had taken his jewelry. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d at 912. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted, Roosevelt Boulevard "runs in a northerly and southerly direction through Northeast Philadelphia," and "[i]n order to travel to Montgomery County from a large section of Northeast Philadelphia, it is necessary to cross ... Roosevelt Boulevard." Id. at 912 n. 12. Perez further testified that Bronshtein had given unset gemstones to Perez's brother. Id. at 912.

The Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that, although a second person had probably been involved in the robbery of Gutman's store, it was Bronshtein who intentionally shot and killed Gutman. Bronshtein, on the other hand, contended that Adik Karlitsky shot and killed Gutman. According to Bronshtein, Karlitsky was a high-level member of a Russian organized crime group. Bronshtein said that he worked for Karlitsky as a jewelry "fence" and had merely accompanied Karlitsky to Gutman's store without knowing that Karlitsky was going to kill him.

The jury convicted Bronshtein of first-degree murder, robbery, theft of movable property, and possession of an instrument of crime, as well as conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, and theft. At the penalty phase, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: that Bronshtein had "committed [the] killing while in the perpetration of a felony," 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(6), and that he had "a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person." 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9711(d)(9). The jury found three mitigating circumstances: extreme mental or emotional disturbance, poor childhood upbringing, and "a possibility that the defendant did not pull the trigger." App. VI at 1969; see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9711(e)(2), (8). However, the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and accordingly returned a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction. The trial court subsequently imposed the death sentence along with consecutive terms of imprisonment for the other convictions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 547 Pa. 460, 691 A.2d 907 (1997), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 20, 1997. 522 U.S. 936, 118 S.Ct. 346, 139 L.Ed.2d 269 (1997).

On December 3, 1997, the Center for Legal Education, Advocacy and Defense Assistance ("CLEADA") filed a "pro se" Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition on Bronshtein's behalf ("pro se PCRA petition"). The petition did not state any claim for relief; it merely stated: "This is not a counseled PCRA petition, but a request to initiate review, filed pro se. A counseled petition shall be filed later pursuant to the court's order." App. VII at 2126. The petition was signed by a CLEADA attorney, purportedly with Bronshtein's authorization.

Shortly after the "pro se" PCRA petition was filed, Bronshtein personally informed the trial court "that he wished to waive his right to appeal and to terminate the PCRA proceedings so that the sentence of death could be carried out immediately." Id. at 2121. He later told the court that the CLEADA attorneys "had been misleading him and acting contrary to his instructions[.]" Id. at 2121 n. 2. On January 26, 1999, after extensive litigation over Bronshtein's competency to waive his rights under the PCRA, the trial court issued an order dismissing the "pro se" PCRA petition with prejudice. The court found that Bronshtein had "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" sought to withdraw the petition. Id. at 2125.

Bronshtein's mother and sister filed a next friend appeal from the trial court's order. On April 16, 1999, the appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that the appellants had failed to show that Bronshtein was incompetent. Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 556 Pa. 545, 729 A.2d 1102 (1999). On April 23, 1999, Bronshtein's mother and sister filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court and asked the Court to issue a stay of execution. On April 29, 1999, during a hearing on the petition, Bronshtein informed the District Court that he had changed his mind and wished to pursue post-conviction relief. The District Court stayed Bronshtein's execution, appointed counsel for him, and gave him 120 days to prepare and file his own federal habeas petition.

On June 9, 1999, Bronshtein filed with the state trial court a petition styled as an "Amended Petition For Habeas Corpus Relief Under Article I, Section 14 Of The Pennsylvania Constitution And For Statutory Post Conviction Relief Under The Post Conviction Relief Act." The trial court treated the petition as a second PCRA petition and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, holding both that Bronshtein had "irrevocably waived" his right to seek post-conviction relief and that the petition was...

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