Bronson Executor v. Chappell

• Decision Date: 01 December 1870
• Parties: BRONSON'S EXECUTOR v. CHAPPELL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

79 U.S. 681

20 L.Ed. 436

12 Wall. 681

BRONSON'S EXECUTOR v. CHAPPELL.

December Term, 1870

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin.

Bronson, of New York, being owner as executor of lands in Wisconsin, sold a tract to E. and J. Chappell, residing near Galena, in that State, the sale being negotiated by one W. C. Bostwick, of the last-named place. A portion of the purchase-money was secured by mortgage; and as it became due it was paid by the Chappells to Bostwick, under the assumption by them that Bostwick, who had advertised himself during a term of twelve or fourteen years as the agent of Bronson, was the duly constituted agent of Bronson to receive it. Bostwick having failed, and appropriated the money to his own use, Bronson now filed a bill against the Chappells in the court below to foreclose the mortgage. The defendants set up the payments to Bostwick; and the question involv d was thus a pure question of agency. The defendants relied upon a correspondence between Bronson and Bostwick, and particularly, as sufficient of itself, on a letter from the latter to the former, dated 9th February, 1860, and a reply to it of the 15th. These two letters are quoted and the general character of the others, with the leading facts of the case, stated in different parts of the opinion. The court below dismissed the bill, and Bronson took the appeal.

Mr. J. J. Townsend, for the appellant; Messrs. Cothren and Laken, contra.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

But a single question has been argued in this court, and that is one arising upon the facts as developed in the record. This opinion will be confined to that subject.

William C. Bostwick, acting for Frederick Bronson, negotiated the sale of a tract of land in Wisconsin to the defendants. According to his custom in such cases, Bronson forwarded to Bostwick the draft of a contract to be executed by the buyers. At the foot of the draft was a note in these words:

'William C. Bostwick, Esq., of Galena, is authorized to receive and receipt for the first payment on this contract. All subsequent payments to be made to F. Bronson, in the city of New York.'

The defendants expressed to Bostwick a preference to receive a deed and give a mortgage. This was communicated to Bronson, who acceded to the proposition and forwarded to Bostwick a deed and the draft of a bond and mortgage. On the 25th of March, 1865, the defendants paid to Bostwick $1500 of the purchase-money, and executed the bond and mortgage to secure the payment of the balance. According to the condition of the bond it was to be paid to the obligee in the city of New York, in instalments, as follows: $781.20 on the 13th of November, 1865, and the remaining sum of $4562.40 in seven equal annual payments, from the 12th of February, 1865, with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. The contract was erroneously construed by Bronson as requiring the interest on all the instalments to be paid with each one as it fell due. The other parties seem to have acquiesced in this construction. On the 4th of December, 1865, the defendants paid to Bostwick, as the agent of Bronson, $825.36, in discharge of the amount claimed to be due on the 30th of November, 1865, and took his receipt accordingly. On the 28th of February, 1866 they paid Bostwick $980 to meet the second instalment and interest, as claimed, with exchange, and took his receipt as before. Bostwick failed in December, 1866. These moneys were never paid over to Bronson. He denied the authority of Bostwick to receive them, and demanded payment from the defendants. They refused, and Bronson thereupon filed this bill to foreclose the mortgage. The validity of these payments is the question presented for our determination.

Agents are special, general, or universal. Where written evidence of their appointment is not required, it may be implied from circumstances. These circumstances are the acts of the agent and their recognition, or acquiescence, by the principal. The same considerations fix the category of the agency and the limits of the authority conferred. Where one, without objection, suffers another to do acts which proceed upon the ground of authority from him, or by his conduct adopts and sanctions such acts after they are done, he will be bound, although no previous authority exist, in all respects as if the requisite power had been given in the most formal manner. If he has justified the belief of a third party that the person assuming to be his agent was authorized to do what was done, it is no answer for him to say that no authority had been given, or that it did not reach so far, and that the third party had acted upon a mistaken conclusion. He is estopped to take refuge in such a defence. If a loss is to be borne, the author of the error must bear it. If business has been transacted in certain cases it is implied that the like business m y be transacted in others. The inference to be drawn is, that everything fairly within the scope of the powers exercised in the past may be done in the future, until notice of revocation or disclaimer is brought home to those whose interests are...