Bronson v. BD. OF EDUCATION, ETC., No. C-1-74-205.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
Citation535 F. Supp. 846
Docket NumberNo. C-1-74-205.
PartiesMona BRONSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.
Decision Date11 February 1982

535 F. Supp. 846

Mona BRONSON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.

No. C-1-74-205.

United States District Court, S. D. Ohio, W. D.

February 11, 1982.


535 F. Supp. 847
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
535 F. Supp. 848
Thomas I. Atkins, Teresa Demchak, NAACP Special Contribution Fund, New York City, G. Phillip Arnold, William Caldwell, Ratner & Sugarmon, Memphis, Tenn., Elizabeth A. McKanna, Cincinnati, Ohio. Leonard D. Slutz, Wood, Lamping, Slutz & Reckman, Cincinnati, Ohio, Solvita McMillan, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs

John A. Lloyd, Jr., Nancy A. Lawson, Glenn Weissenberger, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant City of Cincinnati School Dist.

A. David Nichols, Metzger, Phillips & Nichols Co., LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Mark O'Neill, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, Ohio, for State of Ohio; Special Counsel to Attorney Gen., State of Ohio; Represents State Bd. of Ed.

Gary E. Brown, Richard W. Ross, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendants William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. and James A. Rhodes, Governor.

James W. Farrell, Jr., Mark A. Vander Laan, Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants Deer Park City School Dist., Madeira City School Dist., Mariemont City School Dist., North College Hill City School Dist., Norwood City School Dist., St. Bernard-Elmwood Place City School Dist., Reading Community City School Dist.

Bruce I. Petrie, John B. Pinney, Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist.

George E. Roberts, III, Ennis & Roberts, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Lackland City School Dist.

Michael E. Maundrell, Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Princeton City School Dist.

Lawrence McTurnan, McTurnan & Meyer, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants Finneytown Local School Dist., Forest Hills Local School Dist., Northwest Local School Dist., Three Rivers Local School Dist., Hamilton County School Dist.

John C. Elam, Suzanne K. Richards, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant Wyoming City School Dist.

James W. Harper, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Oak Hills Local City School Dist.

Arnold Morelli, Bauer, Morelli & Heyd, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Green-Hills Forest Park City School Dist.

William E. Santen, William B. Singer, Santen, Santen & Hughes Co., LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Sycamore City School Dist.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
                INTRODUCTION .......................................... 849
                 I. Positions of the Parties ...................... 850
                 A. Plaintiffs ................................. 850
                 B. Defendants ................................. 851
                 II. Summary of Discussion ......................... 852
                 III. Synopsis of Conclusions ....................... 860
                DISCUSSION ............................................ 861
                 I. Pre-1975 School Desegregation Cases Considered
                 by Sixth Circuit: Held to Have
                 Changed No Law Applicable to Deal.................... 861
                 A. Green, Raney, and Monroe: Considered
                 by District Court and Sixth
                 Circuit in Deal II, 1968, 1969 ................... 861
                 1. Conclusion of District Court and
                 Sixth Circuit: Inapplicability of
                 Green, Raney, and Monroe to Deal 861
                 2. As Remedy Cases, Green, Raney,
                 and Monroe Were Inapplicable to
                 Deal .......................................... 864
                

535 F. Supp. 849
B. Swann and Keyes: Considered by the Sixth Circuit in Bronson, 1975 .................. 865 1. Inapplicability of Swann to Deal 866 2. Keyes: No Changes in the Law of School Desegregation Warranting Departure From the Application of Collateral Estoppel ......................... 867 a. Keyes: Supreme Court Holding That a Finding of Contemporary De Jure Segregation in a Portion of the School System Is Highly Relevant in Assessing Claim of Current Systemwide De Jure Segregation ............. 869 1. The District Court ...................... 869 2. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals .............................. 870 3. The Supreme Court ....................... 870 b. Sixth Circuit's Discussion of Keyes in Bronson ........................... 874 c. Most of the Principles Developed by the Supreme Court in Keyes Were Not Directly Applicable to Deal Because Unlike the Keyes Plaintiffs, the Deal Plaintiffs Failed to Prove Contemporary De Jure Segregation in any Portion of the Cincinnati School System 875 II. Columbus and Dayton II: Post-1975 School Desegregation Cases, Not Considered by the Sixth Circuit in Connection With Deal and Bronson ........................................ 878 A. Preliminary Comments ............................ 878 B. Evolutionary Developments: Extension of Keyes' Principles to Non-Statutory Dual School Systems, Created and Maintained by Remote, Intentionally Segregative Acts ................................ 879 C. Reconsideration of Deal in Light of Columbus and Dayton II: Conflict in Legal Principles ................................ 883 1. Re-examination of Deal: Legal Import of Historical Facts ................... 883 2. Sixth Circuit's Position on the Legal Import of Historical Facts in Deal Unaffected by Pre-1975 Supreme Court Desegregation Cases ........................................ 886 3. Sixth Circuit's Position on the Legal Import of Historical Facts in Deal Compared to Supreme Court's Position as Developed in Columbus and Dayton II ....................... 887 a. Re-examination of Columbus and Dayton II ............................. 888 b. Supreme Court Position on Evidence of School Board's Remote Discriminatory Practices Offered to Meet Plaintiffs' Initial Burden of Proof 891 c. Sixth Circuit's Position in Deal II Eliminated as a Viable Legal Option Under Columbus and Dayton II ............................. 892 III. The Sixth Circuit 1975 Bronson Opinion and the Application of Collateral Estoppel In Light of Columbus and Dayton II ................ 894 A. Collateral Estoppel: General Principles and Necessary Inquiries ....................... 894 B. Sixth Circuit 1975 Bronson Opinion: Conclusions as to Appropriate Application of Collateral Estoppel ......................... 898 C. Appropriate Application of Collateral Estoppel In Light of Columbus and Dayton II ...................................... 900 1. Broader Rules of Res Judicata Inapplicable ................................ 900 2. Identity of Issues In Light of Columbus and Dayton II ...................... 900 a. Collateral Estoppel Inapplicable to Issues Not Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal ..................................... 900 b. Collateral Estoppel Technically Applicable to Issues Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal .................................. 903 3. Columbus and Dayton II Have Not Significantly Changed the Law Applicable to the Issues Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal ........................................ 904 4. Columbus and Dayton II Present No Reason, Not Discernible in 1975, to Justify an Exception to Collateral Estoppel With Respect to Issues Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal .......................... 906 IV. Conclusions ........................................ 907 A. Issues Not Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal ............................. 907 B. Issues Actually Litigated and Determined in Deal ........................................ 908 C. Practical Effect on Conclusions on Admissibility and Consideration of Pre-July 26, 1965 Evidence .............................. 908 Tentative Agenda For Meeting Between Court and Counsel on Friday, February 26, 1982 ............... 909 Appendix .............................................. 910

DECISION AND ENTRY CONCERNING APPLICABILITY OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; CONFERENCE SET

RICE, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On October 17, 1980, the Court met with counsel for all parties in this school desegregation case for the primary purpose of discussing the Court's Entry of October 16, 1980,1 "Setting Forth This Court's Interpretation

535 F. Supp. 850
of Sixth Circuit Opinion in Bronson v. Board of Education, 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975)." (doc. # 476) In the Entry, the Court stated its opinion that the Sixth Circuit's decision, if applicable in this case, foreclosed the Bronson plaintiffs from relitigating the issues raised and resolved in the first Cincinnati school desegregation litigation. Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 244 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ohio 1965) (Deal I), aff'd, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847, 88 S.Ct. 39, 19 L.Ed.2d 114 (1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969) (Deal II), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 962, 91 S.Ct. 1630, 29 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971). Therein, Judge Peck had found that the Cincinnati Board of Education was not liable or legally responsible for the racial composition of the Cincinnati school system in 1965, because the racial imbalance existing in the system at that time had not been intentionally caused by the practices and policies of the board. In short, the Court found no intent to discriminate or segregate on the part of the school board, and thus, no violation of plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights. This Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit had determined that Deal I and II were still good law in 1975, and that the Bronson plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from attacking Judge Peck's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In reaching that conclusion, this Court necessarily adopted the position taken by the Sixth Circuit that, between July 26, 1965 (the date of the District Court's decision in Deal I) and September 24, 1975 (the date of the Sixth Circuit's Bronson decision), there had been no significant changes in the law applicable to this case that would render the application of collateral estoppel inappropriate.

A secondary purpose of the October 17 meeting...

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3 practice notes
  • Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Los Angeles Branch NAACP, No. 81-5772
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • November 16, 1983
    ...claims that were fully litigated can be barred--is also without merit. It relies for this proposition on Bronson v. Board of Education, 535 F.Supp. 846 (S.D.Ohio 1982), where it was held that a 1965 district court decision that the Cincinnati schools were not illegally segregated did not pr......
  • BD. OF ED., CITY OF CINCINNATI v. DEPT. OF HEW, Civ. No. C-1-74-185.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • February 17, 1987
    ...Circuit's Bronson decision had "been rendered obsolete to the extent that it forecloses any and all inquiries prior to July 26, 1965." 535 F.Supp. 846, 907. This was because "the body of desegregation law" had been supplemented, making it appropriate to consider issues that had not been add......
  • Bronson v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Cincinnati, Nos. 82-3405
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 31, 1982
    ...on the issue on November 24, 1980 and took it under advisement. On February 11, 1982 the district judge issued a published opinion, 535 F.Supp. 846, and on April 5 certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The district court rejected the claim that collateral estoppel is totally inappli......
3 cases
  • Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Los Angeles Branch NAACP, No. 81-5772
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • November 16, 1983
    ...claims that were fully litigated can be barred--is also without merit. It relies for this proposition on Bronson v. Board of Education, 535 F.Supp. 846 (S.D.Ohio 1982), where it was held that a 1965 district court decision that the Cincinnati schools were not illegally segregated did not pr......
  • BD. OF ED., CITY OF CINCINNATI v. DEPT. OF HEW, Civ. No. C-1-74-185.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • February 17, 1987
    ...Circuit's Bronson decision had "been rendered obsolete to the extent that it forecloses any and all inquiries prior to July 26, 1965." 535 F.Supp. 846, 907. This was because "the body of desegregation law" had been supplemented, making it appropriate to consider issues that had not been add......
  • Bronson v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Cincinnati, Nos. 82-3405
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 31, 1982
    ...on the issue on November 24, 1980 and took it under advisement. On February 11, 1982 the district judge issued a published opinion, 535 F.Supp. 846, and on April 5 certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The district court rejected the claim that collateral estoppel is totally inappli......

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