Bronson v. BD. OF EDUCATION, ETC.

Citation535 F. Supp. 846
Decision Date11 February 1982
Docket NumberNo. C-1-74-205.,C-1-74-205.
PartiesMona BRONSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas I. Atkins, Teresa Demchak, NAACP Special Contribution Fund, New York City, G. Phillip Arnold, William Caldwell, Ratner & Sugarmon, Memphis, Tenn., Elizabeth A. McKanna, Cincinnati, Ohio. Leonard D. Slutz, Wood, Lamping, Slutz & Reckman, Cincinnati, Ohio, Solvita McMillan, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs.

John A. Lloyd, Jr., Nancy A. Lawson, Glenn Weissenberger, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant City of Cincinnati School Dist.

A. David Nichols, Metzger, Phillips & Nichols Co., LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Mark O'Neill, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, Ohio, for State of Ohio; Special Counsel to Attorney Gen., State of Ohio; Represents State Bd. of Ed.

Gary E. Brown, Richard W. Ross, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendants William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. and James A. Rhodes, Governor.

James W. Farrell, Jr., Mark A. Vander Laan, Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants Deer Park City School Dist., Madeira City School Dist., Mariemont City School Dist., North College Hill City School Dist., Norwood City School Dist., St. Bernard-Elmwood Place City School Dist., Reading Community City School Dist.

Bruce I. Petrie, John B. Pinney, Graydon, Head & Ritchey, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist.

George E. Roberts, III, Ennis & Roberts, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Lackland City School Dist.

Michael E. Maundrell, Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Princeton City School Dist.

Lawrence McTurnan, McTurnan & Meyer, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants Finneytown Local School Dist., Forest Hills Local School Dist., Northwest Local School Dist., Three Rivers Local School Dist., Hamilton County School Dist.

John C. Elam, Suzanne K. Richards, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant Wyoming City School Dist.

James W. Harper, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Oak Hills Local City School Dist.

Arnold Morelli, Bauer, Morelli & Heyd, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Green-Hills Forest Park City School Dist.

William E. Santen, William B. Singer, Santen, Santen & Hughes Co., LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant Sycamore City School Dist.

                                            TABLE OF CONTENTS
                INTRODUCTION ..........................................          849
                    I.  Positions of the Parties ......................          850
                        A. Plaintiffs .................................          850
                        B. Defendants .................................          851
                    II. Summary of Discussion .........................          852
                   III. Synopsis of Conclusions .......................          860
                DISCUSSION ............................................          861
                  I. Pre-1975 School Desegregation Cases Considered
                   by Sixth Circuit: Held to Have
                       Changed No Law Applicable to Deal....................     861
                   A. Green, Raney, and Monroe: Considered
                     by District Court and Sixth
                          Circuit in Deal II, 1968, 1969 ...................     861
                     1. Conclusion of District Court and
                      Sixth Circuit: Inapplicability of
                             Green, Raney, and Monroe to Deal                    861
                     2. As Remedy Cases, Green, Raney
                      and Monroe Were Inapplicable to
                             Deal ..........................................    864
                
                   B. Swann and Keyes: Considered by the
                          Sixth Circuit in Bronson, 1975 ..................          865
                          1. Inapplicability of Swann to Deal                        866
                          2. Keyes: No Changes in the Law of
                             School Desegregation Warranting
                             Departure From the Application
                             of Collateral Estoppel .........................        867
                             a. Keyes: Supreme Court Holding
                                That a Finding of Contemporary
                                De Jure Segregation in
                                a Portion of the School System
                                Is Highly Relevant in
                                Assessing Claim of Current
                                Systemwide De Jure Segregation .............         869
                                1. The District Court ......................         869
                                2. The Tenth Circuit Court
                                   of Appeals ..............................         870
                                3. The Supreme Court .......................         870
                             b. Sixth Circuit's Discussion of
                                Keyes in Bronson ...........................         874
                             c. Most of the Principles Developed
                                by the Supreme Court
                                in Keyes Were Not Directly
                                Applicable to Deal Because
                                Unlike the Keyes Plaintiffs,
                                the Deal Plaintiffs Failed to
                                Prove Contemporary De Jure
                                Segregation in any Portion of
                                the Cincinnati School System                          875
                  II. Columbus and Dayton II: Post-1975 School
                    Desegregation Cases, Not Considered by
                    the Sixth Circuit in Connection With Deal
                        and Bronson ........................................          878
                        A. Preliminary Comments ............................          878
                        B. Evolutionary Developments: Extension
                           of Keyes' Principles to Non-Statutory
                           Dual School Systems, Created and
                           Maintained by Remote, Intentionally
                           Segregative Acts ................................          879
                       C. Reconsideration of Deal in Light of
                          Columbus and Dayton II: Conflict in
                          Legal Principles ................................           883
                         1. Re-examination of Deal: Legal
                              Import of Historical Facts ...................          883
                         2. Sixth Circuit's Position on the
                            Legal Import of Historical Facts
                            in Deal Unaffected by Pre-1975
                            Supreme Court Desegregation
                            Cases ........................................            886
                        3. Sixth Circuit's Position on the
                           Legal Import of Historical Facts
                           in Deal Compared to Supreme
                           Court's Position as Developed in
                           Columbus and Dayton II .......................             887
                           a. Re-examination of Columbus
                              and Dayton II .............................             888
                           b. Supreme Court Position on
                              Evidence of School Board's
                              Remote Discriminatory Practices
                              Offered to Meet Plaintiffs'
                              Initial Burden of Proof                                 891
                           c. Sixth Circuit's Position in Deal
                              II Eliminated as a Viable
                              Legal Option Under Columbus
                              and Dayton II .............................             892
                  III. The Sixth Circuit 1975 Bronson Opinion
                       and the Application of Collateral Estoppel
                       In Light of Columbus and Dayton II ................            894
                       A. Collateral Estoppel: General Principles
                          and Necessary Inquiries .......................             894
                       B. Sixth Circuit 1975 Bronson Opinion:
                          Conclusions as to Appropriate Application
                          of Collateral Estoppel .........................            898
                      C. Appropriate Application of Collateral
                         Estoppel In Light of Columbus and
                         Dayton II ......................................             900
                         1. Broader Rules of Res Judicata
                            Inapplicable ................................             900
                         2. Identity of Issues In Light of
                            Columbus and Dayton II ......................             900
                           a. Collateral Estoppel Inapplicable
                              to Issues Not Actually
                              Litigated and Determined in
                              Deal .....................................             900
                           b. Collateral Estoppel Technically
                              Applicable to Issues Actually
                              Litigated and Determined
                              in Deal ..................................             903
                        3. Columbus and Dayton II Have
                            Not Significantly Changed the
                            Law Applicable to the Issues Actually
                            Litigated and Determined in
                            Deal ........................................             904
                        4. Columbus and Dayton II Present
                           No Reason, Not Discernible in
                           1975, to Justify an Exception to
                           Collateral Estoppel With Respect
                           to Issues Actually Litigated and
                           Determined in Deal ..........................              906
                    IV. Conclusions ........................................          907
                        A. Issues Not Actually Litigated and
                           Determined in Deal .............................           907
                        B. Issues Actually Litigated and Determined
                           in Deal ........................................           908
                        C. Practical Effect on Conclusions on
                           Admissibility and Consideration of Pre-July
                           26, 1965 Evidence ..............................           908
                    Tentative Agenda For Meeting Between Court
                    and Counsel on Friday, February 26, 1982 ...............          909
                    Appendix ..............................................           910
                

DECISION AND ENTRY CONCERNING APPLICABILITY OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; CONFERENCE SET

RICE, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On October 17, 1980, the Court met with counsel for all parties in this school desegregation case for the primary purpose of discussing the Court's Entry of October 16, 1980,1 "Setting Forth This Court's Interpretation of Sixth Circuit Opinion in Bronson v. Board of Education, 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975)." (doc. # 476) In the Entry, the Court stated its opinion that the Sixth Circuit's...

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3 cases
  • Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Los Angeles Branch NAACP, 81-5772
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • November 16, 1983
    ...only claims that were fully litigated can be barred--is also without merit. It relies for this proposition on Bronson v. Board of Education, 535 F.Supp. 846 (S.D.Ohio 1982), where it was held that a 1965 district court decision that the Cincinnati schools were not illegally segregated did n......
  • BD. OF ED., CITY OF CINCINNATI v. DEPT. OF HEW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • February 17, 1987
    ...Circuit's Bronson decision had "been rendered obsolete to the extent that it forecloses any and all inquiries prior to July 26, 1965." 535 F.Supp. 846, 907. This was because "the body of desegregation law" had been supplemented, making it appropriate to consider issues that had not been add......
  • Bronson v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Cincinnati
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • August 31, 1982
    ...on the issue on November 24, 1980 and took it under advisement. On February 11, 1982 the district judge issued a published opinion, 535 F.Supp. 846, and on April 5 certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. The district court rejected the claim that collateral estoppel is totally inappli......

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