Bronson v. Bruce

• Decision Date: 03 February 1886
• Citation: 59 Mich. 467,26 N.W. 671
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: BRONSON v. BRUCE.

26 N.W. 671

59 Mich. 467

BRONSON v. BRUCE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

February 3, 1886

Error to Mecosta.

Frank Damon, for plaintiff and appellant.

Stone &amp Hyde, for defendant.

CHAMPLIN, J.

At the general election in the year 1882, the plaintiff was a candidate for congress. The defendant was then editor and publisher of the Big Rapids Current, a newspaper published in the city of Big Rapids, in the county of Mecosta, and circulated in that and other counties in the congressional district which was sought to be represented in congress by the plaintiff, as well as in other counties of the state outside of said district. The defendant, through the columns of his newspaper, opposed the election of the plaintiff to the office for which he was a candidate, and supported the election of the opposing candidates. After the plaintiff was placed in nomination for the office, and before the election to be held for representative in congress, the defendant published in his paper, and circulated throughout the district, and sent the same to exchanges in other parts of the state, certain articles concerning the plaintiff which the plaintiff claims to be libelous, and this action is brought to recover damages therefor. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice (1) that he would prove that he was justified in so doing, for the reason that the alleged defamatory matter, and the several statements in the articles so published by defendant, were each true in substance and in fact as published; and (2) that the same was a privileged communication, and statements therein were bona fide comments upon the acts and statements of said plaintiff of the several matters referred to therein and of the acts, statements, and conduct of the plaintiff in reference thereto, and of and concerning the plaintiff as a public man, and made for the public good, and were published as such comments without any malicious intent or motive whatever. At the trial the publication was not disputed, or that the article is libelous if not true. It charged him with the crime of forgery; of the theft of deposits of poor men and women; and of cheating laboring men of their hard earnings.

Two questions are raised upon the charge of the court: (1) Upon the correctness of his instructions relative to the privileged character of the publication; and (2) upon his instructions relative to the mitigation of damages.

The learned judge, after stating that privileged communications are of two kinds, and defining and illustrating what is absolute privilege, instructed the jury relative to qualified privilege as follows: "There is another kind of privilege which is not absolute, but which is conditioned, on the theory that there is no malice on the part of the person uttering the communication or publishing the libel. It is competent--it is justifiable--for the press to comment upon the character and standing--intellectually, morally physically, and otherwise--of a man who offers himself as a candidate for office of trust. I say it is competent to do that, depending, of course, upon the circumstances of the case and the surroundings. When a man sees fit to take the stand before his constituency for a public position and public honors, he thereby, to a certain extent, makes himself public property, subjects himself to criticism by his constituency. And if it is made to appear that the criticism is just, is proper, is made in good faith, is made without malice and for the public good, for the purpose, as supposed by the person at the time, to prevent an incompetent and unfit and unsuitable person from receiving the majority of the votes of the electors of the district, or as the case may be, that article is prima facie privileged, and the law will require of the party who complains of the article to show that the same was published with bad motives, and not for good ends and purposes. *** When that is shown, that privilege vanishes, and it is no longer a protection to the person apparently covered by it in the first instance. In this case, gentlemen, it appears beyond dispute that, at the time of the publication of these articles, Mr. Bronson was a candidate on a fusion ticket for congress from this congressional district, and was then before the people for that purpose. These articles were published of and concerning him, reflecting upon his character and standing as a man, and his connection with the Exchange Bank, etc. And it is claimed by Mr. Bruce that he published these with good motives and justifiable ends, and with no malice whatever. That is his claim. If that is true if he had no malice, no disposition to specially injure this man, Mr. Bronson, but published the same in good faith, honestly believing that the occasion required it,--then the communication is privileged, and the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit, even though the communications themselves were false; because if they were privileged by the occasion, that is a complete justification to the action. Right here is the starting point in the case: Were the articles privileged? They are prima facie privileged by the occasion, in my judgment, and I so charge you as matter of law. But it will be for you to determine whether this man Bruce, in the publication of the article, was actuated by private malice, or malice of any sort, at that time. If so, then that privilege ceased."

The constitution of this state provides that "no law shall ever be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press; but every person may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right." Article 4, � 42. The publishers of a newspaper possesses no immunity from liability in publishing a libel other or different than any other person. The law makes no distinction between the newspaper publisher and any private person who may publish an article in a newspaper or other printed form; and if either of them abuses the right to publish his sentiments on any subject and upon any occasion, he must defend himself upon the same legal ground.

As was said by the supreme court of West Virginia in Sweeney v Baker, 13 W.Va. 183: "The fact that one is a candidate for office in the gift of the people affords, in many instances, a legal excuse for publishing language concerning him as such candidate for which publication there would be no legal excuse if he did not occupy the position of such candidate, whether the publication is made by the proprietors of a newspaper, or by a voter or other person having an interest in the election. The conduct and actions of such candidate may be freely commented upon, his acts maybe canvassed, and his conduct boldly censured. Nor is it material that such criticism of conduct should, in the estimate of the jury, be just. The right to criticise the action or conduct of a candidate is a right, on the part of the party making the publication, to judge himself of the justness of the criticism. If he was liable for damages in an action for libel for a publication criticising the...