Brook House Condominium Trust v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1993
• Citation: 414 Mass. 303,607 N.E.2d 744
• Parties: BROOK HOUSE CONDOMINIUM TRUST v. AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER APPEALS BOARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 744

607 N.E.2d 744

414 Mass. 303

BROOK HOUSE CONDOMINIUM TRUST v. AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER APPEALS BOARD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 14, 1992.

Decided Feb. 16, 1993.

Jon Laramore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Franklin C. Huntington, IV (Andrew M. Pearlstein with him) for plaintiff.

Michael E. Malamut, for 407 Marlborough Street Condominium Trust, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

O'CONNOR, Justice.

The plaintiff, Brook House Condominium Trust (trust), appealed pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14 (1990 ed.), to the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant, Automatic Sprinkler Appeals Board (board). The board had affirmed an order of the Brookline fire department requiring the trust to install automatic sprinklers throughout the common areas and individual units in condominium buildings managed by the trust. A judge of the Land Court, sitting in the Superior Court by assignment pursuant to G.L. c. 211B, § 9 (1990 ed.), ordered the entry of summary judgment for the trust annulling the board's decision and remanding the matter to the board for the entry of an order that the trust's "appeal from the Brookline Fire Department's decision is allowed." The board appealed from the judge's order. We granted the parties' requests for direct appellate review, and we now affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.

In 1973, the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 148, § 26A, inserted by St.1973, c. 395, § 1, requiring the installation of automatic fire sprinklers in buildings more than seventy feet in height. By St.1975, c. 676, §§ 1, 3, the Legislature revised § 26A to provide that sprinklers would be required only in buildings constructed or substantially altered after January 1, 1975. Then, in 1986, the Legislature inserted § 26A 1/2. In relevant part, § 26A 1/2, inserted by St.1986, c. 633, § 2, provided that "[e]very building or structure of more than seventy feet in height above the mean grade and constructed prior to January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-five, shall be protected with an adequate system of automatic sprinklers in accordance with the ... state building code; provided, however ... that sprinklers shall not be required to be installed in buildings where construction has commenced prior to January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-five and which have been submitted to the provisions of chapter one hundred and eighty-three A ..." (emphasis added). General Laws c. 183A (1990 ed.) sets forth provisions governing condominiums. A building that has been converted to a condominium has "submitted to the provisions of chapter one hundred and eighty-three A." G.L. c. 183A, § 2.

The material facts are undisputed. The property managed by the trust, with which this case is concerned, consists of a complex of four buildings in Brookline containing 776 condominium units. The buildings were constructed in the 1960's and are more than seventy feet in height. They were converted to condominiums, pursuant to G.L. c. 183A, on May 28, 1981. In June, 1988, the Brookline fire department notified the trust that it had to install fire sprinklers throughout the buildings. The trust appealed that order to the board and also sought a variance from the board. After a hearing, and relying at least in part on an earlier opinion of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, see Rep.A.G., Pub.Doc. 12, at 69 (1988), the board affirmed the Brookline fire department's order and denied the trust's application for a variance.

The trust then filed a complaint in the Superior Court for review of the board's order, and the board counterclaimed to enforce its order. The trust also filed a petition in the Land Court which thereafter was dismissed as moot. No appeal was taken from the dismissal. As we indicated at the outset of this opinion, the trust filed a motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court case and the motion was allowed.

In her order granting summary judgment to the trust, the judge reasoned as follows: "I find and rule that [the trust] falls squarely within the statutory language since it was constructed prior to January 1, 1975 and before 1986 was submitted to the provisions of G.L. c. 183A. The [board] contends that the date of January 1, 1975 modifies both conditions which must be present for the exemption to be effective, but the plain language of the statute impels the opposite conclusion. If the General Court had...