Brooke v. Croson, 5443.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1932
• Docket Number: No. 5443.,5443.
• Citation: 61 App. DC 159,58 F.2d 885
• Parties: BROOKE v. CROSON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

61 App. DC 159, 58 F.2d 885 (1932)

BROOKE v. CROSON.

No. 5443.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

Argued April 8, 1932.

Decided May 2, 1932.

Harry H. Millard and Glenn Willett, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Crandal Mackey, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, and GRONER, Associate Justices.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Appeal from a judgment for damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between automobiles.

The record discloses that on June 13, 1927, a collision occurred between two passenger automobiles owned and operated respectively by appellant and appellee; that appellee as plaintiff thereupon sued appellant in the lower court charging that the collision had resulted from appellant's negligence in the operation of his automobile, and praying for damages for injuries resulting therefrom. Defendant by his plea admitted the happening of the collision, but denied that it had resulted from negligence on his part. The issue was tried before the court and jury, and a verdict for $2,000 was found against defendant. Judgment was entered accordingly.

At the trial the plaintiff was called as a witness in chief in his own behalf, and testified in part to a conversation which he had with the defendant immediately after the accident. The record sets this out as follows: "That he (plaintiff) there met and talked with defendant about the accident; that defendant then and there made statements whereby defendant admitted that the accident resulted from defendant's own fault; that the substance of defendant's statements was that defendant was due at the store at 7 o'clock, that defendant was five minutes late at the time of the accident, that the plaintiff would not suffer any loss as he (the defendant) was fully insured."

The record discloses that thereupon the following proceedings took place: "The defendant by his counsel objected to the reception and consideration by the jury of any evidence tending to show that the defendant was insured against liability arising from this accident, on the ground that such evidence is wholly incompetent and prejudicial under the issues in this case, and claimed the protection of the court in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in its decision in Capital Construction Company v. Holtzman, 27 App. D. C. 125, which was cited to the court; but the court, after hearing argument both for the plaintiff and the defendant, by their respective counsel, expressed the opinion that the ruling cited and relied upon by the defendant was not applicable to this case, as the mention of insurance came into the testimony in this case as part of a conversation which was clearly admissible, and thereupon overruled the defendant's objection and admitted the evidence to be considered by the jury along with the other evidence in the case, to which ruling and action of the court the defendant by his counsel then and there duly excepted."

The foregoing ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence the statement concerning defendant's insurance, and directing that it should be considered by the jury along with the other evidence in the case, is set out by appellant as the sole assignment of error in this appeal.

In our opinion, the ruling in question was erroneous. It is established by the overwhelming weight of authority that as a general rule it is reversible error in the trial of an action for damages for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident to permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence to show that the defendant is protected by liability insurance against such accidents. It is held that such evidence is not relevant to the issue of negligence, and can have no effect but to induce a verdict based on the fact that an insurance company, and not the defendant, must pay the award. It has, however, been held that such evidence may be admitted where it is material as tending to establish an incidental fact in...