Brookenick Development Company, LLC v. Bruce, C.A. No. PC-2008-2285 (R.I. Super 8/20/2009)

• Decision Date: 20 August 2009
• Docket Number: C.A. No. PC-2008-2285.
• Parties: BROOKENICK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, v. THOMAS M. BRUCE III, in his capacity as the Finance Director and Treasurer for the Town of Cumberland; EUGENE JEFFERS, in his capacity as the Director of Public Works for the Town of Cumberland
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

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BROOKENICK DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, v. THOMAS M. BRUCE III, in his capacity as the Finance Director and Treasurer for the Town of Cumberland; EUGENE JEFFERS, in his capacity as the Director of Public Works for the Town of Cumberland

C.A. No. PC-2008-2285.

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence, Sc.

Filed August 20, 2009.

DECISION

GIBNEY, J.

Before this Court is Brookenick Development Company's ("Brookenick's") Amended Motion for Injunctive Relief. In response, the Town of Cumberland ("Town"), by and through Thomas Bruce III, the Town's Finance Director and Treasurer, and Eugene Jeffers, the Town's Director of Public Works, contends that granting this equitable remedy will deprive the Town of its right to have a jury decide all of the factual issues of Brookenick's claims. Brookenick disputes the Town's right to a jury trial. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 38.

Facts and Travel

On March 21, 2008, Brookenick Development Company, LLC filed a complaint against the Town of Cumberland ("Town"), by and through Thomas Bruce III, the Town's Finance Director and Treasurer, and Eugene Jeffers, the Town's Director of Public Works. Brookenick alleges that the Town dispensed, discharged, and deposited trash and other solid waste on Brookenick's property ("Property"), identified as Assessor's Plat 55, Lot 2 on Old Albion Road in Cumberland, Rhode Island.

Specifically, Brookenick's complaint alleges that it obtained Master Plan approval for a twenty-one lot subdivision at a November 29, 2006 Cumberland Planning Board meeting, and such approval was extended to December 19, 2008. Brookenick asserts that during the hearing and review of the Master Plan, the Planning Board requested that Brookenick consult with the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management ("DEM") and conduct tests to determine whether the Town's abandoned landfill encroached on the Property. Brookenick further alleges that during the testing, it was discovered that Old Albion Road and the Property contain waste as deep as thirteen feet, making the property inaccessible and unsuitable for development.

As a result, Brookenick asserts five counts against the Town. Brookenick's first count of inverse condemnation alleges that the Town's depositing of waste on the Property and Old Albion Road is a taking without just compensation in violation of article 1, section 16 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Brookenick's second count, alleging a violation of its substantive and procedural due process rights, avers that the Town's action in collecting, discharging, and depositing the trash and solid waste onto the Property is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest and is an abuse of government power in violation of article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Brookenick's third count, continuous trespass, alleges that the Town knowingly and intentionally encroached on the Property without Brookenick's consent, permission, authority, or license. Pursuant to each of these counts Brookenick requests a declaration, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1 et seq., that the Town is liable and prays for an award of damages¹ as compensation for the loss of all economic beneficial use of the Property, lost use of the Property, and lost business opportunity and expected business advantage. With each of these counts, Brookenick also seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief² preventing the Town from continuing to discharge waste onto the Property and mandating the removal of the waste and the restoration of the Property to a condition suitable for residential development.³ In its answer, the Town requested a jury trial.

On November 5, 2008, Brookenick filed an amended motion for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion seeks an order from this Court requiring the Town to remove all trash, garbage, and industrial waste from the Property and Old Albion Road in accordance with DEM Rules and Regulations and "forever prohibiting" the Town from trespassing on Brookenick's Property and Old Albion Road. It also requests an order mandating that the Town obtain necessary approvals, licenses, or permits from the DEM to remove the trash, garbage, and waste and an order requiring the Town to fill in the area of the Property and Old Albion Road from which trash, garbage, and waste have been removed so that it can be developed and used for residential purposes.⁴

On December 1, 2008, the Town objected to Brookenick's amended motion for injunctive relief by filing a memorandum in support of its claim for a jury trial. The Town argues that if this Court were to grant the injunctive relief requested by Brookenick, Brookenick's legal claims would effectively be decided without the requisite jury, save for a damages determination. The Town requests that prior to this Court's consideration of injunctive relief, a jury decide the factual issues of Brookenick's legal claims. On December 10, 2008, Brookenick filed a reply, arguing that under Rhode Island law a municipality does not have a right to a jury trial and that Brookenick is entitled to equitable relief under the claims alleged.

Law and Analysis

Our Supreme Court has established a framework for determining whether a right to a jury trial exists. See Fud's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1999). Our Supreme Court's analysis stems from article 1, section 15 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." See also Super. R. Civ. P. 38(a) (providing that "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by Article I, Section 15 of the constitution of this state or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate[]"). In Fud's, our Supreme Court stated that the right to a jury trial "must remain available to litigants in any type of legal action which was triable before a jury in 1843, the year when Rhode Island's first constitution became effective. That constitution included the same language as is now contained in article 1, section 15, of the current constitution." Id. at 695 (citing Egidio DiPardo & Sons, Inc. v. Lauzon, 708 A.2d 165, 171 (R.I. 1998); Bendick v. Cambio, 558 A.2d 941, 943-44 (R.I. 1989)); see DiPardo, 708 A.2d at 171 (stating that the "constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury is preserved as it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of our original constitution in 1842, which became operative on May 2, 1843[]" (citations omitted)). This Court's determination of whether a right to a jury trial exists requires consideration of two issues. It must ask:

whether the particular cause of action or any analogous claim would have been triable to a jury in 1843. [It] also tr[ies] to assay whether the type of relief available for the cause of action is legal or equitable. Indeed, this available-relief analysis is "`[m]ore important' than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether" article 1, section 15, mandates the opportunity for a jury trial. Fud's, 727 A.2d at 695 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).

Regarding the latter consideration, our Supreme Court acknowledged that compensatory and punitive damages are traditional forms of legal relief. Id. at 696 (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96). The Fud's Court concluded that the employment discrimination action at issue, filed pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), more closely resembled a common law tort or contract action than any equitable cause of action. Id. at 697. Our Supreme Court held:

Because we conclude that an important and potentially substantial component of the statutory relief available here is legal in nature and that the cause of action itself is more analogous to an action triable before a jury in an 1843 court of law than to any equitable cause of action, we conclude that a FEPA action triggers employers' rights to a jury trial. Consequently, FEPA's deprivation of that right to a jury trial is unconstitutional. Id.

The Town argues that Brookenick's inverse condemnation, due process, and continuous trespass claims are legal claims entitling it to a jury trial. This Court notes that in addition to the injunctive relief Brookenick seeks for each of these claims, Brookenick also requests damages as compensation for the loss of all economic beneficial use of the Property, lost use of the Property, and lost business opportunity and expected business advantage. These damages are not merely incidental to the injunctive relief sought. See Fud's, 727 A.2d at 697. This Court finds that praying for compensatory damages, which could have a "significant financial impact" on the Town "bears more similarity to an action at law than to an equitable cause of action." Id. (citation omitted); see 8 James WM. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, § 38.31[5][b][i] at 84 (3d ed. 2008) (stating that "[w]hen money damages are sought in addition to injunctive relief, a jury trial will ordinarily be available on the damages claim[]" (footnote omitted)). Further, our Supreme Court has concluded that damages are an available form of relief for the claims at issue. For example, in Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 135 (R.I. 1983), our Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had "established an action of inverse condemnation against the town and thus must be compensated for a constructive `taking' of her property." Regarding trespass, our Supreme Court stated, "In an action of trespass for damages to real or personal property, compensation does not consist merely in such a sum of money as will repair or replace the injury done, but includes also the damages for the violation of the right of property." Whipple v. Wanskuck Co. 12 R.I. 321, 323 (1879); see also 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 91 at 92 (2007) (stating that "[f]rom every...